Running Head: THE REAL VYGOTSKY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE REAL VYGOTSKY: HOW CURRENT PEDAGOGY AND SLA THEORY ARE IGNORING THE RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGIST’S MARXIST FOUNDATIONS

 

Louis Betty, Vanderbilt University

 

 

Louis Betty, 1917 Sully Ct., Bakersfield, CA 93311

615-260-4390

louis.r.betty@vanderbilt.edu

 

           

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract: The work of Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky has become in recent years a significant influence in general pedagogy and second language acquisition (SLA) research; however, theory and research emerging from these fields, as they manifest themselves in the current literature, fail to address the obvious importance of Vygotsky’s Marxist commitments: such literature constitutes a kind of “opportunist” Vygotskyism that neither investigates, nor far less attempts to render problematic, the philosophical and methodological foundations of Vygotsky’s thought. I begin by offering evidence of Vygotsky’s commitments to Marxism, on the one hand refuting common misunderstandings about Vygotsky’s ties to Marxist philosophy, and on the other demonstrating, through philosophical analysis and deduction, the affinities between Marxism and Vygotsky’s theories. I move on from this first task to review the current journal and “book-chapter” literature published in the last decade and a half concerning the experimental verification and practical pedagogical implementation of Vygotskian/Sociocultural theory, revealing, as it were, an almost utter lack of interest in the question of Vygotsky’s Marxism in the current pedagogical milieu. Finally, I propose a number of criticisms of Vygotskian/Sociocultural theory that focus on the general problems of empirical and constructivist views of the human mind—views which naturally coincide with a Marxist vision of human nature.

           

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

            It is reasonable, I think, to claim at this point that anyone who has anything to do with general pedagogy or applied linguistics (most specifically second language acquisition theory) has heard the name of Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky, or at least has some sense of the theory of mind and learning—Sociocultural Theory—which he and his Russian colleagues birthed during the first half of the twentieth century. Serious scholars of Vygotsky—and there are more and more every year—are wont, we can be assured, to grasp the importance of that most significant thing, which casual, “opportunist” Vygotskians, filling journals with reports of research on inner speech or ideas of how to “Vygotskianize” the classroom, are either perfectly ignorant of or prefer to pass over in academic silence—namely, the depth and gravity of Vygotsky’s commitment to Marxism, a commitment which formed the theoretical basis of his entire enterprise. Those who have built, at least in part, a career out of Vygotskian theory or one of its various mutations will likely wonder at the purpose of pointing out scholarly failure in bringing to general attention the issue of Vygotsky’s Marxist affinities; a colleague of mine has already posed, as it were, the “so what?” question concerning the aims of the present article—that question was by no means easily withstood, though by now it has merely become an inspiration toward greater clarity. As far as I can tell—and being in academia for as long as I have certainly has pointed the way—the only reason anyone would ask “so what?” about Vygotsky’s Marxism simply stems from the fact that most people in our line of work (that is, the Humanities) are committed, either implicitly or explicitly, to some working form of Marxism or its theoretical partenaire de débauche, radical empiricism. Speculation? Generalization? Inevitably, to write an incendiary piece bemoaning scholarly failure to take into account Vygotsky’s Marxism can only be a product of two mindsets—one, that one is a devout Marxist and wishes to affix the heraldries of Marxism atop the great gathering hall of the Vygotskian world; or, that one is not a Marxist at all and is alarmed at the consumption of an idea—a vision of human nature, as it were—which calls to mind many of the great crimes of the past century. If all those “opportunist” Vygotskians, as I call them, filling the journals with the products of their not quite perfectly informed cogitations, were perfectly aware of Vygotsky’s Marxist loyalties and still chose to pursue their various intellectual and political commitments, then truly I would see no reason for the present article. But I have no reason to believe that the persons in question have taken serious stock of Vygotsky’s Marxism, and I feel, ultimately, that minds would be seriously changed if the real Vygotsky—the Marxist Vygotsky—were to be known to the world. This intuition is perhaps an illusion—the academy is perhaps so self-consciously left of center that my supplications might be better spent convincing a river to flow uphill. Yet, something should be said—if only for the sake of the history of ideas, of clarity, of setting the record straight, so to speak. At least, then, in that case, the information would be there for the next person who has a funny feeling about Vygotsky—for the one who wants to meet the Real Vygotsky.

            Let it be said that my interest in the question of Vygotsky’s Marxism, the birth of my funny feeling, stemmed from a course in second language acquisition I took as a graduate student.  The question of Marxism arose during our reading of Marysia Johnson’s A Philosophy of Second Language Acquisition (2004)—basically a full length implementation piece for Vygotskian theory in second language acquisition pedagogy. In a short passage, which figures in importance only among myriad others, Johnson mentions Vygotsky’s attempt—his desire—to create a Marxist psychology. Naturally (though I don’t want to speculate on her political commitments), Johnson offers no comment on the significance of Vygotsky’s Marxist yearnings, and certainly does not make any effort to use the historical failures of Marxism to render Vygotsky problematic (which might very well amount to anathema in Academia). For whatever reason, owing to some innate, ineluctable suspicion of all forms of empiricism, this “glossing over” of the Marx question struck me tout de suite—and when the course instructor (the same who posed the “so what?” question) asked us for a series of questions that we would like to ask Dr. Johnson about her book, I naturally took the minority position and addressed what I saw as a dangerous connection between Vygotsky and Marxist dogma. Reworked slightly, those questions are as follows:

1) Do you think that Vygotsky’s theory betrays a kind of developmental communism, in that meaning and even the capacity to function in a mentally complex way require a community? 

