

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS:
**STRATEGIC CONFLICT AVOIDANCE AND
THE DIVERSIONARY USE OF FORCE**

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Are They *Really* Potential Targets?
An Addendum on the (Small) Effect of Excluding Canada, Ecuador, and Peru

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One obvious objection to the analysis presented in the paper is that the list of U.S. rivals presented in Table 1 includes several surprising entries. Canada is a member of NATO, and Ecuador and Peru have had only fishing disputes with the United States. These states arguably do not belong on a list of potential targets for American diversionary military action. In terms of American hostility, none fits comfortably into the same category as Cuba, Iran, or North Korea. Nevertheless, because all three have a history of militarized disputes with the United States, they are included in the list of rivals assembled by Diehl and Goertz (2000). Rather than be accused of special pleading, these states were included in the sample used in the paper. Nevertheless, their obvious differences from the other states in the analysis raise the question of how much their inclusion influences the results.

In order to answer this question, the models were re-estimated on a sample that excludes these three states. The results indicate that including or excluding these states does not influence the results enough to affect the conclusions of the paper. Revised versions of Tables 3 and 5, which presented the substantive effects of American economic conditions on the behavior of rival states are presented below. In five of the fifteen instances in which there were statistically significant effects, the exclusion of these three questionable rivals produced numerical differences in the marginal effects too small to be worth reporting. (Numbers beyond one decimal place have no clear substantive interpretation in the events datasets used in the paper.) In one other case, a

previously very small estimated effect was no longer statistically significant when the three questionable states were excluded.

The estimated marginal effects were larger than those contained in the paper in eight of the ten instances where the alternative estimates differed from those in the paper. (In these cases, the tables present the original results beneath the alternative estimates for the sake of comparison.) This pattern makes sense substantively. If the three excluded states did not expect to be targeted for a diversionary use of force by the United States, then American economic conditions should not shape their behavior. Including states like these should bias the estimates toward zero, which is precisely what appears to have happened. However, the effects of this bias are too small to affect the substantive conclusions of the paper.

Alternative Version of Table 3.
Marginal Effects of U.S. Behavior and Domestic Conditions on Rival Conflict-Cooperation toward the United States excluding Questionable Rivals

	Economic Indicator		
	Unemployment	Inflation	GDP Growth
COPDAB data (1948-78)			
Change in predicted behavior when U.S. economic performance worsens	+14.9 +7.3	No effect	No effect
Change in predicted response to behavior of other states when U.S. economic performance worsens	No effect	No effect	No effect
WEIS data (1966-92)			
Change in predicted behavior when U.S. economic performance worsens	+0.6 +2.3	-1.59 -0.6	+3.7
Change in predicted response to behavior of other states when U.S. economic performance worsens	+0.5	-0.3	+0.1

Note: Marginal effects are based on the models in table 2, and consider one standard deviation changes in U.S. economic performance and an additional strong verbal conflict event, coded -16 in the COPDAB data and -3 in the WEIS data. Positive marginal effects indicate more cooperative behavior. Negative marginal effects indicate more conflictual behavior. The strategic conflict avoidance argument implies that both hypothesized changes in conflict behavior should be positive. When they differ, the results in the original table are printed beneath each of the alternative estimates.

Alternative Version of Table 5.
**Marginal Effects of Change in Overall Conflict-Cooperation and U.S. Domestic
 Conditions on Overall Rival Conflict-Cooperation excluding Questionable Rivals**

	Economic Indicator		
	Unemployment	Inflation	GDP Growth
COPDAB data (1948-78)			
Change in predicted behavior when			
U.S. economic performance	+285.6	+127.97	+455.2
worsens	+260.9	+113.1	+198.2
Change in predicted response to			
behavior of other states when U.S.	+8.6	No effect	+14.5
economic performance worsens	+7.8	+0.15	
WEIS data (1966-92)			
Change in predicted behavior when			
U.S. economic performance	+5.3	+17.7	No effect
worsens	+3.5	+2.9	
Change in predicted response to			
behavior of other states when U.S.	No effect	+1.8	No effect
economic performance worsens		+1.0	

Note: Marginal effects are based on the models in table 4, and consider one standard deviation changes in U.S. economic performance and an additional strong verbal conflict event, coded -16 in the COPDAB data and -3 in the WEIS data. Positive marginal effects indicate more cooperative behavior. Negative marginal effects indicate more conflictual behavior. The strategic conflict avoidance argument implies that both hypothesized changes in conflict behavior should be positive. When they differ, the results in the original table are printed beneath each of the alternative estimates.