

**Public Support for Democracy:
A Core Component of Human Development**

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Human Development and Democracy.

As Sen (2001) has pointed out, the underlying theme of human development is the broadening of human choice. It is by no coincidence that the number of democracies has been growing through the past two centuries, through a series of surges and declines that have been described as “waves.” At the start of the 20th century, only a handful of countries could be described as democracies, even by loose standards that ignored the fact that women could not vote. In the 2005 Freedom House survey, more than 80 societies were coded as “free.” Though a number of these countries might not qualify as liberal democracies by more demanding standards, there is no question that the number of countries with democratic institutions has been growing rapidly—and little question that this process is linked with economic development. Thus, although it is clear that economic development does not automatically bring democracy, one finds a .85 correlation between per capita GNP (using PPP estimates) and the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties ratings.

This paper summarizes findings from a massive body of cross-national data demonstrating that (1) socioeconomic modernization, (2) a cultural shift toward rising emphasis on self-expression values, and (3) democratization, all reflect a single underlying process, based on mutually-reinforcing components. This paper only gives a brief overview of the evidence; Inglehart and Welzel (2005) present and analyze it in much greater detail. Socioeconomic modernization reduces the external constraints on human choice, bringing growing public demands for civil and political liberties, gender equality and responsive government. This process helps to establish and sustain the institutions best suited to maximize human choice-- democracy.

People in postindustrial societies are coming to demand freer choice in all aspects of life. Gender roles, religious orientations, consumer patterns, working habits and voting behavior all become increasingly matters of individual choice. Massive contemporary changes, from growing gender equality and changing norms concerning sexual orientation, to growing concern for genuine, effective democracy, reflect growing emphasis on human autonomy. These changes are not a patchwork of loosely related phenomena. There is a coherent pattern integrating these seemingly isolated changes into a common whole: the process of human development.

Democratization is a core component of human development—and, as we will demonstrate, growing mass support for democracy plays a major role in the spread of democracy. If this is true, then well-informed decision-makers need reliable feedback on where, why and how mass support for democracy is growing, and where it is faltering—just as they need reliable feedback on economic growth, from such indicators as per capita GNP and unemployment rates. Techniques for measuring public support for democracy are newer and less developed than techniques for measuring gross national product, but the relevant mass attitudes can be measured—and when they are, they turns out to have an autonomous societal impact that is fully as important as that of economic factors. Let us examine the evidence.

How solid is mass support for democracy—and how can we measure it?

Several major research programs are monitoring public support for democratic institutions, including the New Democracies Barometer, the New Russia Barometer, the LatinoBarometer, the AfroBarometer, the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey. Certain questions, measuring overt support for democracy or a preference for democracy over alternatives such as military rule, are regularly utilized in these surveys. These questions are well designed and demonstrate internal consistency: people who support democracy on one indicator, tend to support democracy on the other indicators. But our faith in these measures ultimately rests on their face validity-- and one becomes cautious about placing too much confidence in face validity when one discovers that the publics of Albania and Azerbaijan show higher levels of overt support for democracy than do the publics of Sweden and

Switzerland (as the World Values Survey data demonstrate). One wonders: is mass support for these items actually conducive to the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions?

It is perfectly conceivable that other factors could be even more important than overt support for democracy. A massive literature argues that interpersonal trust plays a crucial role in democracy (Putnam, 1993; Warren [ed.], 1999; Norris [ed.], 1999). Furthermore, Gibson (1996) has argued convincingly that tolerance of outgroups is essential to democracy: civil liberties and legitimate opposition require tolerance and forbearance toward groups with whom one disagrees and dislikes. Moreover, three decades of time-series data demonstrate an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values, linked with rising levels of economic development (Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Since Postmaterialists give high priority to protecting freedom of speech and to participation in making important government decisions, this trend should bring growing mass demands for democratization. Finally, economic success seems to help legitimate democratic institutions. The fall of Germany's Weimar Republic was linked with its failure to provide economic security during the Great Depression; conversely, the success of democracy in Germany after World War II was linked with the postwar economic miracle, which led democratic institutions to be associated with economic and social well-being. Accordingly, high levels of subjective well-being among the public are closely correlated with democracy (Inglehart, 1997).

All of these qualities—tolerance of outgroups, interpersonal trust, the Postmaterialist emphasis on civil rights and political participation, and a sense of subjective well-being—may contribute to the emergence and flourishing of democracy, but the questions that measure them make no explicit reference to democracy. By contrast, questions that measure overt support for democracy have face validity, which may be one reason why the programs that monitor support for democracy, focus largely on measuring overt support. A more conclusive test can be made by measuring the extent to which mass attitudes are actually linked with democracy at the societal level.

The large-N cross-national surveys, covering scores of countries, can do something that surveys carried out in one country or even several countries were never able to do: they make it possible to carry out statistically significant analyses of the linkages between individual-level beliefs, and societal-level

phenomena such as democracy. If one has data from a large number of countries, representing the full range from authoritarian societies to solidly democratic societies, one is not limited to validating a measure by testing it against other items *within* the survey. One can measure to what extent given items actually are correlated with democracy *itself*, as measured by the Freedom House ratings, the Polity scores or other widely-accepted measures of how democratic a society actually *is*.