2)     Is his theory marred by the ideology of his time? 

My instructor’s reading of these questions seemed to convince her that I ought to carry out some serious research on Vygotsky’s ties to Marxism; she indicated, moreover, that as far as she knew the issue of such ties was completely overlooked in the current scholarly environment. Needless to say, my own research into journal literature written on Vygotsky in recent years—specifically those writings that concern the experimental verification and practical implementation of Vygotsky’s theories, not those that deal with his place in the history of ideas (for these usually always mention Marx)—has largely born out her hypothesis. Why should it be that those who write in the service of putting Vygotsky to good use in the academic world should gloss over his Marxism or simply fail to mention it altogether? The most obvious explanation for this phenomenon is that pro-Vygotsky practioners and researchers (I am speaking of those in the Anglo-Saxon world) are fearful of seeing their master contextualized within the historical failures of Marxism, and perhaps within Marxism in any sense. Owing to that fear, one could argue that such researcher-practioners either never received sufficient education about the ideological nature of Vygotsky’s ideas, or that they have sought some means by which to downplay or dismiss it. In any case, one of my major goals in the present paper will be to reveal the lack of mention given to Marxism in certain serious scholarly writing on Vygotsky—because in a very general sense my belief is that one cannot coherently be pro-Vygotsky without being pro-Marx (in the same sense that one cannot be a proponent of Hume without being an empiricist), it seems vitally important that pro-Vygotsky researcher-practioners take some personal stock of their own feelings about Marxism. The result of such a taking stock should—in fact, must, I would argue—be either a vote yes or no in favor of Vygotsky; for to be for Vygotsky yet against Marx would be wholly inconsistent—like being for the cardinal but against the pope. My hope, at any rate, is that by connecting Vygotsky to the historically invalidated tenets of the Marxist view of human nature, I will be able to spirit some people away from him altogether.

            Be that as it may, I should now give some indication of the organization that the present paper will take. To begin, I will attempt to offer some kind of consensus on the real extent of Vygotsky’s Marxism—to demonstrate, by implication, the difficulty one should have in taking seriously any pro-Vygotsky scholarship that presumes to work outside the vein of Marxist philosophy. Vygotsky’s ties to Marx are evident, as the following section will show—though no doubt some readers will be surprised to see them laid bare. In this task, I will refer myself to the “honest” Vygotsky scholarship that has been done by such authors as Wertsch (1985), Robbins (2003), Langford (2005), and Van der Veer and Valsiner (1994); though I will naturally count on Vygotsky’s own words as well, for he implicates himself in Marxist philosophy better that any of his apologists and biographers could ever hope to. Secondly, I will review recent pro-Vygotsky journal literature (let me remind the reader of my distinction between pro-Vygotsky writing and other “history of ideas” pieces that are not ideologically oriented) in order to point out the lack of recognition of the Marxism question in the current scholarly milieu. I have divided this journal literature into two camps: that concerning general pedagogy and that concerning second language acquisition (SLA) theory. In the first camp, I will discuss thirteen articles: Andreson, 2005; Estep 2002; Gajdamaschko, 2005; Johnston, 2006; Kanevsky and Geake, 2004; Keefer, 2006; Kerr, 2006; Kwon and Kellogg, 2005; Ohta, 2005; Otero, 2006; Plessow-Wolfson and Epstein, 2005; Sanders and Welk, 2005; and Sluss and Stremmel, 2004. In the second camp, I will consider five articles and one introduction from the Modern Language Journal, a recent important article on Sociocultural theory by J. Lantolf, Thorne and Lantolf’s introduction to Sociocultural theory in Theories in Second Language Acquisition (2007),and finally the numerous chapters (since these are not monographs I will consider them roughly equivalent to journal articles) on Vygotskian theory in the two most significant book-length compilations of pro-Vygotsky literature in SLA theory, Sociocultural Theory and Second Language Learning (2000) and Vygotskian Approaches to Second Language Research (1994). I will also mention a number of more philosophical pieces that do say at least something about Vygotsky’s debt to Marx, as well as to other thinkers, in the interest, no doubt, of giving some indication of what more honest Vygotsky scholarship would look like. Let me also say that the sample of articles I have chosen has not been selected because of those articles’ general evasiveness or “throw-away” remarks concerning the question of Marxism; these various writings are representative of what is being said and read about Vygotsky in the current environment. Finally, as a third and final section, I should offer something of a general critique of Sociocultural theory as a mostly untenable species of empiricism—a critique which I have offered elsewhere but which I feel justified in reiterating here. For, if readers are not put off by Vygotsky’s Marxism—if, in other words, they remain unconvinced by my argument or are already unproblematically committed to some form of Marxism or a kindred species of constructivism—they may at least be swayed in my direction by more general objections to Sociocultural theory as a whole. It is not enough, after all, to demonize Marxism—such has been done the world over, with rather paltry results in the academic realm. Rather, what is crucial is to challenge the social-historical notion of human nature altogether, a notion which is necessarily embraced, so it could be argued, by all forms of empiricism, outmoded as it is for Science, though revered as it is in the Humanities. 

            In any case, let us now deal with the specific question of Vygotsky’s Marxism.

 

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            It seems to be kosher in writing about Vygotsky’s Marxism to insist on a certain ambiguity, or at least ambivalence, in Vygotsky’s feelings about the dominant ideology of his time and place. For example, Van der Veer and Valsiner, authors of the authoritative biography Understanding Vygotsky: A Quest for Synthesis (1991), state in their introduction to The Vygotsky Reader (1994) that “[Vygotsky] was both a Marxist (honoring some of Marx’s and Engel’s productive ideas) and non-Marxist (citing formalist poets and not bothering to take his contemporary Marxists seriously).” While the reference to formalist poets likely concerns some lines from Mandelstam on the role of language in thought, whom Vygotsky quotes at the beginning of the final chapter of Thought and Language, we might, in a more general sense, understand the supposed non-Marxism which the authors claim by considering that Vygotsky did in fact take certain liberties that other Marxists might not have been inclined or permitted to take at that particular time in history—liberties which manifested themselves in part in the frequent citation and treatment of Western sources (such as Jean Piaget, to offer one well-known example). Of course, this practice, as Robbins (2003) tells us, was common in the 1920’s in the Soviet Union and only became questionable in the 1930’s when Stalinism had become a seriously repressive apparatus—she writes that “[t]he 1920’s represented a time when partial Marxist education experiments took place in Russia. Although at the same time ideas from the West were readily being adopted.” Admitting then the commonplace of using Western sources before the onset of Stalinism, Robbins nevertheless appears to be moving in the same direction as Van der Veer and Valsiner, insomuch as she wants to argue, we can suppose, that the reason these Marxist experiments were partial—or, in Van der Veer and Valsiner’s case, that Vygotsky was somehow only “partially” Marxist—is because they (and he) were influenced by Western sources. But the move to distance Vygotsky from Marxism because of his active engagement with Western thinking is a mistake. On the one hand, anyone who wants to claim that adherence to Marxism somehow forces a prohibition on Western thinking forgets that the interdiction of Western sources in the Soviet Union was a consequence not of Marxism per se but of Stalinist isolationism; furthermore, there is the plain point that Marx, although he was critical of Western philosophy, was nonetheless a Western philosopher and was influenced by other Western philosophers, such as Hegel, to cite a famous example. These facts make it unclear how the use of Western sources in Vygotsky’s work would take anything away from his being a Marxist, when the fact is that Marxism is a Western philosophy to begin with. The attempt to downplay Vygotsky’s Marxism by pointing out some reference to Spinoza or Husserl or whomever in his work only really proves that Vygotsky was not Stalin, not that he was un-Marxist. 

            The tendency to sell Vygotsky’s Marxist commitments short is perhaps best expressed in a passage from Marysia Johnson’s already mentioned work, A Philosophy of Second Language Acquisition (2004). Offering background on the formation of Vygotsky’s theories, she writes, concerning the question of Marxism, that “Vygotsky was very much involved in developing a new kind of psychology, one based on Marxist philosophy,” but then states that “his success would not have been possible had he expressed even the slightest objection to the official Soviet doctrine. The fact that he was working on the new Marxist psychology to be used by the regime to control the masses most likely saved his life.” This observation, aside from attributing to Vygotsky the same halfway-house Marxism that Van der Veer and Valsiner suggest, introduces general confusion on at least two levels. To begin with, until 1949, although behaviorist theories of psychology had always been favored under the Stalinist regime, there was no official party doctrine on psychology in the Soviet Union (Langford, 2005).  Johnson furthermore seems to suggest, by supposing that Vygotsky’s adherence to Marxist philosophy was in some sense a token move intended to spare him persecution, that his work was only loosely, or liberally, Marxist, and that the creation of a Marxist psychology was a pretext for carrying out more radical or dissident projects. But Johnson, if I am interpreting her correctly, is obviously in error—Vygotsky himself claimed that he wanted to build psychological science on the basis of Marx’s method (Jantzen 2002). Johnson may simply be suggesting that Vygotsky was not a proponent of orthodox Stalinism, but in using the word “Marxism” instead of “Stalinism,” she creates confusion.   In any case, Vygotsky’s dedication to general Marxism is well-attested.  Sokolova (2002), for example, writes that “Vygotsky’s research program was rooted in Marxist philosophy. A.R. Luria and A.N. Leont’ev [his contemporaries] became Vygotsky’s colleagues and followers, acknowledging that only Vygotsky was a ‘sincere and genuine’ Marxist, who had creative command of Marxist philosophy.” Vygotsky, of course, confirms this observation, if only by his clearly stated commitment to historical materialism, whereby he understands human behavior and functioning as essentially cultural-historical developments. Vygotsky is unequivocal about his position: in Thought and Language (1962), he writes, concerning the development of verbal thought: “Verbal thought is not an innate, natural form of behavior but is determined by a historical-cultural process and has specific properties and laws that cannot be found in the natural forms of thought and speech. Once we acknowledge the historical character of verbal thought, we must consider it subject to all the premises of historical materialism, which are valid for any historical phenomenon in human society.”[1]

            A further component of the temptation to view Vygotsky as non-Marxist or quasi-Marxist stems from his rejection of the main psychological thinking of the time in the Soviet Union, behaviorism (known in Soviet Russia as reflexology). Langford (2005) states that “[n]early all those who had, like [Vygotsky], set out to build a Marxist psychology in the Soviet Union, in this period, were committed to reflexology or to halfway-house versions.” Vygotsky, dismissing behaviorist theory, put himself in the compromising position of opposing the vast majority of Marxist psychologists, which perhaps made it appear as if he was opposing Marxism itself   (Joravsky, 1989). This fact perhaps explains Van der Veer and Valsiner’s claim that Vygotsky did not take his Marxist contemporaries seriously.[2]  But of course, though Van der Veer and Valsiner are right in one sense, the assertion that this “not taking seriously” constituted opposition to Marxism is false—there is no necessary link between Marxism and behaviorism, only a historical one (if anything, Vygotsky confirms this point). One will note, furthermore, as Langford (2005) explains, that it was not even because Vygotsky abandoned behaviorism/reflexology that he was eventually banned. After all, Marx had never decreed that behaviorism was to be the Marxist psychology, and Pavlov, one ought to keep in mind, the father of behaviorism, was not even a Marxist (Joravsky, 1989). Vygotsky’s rejection of behaviorism simply demonstrates a lack of consensus among Marxist psychologists on what form a Marxist psychology ought to take, and in no way indicates that Vygotsky was less dedicated to Marxist philosophy that his colleagues.

            I have just located two sources of misunderstanding concerning Vygotsky’s ties to Marx: one the one hand, some falsely believe that Vygotsky’s use and treatment of Western sources somehow strained his devotion to Marxist philosophy, while in fact I have shown this assumption to be misled; on the other hand, some confuse his rejection of reflexology-behaviorism—the form of psychology most favored by Marxist psychologists—to be evidence of a general rejection of Marxist ideas, while I have made it clear that there is no necessary link or affinity between Marxism and behaviorism. If there still remains any doubt, let me offer a quotation from Vygotsky himself, cited in Jantzen (2002): “I do not want to learn what constitutes the mind for free, by picking out a couple of citations, I want to learn from Marx’s whole method how to build a science, how to approach the investigation of the mind.” Vygotsky here is criticizing his behaviorist colleagues while affirming his deep commitment to Marxism—how that Marxism could be glossed over in light of such an avowal is mysterious.

            But it is also important, in addition to the circumstantial evidence provided above, to compare Vygotsky’s thinking directly with the actual tenets of Marxist philosophy. It is well known among Vygotsky scholars that Vygotsky deviated from Marx in stressing the role of language and symbolic mediation in the development of human higher mental functions. Those who are familiar with Vygotsky’s theory already know the specifics of this particular element of his thinking.  Johnson (2004) explains that thinking in this way:

Vygotsky’s fundamental theoretical insight is that language, in addition to fulfilling its communicative function, serves as a means of organizing mental activities. According to Vygotsky, language regulates and facilitates not only the child’s manipulation of objects but also his or her behavior. The main function of speech is to serve as a mediator between two planes: the interpersonal (between people) and the intrapersonal (within the individual).

Vygotsky’s insistence on the role of symbolic mediation—language—in the development of human cognition, whereby the human mind comes to internalize socially and dynamically generated higher mental functions through the medium of language (those functions that we recognize, in general, as uniquely “human”) is what put him in a position to alarm the censors of the period—due to the fact, no doubt, that Marx had not put any emphasis on the role of signs—or ‘psychological tools’ (Karpov, 2005)—in the development of human higher functions.  Rather, as Wertsch (1985) makes clear, Marx had simply explained the development of typically human behavior as a phenomenon of the emergence of socially organized labor and production. In stressing the role of language in the formation of higher processes—those processes that distinguish humans from animals—Vygotsky therefore put himself in the position of having “amended” Marx, or, as I would prefer to claim, of having enriched his thinking in certain respects. In any case, the censors of the time did not see Vygotsky’s emphasis on language as an enrichment. Langford (2005) explains this in some detail:

A.N. Leont’ev and Rubinshtein [Vygotsky’s contemporaries] agreed that Vygotsky put too much emphasis on language in the development of the child. They thought that a Marxist psychology would stress the direct psychological effect of the use of tool in practice. They found this in Marx’s pronouncements on the subject. Although Vygotsky agreed that tools are a significant element in development, they objected to his idea that throughout much of development dynamic psychological influence is exerted downwards from language and signs to practice. // Although Vygotsky had opposed Marx on this subject in the years before 1929, in that year there was a determination to bring intellectuals into line with party thinking. On many issues this thinking was less Marxist than Vygotsky. However, Vygotsky had chosen to amend Marx on a point where the politics of the hour decreed Marx had been right. The main reason was probably that in 1929-1933 Stalin pursued an ultra-left political rhetoric and policy that glorified manual labor and decried the work of the mental worker. In the hysterical atmosphere that prevailed, theories like those of Rubinshtein and A.N. Leont’ev’s that praised manual labor and direct physical practice were more likely to be smiled on than one like Vygotsky’s that praised words.

Curiously, this disagreement on the particulars of Marxist philosophy is not what led to the eventual repression of the by then late Vygotsky’s work. Langford goes on to explain that the actual ban was a result of Vygotsky’s assertion that the “cultural level of the peasantry was lower than that of the cities,” and because practitioners of ‘pedology,’ a form of pedagogy which was Vygotsky’s brainchild, “asserted such things as that educational potential is limited by genetic potential” (2005). These views, which insinuate class prejudice or grant to much to biological science, were naturally an affront to Stalinist-Marxist dogma concerning the infinite malleability of human nature. What is odd, however, as Langford points out, is that these “condemned propositions” can actually be found in the writings of Marx and Engels (2005). It seems that both Vygotsky and Stalinism are guilty of slight deviations from Marxist philosophy—though of course those deviations do not land them outside the general framework of historical materialism. 

            The gap, however, between Marx and Vygotsky still remains concerning the role of language in the development of human higher mental functions. To reiterate: Vygotsky accounts for human cognition mainly by stressing the role of language in mental development, whereas Marx, according to Vygotsky’s colleagues, explains the development of cognition in terms of tools and labor (Langford 2005; Wertsch 1985).   Outside the assumptions of historical materialism, this difference is surely minor; yet, I will suggest that even within the confines of Marxism, the deviation between Vygotsky and Marx on the question of language is not a serious one: as I have stated before, Vygotsky’s insistence on the importance of language should actually be viewed as an enrichment of Marxism—a clarification of something Marx had not sufficiently developed.      

            Marx’s view of human development was rooted in the theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics, a theory proposed by Lamarck that had begun to fall into serious doubt in the 1920’s. Though he had originally conceived of the capacity needed for “advanced civilization” to be innate and only activated by the complex demands of economic development, Marx eventually altered that position in favor of Lamarck’s theory (Langford, 2005). Again, it will be helpful to quote Langford (2005) at length:

Marx later seems to have realized that this [innate capacities] did not explain where the sophisticated capacities needed for production had originated. At least by the time of Marx ([writing in] 1870), he was leaning towards Lamarck’s theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Marx was still not willing to accept that cultural evolution sustained by language and signs could be responsible; and he had for some time maintained that they were gradually learned by trial and error, up to the point where sophisticated science was applied to production. By 1870 he concluded that the inheritance of the acquired characteristics, learned in this process of trial and error, was probably responsible for the ability of the child to gain these skills and abilities so quickly in its development. Engels was later to support the Lamarckian view in a more unequivocal way, resulting in its being seen by many later Marxists as an integral part of Marxism. // The result of this was that Marx and Engels were not obliged to appeal to the cultural or linguistic transmission of the abilities needed in production because they could appeal to the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

Vygotsky, writing in the 1920’s and 1930’s, a time in which the theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics had become suspect, rejected the theory, insomuch as he claimed that the first humans were not any biologically different from humans today (Langford, 2005). Because the inheritance of acquired characteristics was no longer feasible as a theory (at least to Vygotsky), he was forced to reject it in favor of his thesis that development is not a result of the activation, by economic forces, of inherited acquired traits, but rather a consequence of language and sign passing such cognitive abilities from one generation to the next. One can be sure that this deviation from Marx did not deter Vygotsky from the conviction that his project in psychology was essentially Marxist, both in inspiration and method; after all, Vygotsky was still operating within the confines of historical materialism, Spinozian monism (Robbins, 2001; Joravsky, 1989), and the social (historical) rather than biological understanding of the development of human functioning and behavior. Let us consider on this point what Vygotsky’s aforementioned contemporaries, A.N. Leont’ev and A.R. Luria, write of their guru: “The idea of broadening the representation of the fundamental forces of psychological development by interpreting the basic mechanisms of higher physical functions, i.e., the nature and internal structure of man’s consciousness, as a product of social history became the basis for all of Vygotsky’s creative work” (Leont’ev and Luria, 1968). Hence, Vygotsky’s only disagreement with Marxism lies in his understanding of how historically-socially developed functions and behaviors are transmitted from generation to generation—a trifle of a distinction, I would argue, for anyone thinking outside the bounds of historical materialism.

            In light of these facts, I would like to offer a suggestion: instead of conceiving of Vygotsky’s theory of the role of language in the development of higher functions as a kind of rupture with Marxism, it ought to be thought of more along the lines of either an important and necessary improvement or even an enrichment of it. Marx and Engels had not had the benefit of the biological science of Vygotsky’s time to steer them in the right direction concerning the transmission of higher behaviors and functions. Vygotsky therefore found himself in a position, at the time in which he wrote, to strengthen and solidify Marxism by giving it a vital upgrade. Vygotsky had to break with Marx; but he had to do so in the interest of preserving the validity of Marxism in general. Such thinking probably reveals much about what Vygotsky meant when he said that “[o]ur science will become Marxist to the degree that it will become true, scientific; and we will work precisely on that, its transformation into a true science, not on its agreement with Marx’s theory” (Joravsky, 1989). We ought carefully to note the sense in which Vygotsky is invoking Marxism here. If he in fact believed that science would affirm itself as Marxist to the degree that it would be true, then he is invoking Marxism not as a theory among theories but as the objective and ultimate truth about the world. To say that all that is true is necessarily Marxist is of course to say that all that is Marxist is necessarily true—for the simple fact that it is true. This kind of thinking, evidenced by Vygotsky’s own words, shows a commitment so radical to Marxism that few of his contemporaries probably even understood it. The fact that Vygotsky went beyond Marx in insisting upon the importance of the mediating role of signs and language in the historical development of behavior and functioning in no way indicates that Vygotsky is abandoning Marxism; if nothing else, he is simply providing Marxist theory with a little bit of phenomenological mapping, revealing the mechanisms by which the relations of production and other such historical-economic phenomena actually operate to produce human behavior and functions. In this sense, then, Vygotsky is a better Marxist than even Marx.

            If I am identifying Marxism too specifically with historical materialism, and ignoring other salient aspects, it is simply because I am not an expert in Marxist philosophy. My objections to Marxism are simply my objections to historical materialism in general, essentially to the idea that human functioning and behavior, that is, human nature, are a result of the motive forces of production and economic history rather than of nature itself or of some hierarchical blend of nature and history. Vygotsky himself states, in his essay The Socialist Alteration of Man, that “…the struggle for existence and natural selection, the two driving forces of biological development, lose their decisive importance as soon as we pass on to the historical development of man. New laws, which regulate the course of human history and which cover the entire process of the mental and material development of human society, now take their place” (Vygotsky, 1994). To the extent that I see Vygotsky supporting this view I label him a Marxist. Others more interested in details may see this as a gross oversimplification or generalization; this issue is certainly worthy of some debate. It should be kept in mind, however, that my goal has never been to claim that Vygotsky is dogmatically Marxist— he himself denies this, as do others (Joravsky, 1989; Robbins, 2003); rather my intention has all along been to show that he is essentially Marxist. 

            What I have discussed up to this point is likely surprising to some and no news at all to others. Many, no doubt, embrace Vygotsky precisely because of his ties to Marxism—this paper is not for them. My stated intention, let me remind the reader, is to deter some readers from embracing Vygotsky in light of his deeply felt Marxism. I want to make sure that what I have said so far does not seem like a political rant—it most certainly is not. Marxism is but a philosophical theory among theories, one which I find highly problematic for its ontological claims. My sense is that many who have written casual pieces on Vygotsky might share similar feelings, and that if they were aware of Vygotsky’s Marxist commitments might think differently about their own work. In other words, I mean simply to inform, if only for the sake of the mental and methodological clarity of others. 

            Having said all this, I would now like to address the question of the current journal literature.  It is here that the question of Vygotsky’s Marxist commitments is most ignored.

 

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            It is likely the most unpleasant of all the various things one does in writing a critical article to have to point out the ways in which other writers have fallen short or missed the mark in one way or another. There is a palpable timidity in journal literature on Vygotsky—by journal literature I remind the writer that I am considering experimental verification and practical implementation pieces, not critical or historical assessments—even to mention the name Marx in connection to Vygotskian theory. I feel I can explain this phenomenon very simply, though naturally my explanation is worthy of serious and extended debate: essentially, aside from writers who may simply be unaware of Vygotsky’s Marxism or misinformed about it, it seems obvious that in a society such as ours, Marxist or at least Marxism-inspired pedagogies are not likely to be received well by those for whom they are intended. I have tried sometimes to imagine the reaction of a typical American parent with a child in elementary school getting the news that his or her child’s teacher was trained—in all likelihood unbeknownst to that teacher—in Marxist-derived theories of education. Of course, I cannot be sure of the extent to which this kind of thing is happening; I merely make the observation because academicians, who have the material liberty to indulge in such things as Marxist theorizing, often forget the kind of society we are actually living in. Should the theoretical foundations of pedagogy have to be held in secret? Ought their nature and even existence be concealed to those for whom they are intended? Needless to say, such a scenario would be unfortunate, though it certainly already exists in a number of respects.

            Elhammoumi (2002), writing from the perspective of a Marxist, states that “[w]hile suppression of Marxist sources in Vygotsky’s writings will always help sell books in America, as with the sanitized 1962 version of Vygotsky’s Language and Thought, and the 1978 version of Mind and Society, such repression also makes one wonder about the seriousness of such works.” We ought to include in the notion of “such works” the glossy and opportunist journal literature on Vygotsky that inundates academic publications. Let us now take a look at a sampling of this literature.

            A recent article by L. Keefer (2006), for example, reporting on a study of defiant behavior in two- and three- years olds based on a Vygotskian approach, makes no mention of Marx or Marxism and alludes only in the vaguest of ways to a kind of social determinism that might be implicated, at least in her mind, with a kind of historical materialism. She refers, in the opening paragraph of her article, to two- and three- year olds’ defiant behavior as being “a natural and healthy phase of their socio-emotional growth” (Keefer, 2006). The assumption here, I would imagine, is that emotional development is a consequence of social interaction, and thus by extension of the history of development of society, though we are not sure if she is referring to emotional behavior or the actual inward experience of emotion. What is important, however, in the overall sense, is that the connection between Vygotskian theory and Marxism is never mentioned, even though the interpretative model for the study is based on Vygotsky’s discussion of the “crisis at three” phenomenon. This scenario is repeated in other articles. Plessow-Wolfson and Epstein (2005), writing about the “dyadic interactions” of mothers and deaf children during (signed) storytelling, are eager to use such Vygotskian and Sociocultural terms as “scaffolding” and the “zone of proximal development” (ZPD) to describe the nature of the phenomena they observe; there is, of course, no mention of Marxism. We find the same thing in Kwon and Kellogg (2005), Andresen (2005), Sluss and Stremmel (2005), and Kanevsky and Geake (2004). Each of these articles, which deal with things such as role play, play in general, English as a foreign language (EFL) pedagogy, and gifted student instruction, shows a deep commitment to a Vygotskian approach in the interpretation of data. The familiar references to scaffolding, the ZPD, interpsychic vs. intrapsychic, etc., are all present; however, absent is any reference whatsoever to the Marxist inspiration behind Vygotsky’s theories.

            What I have termed “practical implementation pieces,” that is, articles urging the implementation of Vygotskian theory into pedagogy, also display this same absence of reference to Marxism. One of the most interesting pieces I found recommended the use of private speech in the learning of ballet (Johnston, 2006). Whatever the virtue of such an approach might be, a reader of the article would never guess from the text itself that Vygotsky was a Marxist or that his theory was such. The author at least mentions that Vygotsky was Russian, though the citations that follow are dated from 1978 onward, giving the uninformed reader the impression that Vygotsky is a more recent theorist than actually is the case. Other articles make the same omissions. Sanders and Welk (2005), who discuss the practical applications of Vygotskian teaching strategies such as (so they claim) “modeling, feedback, questioning, instructing, and cognitive structuring” to nursing education, make no mention of Marxism nor even of the fact that Vygotsky was Russian, leaving the reader to divine his nationality from the Slavic ring of his name. Otero (2006), Kerr (2006), Gajdamaschko (2005), and Ohta (2005), who discuss the utility of Vygotskian theory in such areas as formative assessment, the relationship between speech and writing, imagination, and interlanguage pragmatics, all follow suite. The only article I was able to find that did mention something about Vygotsky’s ties to Marx was Estep (2002), though the article dismisses Marxism as something Vygotsky was “never readily identified with.” The evidence Estep gives in support of this conclusion, however, reveals the unwarranted tendency, which I have already criticized, to dismiss Vygotsky’s Marxism on the basis of his rejection of behaviorism; as much becomes evident when one reads the text. Aside from this one exception then, the general trend, at least in recent years, has been to avoid any mention of Vygotsky’s ties to Marxism in general pedagogical journal literature, though I have no doubts that such omission stretches back a significant number of years.

            In the more specific realm of second language acquisition (SLA) theory, we observe a similar phenomenon. The key moment at which Vygotskian theory became a major player in SLA theory is in all likelihood the year 1994, which saw the publication both of a special issue of the Modern Language Journal given over entirely to Sociocultural theory, and the already mentioned book, Vygotskian Approaches to Second Language Research, edited by James Lantolf and Gabriella Appel (1994). Neither of these publications, as I have come to expect, has anything to say about Marxism. Lantolf’s introduction to the 1994 Modern Language Journal special issue (vol. 78, no. 4)—taken to be an authoritative introduction to Vygotskian ideas, no doubt—mentions nothing of Marx, while presenting all the generalities of Vygotskian theory. The articles which follow it (McCafferty 1994; Appel & Lantolf 1994; Donato and MacCormick 1994; Aljaafreh & Lantolf 1994; De Guerrero & Villamil 1994; Platt and Brooks 1994) are guilty of the same omissions. One would think that Lantolf at least, who is likely the foremost figure in Vygotskian research in SLA theory, would have given the subject a minimum of attention. But the MLJ chose to remain silent, and it took Lantolf until 2005 to discuss, along with his colleague and co-author Stephen L. Thorne, the issue in any depth (Lantolf & Thorne 2005). And still, in a long article summarizing Sociocultural-L2 research published the following year in Studies in Second Language Acquisition (2006), Lantolf only mentions Marx in a note! Even more egregious, however, is the utter lack of treatment in his and Thorne’s introduction to Vygotsky and SCT in Bill VanPatten and Jessica William’s edited work, Theories in Second Language Acquisition (2007). Perhaps Lantolf and Thorne are so given over to Marxist thinking (or at least to some kindred form of constructivism)—and assume everyone else to be as well—that they do not even see a reason to mention Vygotsky’s Marxism; what is more probable, however, is that in the case of VanPatten and William’s book, Lantolf and Thorne were aware they were writing for a more general, student audience—an audience who, still unformed perhaps in its beliefs about teaching, language, and cognition, might have been less likely to accept Vygotsky and SCT were they connected to Marxism in any way.

            Finally, the general attitude of omission prevails as well in the already mentioned book-length publications on Vygotskian theory, Sociocultural Theory and Second Language Learning (2000) and Vygotskian Approaches to Second Language Research (1994). The former work, edited by James Lantolf, contains, as we have come to expect, only one reference to Marx, which appears in Thorne’s (2000) chapter “Second Language Acquisition Theory and the Truth(s) about Relativity,” where the author cites Wertsch as having claimed that Vygotsky and his colleagues wanted to create a psychology based on Marxist philosophy. This brief mention is the only treatment—acknowledgement really—of Marx in a 250 page book taken to be an authoritative exposé of Sociocultural theory in the SLA context. The situation in Vygotskian Approaches to Second Language Research is even more dire—here we find no mention of Marx at all. No surprise either to find that Lantolf co-edited the book. The agenda of SCT’s principle authority in SLA theory could not be clearer.

            In a sense, one can see the practical purpose served by the works I have just discussed; their authors are interested in part in implementing a useful pedagogy, be it in the realm of general educational practices or second language acquisition. Given this pragmatic mindset, no wonder that the theoretical foundations of Vygotskian and Sociocultural theory are passed over in the attempt either to champion or formulate a certain approach to teaching and learning. But this attitude is surely an irresponsible one, one which is perhaps allowed to proliferate due to the reticence of authorities such as Lantolf, who are well aware of the facts but choose to omit them; and whatever practical purposes such writing might serve, it only confuses readers about the nature and foundation of Vygotskian theory and SCT in general. That no mention of Marxism is made in those very works that urge, either implicitly or explicitly, the adoption of pedagogies of Marxist-inspiration makes one wonder, as Elhammoumi (2002) does, how seriously one ought to take such publications. There do of course exist some critical assessments of Vygotsky which have appeared recently in journals and offer valuable insight into Vygotskian theory. Derry (2004), for example, presents a helpful exposé of Vygotsky’s ties to the philosophy of Spinoza; Liu and Matthews (2005), argue that confusion about the nature of Vygotskian theory stems from a kind of unwitting “dualizing” of Vygotsky’s monist assumptions. Thorne, though guilty of serious omissions of the kind I have just discussed, does, in his 2005 article “Epistemology, Politics, and Ethics in Sociocultural Theory,” come off as unabashed about mentioning Vygotsky’s Marxist roots. In general, however, the question of the link between Marxist philosophy and Vygotskian theory and SCT does not represent an issue of any significant concern in the field today.

 

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            So far in the present article, I have attempted to demonstrate the nature and degree of Vygotsky’s commitments to Marxism, as well as point to the lack of treatment of the Marx question in current scholarly literature on Vygotsky, specifically journal literature in general pedagogy and second language acquisition theory. The purpose of this endeavor, as I have already stated, is both to dissipate, for the sake of clarity, ignorance about Vygotsky’s Marxism, and to use the facts of that Marxism to dissuade pro-Vygotsky researchers and practitioners from embracing Vygotsky on both theoretical and practical levels. My feeling is that in order to be coherently Vygotskian, one must necessary be some kind of Marxist, and thus that those who are uncomfortable with Marx or Marxist philosophy ought to reconsider their commitment to Vygotsky and Sociocultural theory. That I have done this much in the present article, however, is not enough to convince but perhaps a handful of people; beyond a simple genealogy of the origin of Vygotskian theory and SCT, what is of the highest importance is to include along with that genealogy a critique of the theories for what they are. I would argue that the only thing more lacking in Vygotsky and SCT literature than adequate treatment of Marxism is a decent critique of those theories themselves. So, if I have already dissuaded certain readers away from Vygotsky by pointing to his Marxism, I warmly congratulate myself; but for the unconvinced, allow me to draw up a few objections to Vygotsky-SCT which I feel constitute material for extended and profoundly necessary debate.

            1) Sociocultural theory is an outmoded form of empiricism. The assumption in SCT is not only that the human mind is impossible without social interaction (a highly likely hypothesis when understood in a certain light), but that the development of that mind cannot be accounted for in any naturalistic way. For instance, a sociocultural theorist could not argue that the mind contains a blueprint—an innate, “socially grown”—capacity for logical reasoning, but that the very mental capacity of logical reasoning is dynamically (socially) generated in dialogical (communal) processes. Besides taking the human mind “out of the brain” and placing it in the social ether, a dubious move to say the least, this perspective makes social interaction not only the condition of possibility for the realization of human cognition but the condition of possibility for its structure. Vygotsky was clear on this point when he stated that biological evolution plays no determining role in the historical development of the human mind (1994). One would think that, well after Vygotsky’s death and the discoveries of such things as DNA and universal grammar, people in the Humanities and other disciplines would wake up and stop insisting on outmoded thinking. Empirical thought has never been very good at dealing with the conditions of possibility of anything. Take, for instance, the condition of possibility for language—having the intuition of the possibility of representation. Vygotsky (1962) rejected, with good reason, the intellectualistic theory of language acquisition offered by Stern, wherein children undergo a moment of conscious realization of the possibility of symbolic representation. Vygotsky dismissed the idea of such explicit, non-intuitive realization, but one gets the definite feel in his writing that we nonetheless derive the possibility of representation from the world around us, that is, from experience, if only from our interactions with others. Let me ask a simple question—does any phenomenon in the world include as information about itself the possibility of its being represented in language? In other words, does anything about the tomato plant in my backyard tell me that it can be represented in symbolic form? Of course it does not. I could never never, no matter what experience or interaction I have, intuit the idea of representation from the world around me. The same goes for other intuitions—logical vs. illogical thinking, grammar, etc. That Vygotsky and the myriad empiricists that reign in the academy today do not see this is stunning—they simply cannot think in terms of conditions of possibility, either because they cannot reason through the causal problems raised by issues of “innate ideas” or they find the existence of such ideas to be ideologically repulsive. Not everyone can be a Kantian, I suppose—nor can they see beneath the naïve realism whereby the world appears as a priori intelligible. I could extend this objection indefinitely, but having written about it elsewhere I will move on to my second point.

            2) Sociocultural theory/Empiricism/Constructivism leave us open to the tyranny of the other. There is no more admired notion in the academy today than that of the “Other.” In SCT, the Other is the necessary condition for the formation of the self, i.e., we depend on social interaction for the structure and realization of human cognition. Let me offer a simple point: there are good and bad others. There is Mother Theresa and there is Pol Pot. Academicians seem to think of the Other as a perennially benevolent creature, whereas in reality the Other is commonly selfish, brutal, and idiotic. If we leave the formation of the human mind at the mercy of otherness, then it will necessarily be as corrupt as all the terrible others we fight against on a daily basis. Of course, the best way to oppose the tyranny of the unstable Other is to have some kind of innate self that resists the dangers of external determination. This point seems so obvious that I wonder if it is even original.

            3) The implementation of SCT in teaching assumes that learners will get along optimally. This is the same problem the Soviets faced. If educators can create a learning environment in which childish antipathies, natural inclinations towards competition, as well as the intellectual insularity of some learners (I was one such student—not wanting to be bothered by my peers, distracted by them), are eliminated, all in the interest of common learning and universal cooperation, then I will offer no more criticism of SCT. But I imagine such an experiment will be about as successful as a collective farm in Soviet Kazakhstan.

            4) Terms such as “Vygotskian” and “Sociocultural” are code words for Marxism. This point should be evident given the content of the present article. Obviously, many theorists and practitioners would be glad to see themselves as promoting Marxist ends; however, they likely recognize the danger of employing the classical vocabulary of Marxist philosophy. Thus we have a new vocabulary—the vocabulary of Sociocultural theory. To the extent, however, that SCT is a Marxist theory, it is subject to the same criticisms, and therefore must seek the same justifications, that Marxism in general has had to suffer and seek in light of its distressing record in the last century.

            My hope in concluding is that those who have read the present article will develop a willingness to be more critical of Vygotsky than they have been previously, on any of the grounds I have discussed. I do not wish the reader to think me naïve—if anyone is aware of the possible futility of this article, it is I. But if I can dissuade just a few readers away from adherence to SCT and Vygotskian theory—if I can at least prevent them from asking “so what?” as did my instructor—I will consider my task successful. What is at stake, after all, is the founding ideas of our theory and practice; I make my appeal lest certain ideas so monopolize our thinking that we cannot even understand the relevance of calling them out.

 

 

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