When one tests the validity of survey questions directly, in this fashion, some surprising findings emerge. Some attitudes such as interpersonal trust, prove to be rather strongly correlated with democracy; but still others, such as Postmaterialist values and tolerance for outgroups, prove to be even *more* strongly linked with the emergence and survival of democratic institutions—and this linkage holds up even when one controls for a society’s level of economic development and other relevant variables (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). This article will present some examples of the remarkably strong linkages that one finds between individual-level attitudes and societal-level phenomena.

Evidence from the World Values Surveys indicates that the beliefs and values of ordinary people play a major role in social, political and economic life. Mass beliefs and values interact with a society’s institutions and economic factors in shaping social change. In many cases people’s beliefs and values have even more explanatory power than do the standard economic and social indicators. Mass beliefs seem to have a major impact on key societal-level phenomena ranging from good governance (as measured by the World Bank’s Good Governance indicators), objective gender equality (as measured by the UN Gender Empowerment Measure), and the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions (as measured by the Freedom House scores).

What questions actually measure societal-level democracy?

The Values Surveys now provide data from more than 80 societies, ranging from authoritarian regimes to established democracies, enabling us to analyze the empirical linkages between individual-level survey responses within each society, and a society’s level of democracy, as measured by the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores.

Our findings are unambiguous. Although overt endorsement of democracy is almost universal today, it is not our most accurate indicator of how deeply democracy has taken root in given countries. The extent to which a society emphasizes a syndrome of tolerance, trust, political activism and Postmaterialist values is a much stronger predictor of stable democracy. This syndrome of “Self-expression values” is quite coherent: a society that ranks high on one of these qualities tends to rank high on all of them, while other societies tend to rank low on all of them, emphasizing “Survival values.” The Survival vs. Self-expression dimension is a major axis of cross-cultural variation, and it is closely linked with economic development, which brings a shift from emphasis on Survival values to growing emphasis on Self-expression values (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). This helps explain why economic development is conducive to democracy: by themselves, high levels of wealth do not necessarily bring democracy (if they did, Kuwait would be one of the world’s leading democracies). But in so far as economic development brings rising levels of tolerance, trust, political activism and greater emphasis on freedom of speech (the components of Self-expression values) it leads to growing mass demands for liberalization in authoritarian societies; and to rising levels of direct mass participation in societies that already are democratic.

The Survival/Self-expression dimension was not developed for analysis of democracy. It emerged as one of two major dimensions in an analysis of cross-national cultural variation, and is closely linked with the rise of post-industrial society. Overt support for democracy seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic institutions to emerge. Unless mass pressures for democracy are present, power-hungry elites are unlikely to give publics the power to remove them from office. Today, overt support for democracy is widespread among publics throughout the world. But favorable attitudes toward the general idea of democracy are not sufficient. For democratic institutions to survive in the long term, they need a mass culture of tolerance, trust, participatory orientations, an emphasis on self-expression and reasonably high levels of subjective well being. To a striking degree, societies whose publics rank high on self-expression values, show high levels of democracy.

With rising emphasis on Self-expression values, people increasingly want to have more say in decision-making at work, in their communities and in politics. And rising emphasis on self-expression values leads to publics to exert growing pressure on economic and political elites. They become increasingly likely to scrutinize officials' actions and hold them to account—and they tend to become increasingly proficient in doing so. Consequently, rising mass emphasis on self-expression values at the individual level, is linked with rising levels of good governance, as measured by the “good governance” indicators developed for the World Bank by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).

As a society moves from emphasis on Survival values toward increasing emphasis on Self-expression values, it moves toward higher levels of honest and effective government. Rising emphasis on self-expression values leads people to demand laws and institutions that allow them to act according to their own preferences. And they become increasingly likely to intervene directly in the political process, placing stronger pressure on elites to respond to their demands.

Analytic Strategy

How can we measure the extent to which given mass orientations are conducive to democracy? In the first place, since causes precede effects, our analysis will examine the impact of various political culture predictors that were measured around 1990-1995, on measures of democracy at a *later* time point-- as of 2000-2000, to be specific. In addition, our regression analyses will control for the temporal autocorrelation of democracy, using the duration of a society's experience with democracy up to the mid 1990s, to control for the possibility that democracy in 2000-2002 simply reflects prior levels of democracy. The duration of a society's experience with democracy generally has a positive influence on its subsequent democratic performance. Controlling for this, one can examine whether given mass values have an additional independent impact on subsequent measures of democracy. Holding the democratic tradition constant also helps us control for the influence of Western culture, since Western societies have the longest democratic tradition.

Our analysis makes an important distinction between “formal democracy” – the fact that a society holds elections and nominally adheres to democracy, even if elites actually control the process-- and

“effective democracy,” which exists when elites actually respond to public preferences (this distinction is explained more fully and operationalized in Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). We will examine the effects of various measures of mass attitudes on both formal and effective democracy. As we will see, mass attitudes explain considerably more of the variance in effective democracy than they do in mere formal democracy, reflecting the fact that effective democracy is a more deeply-rooted societal phenomenon than formal democracy. Nevertheless, we consistently find that the same mass attitudes that provide the strongest explanation of effective democracy, *also* provide the strongest explanation of formal democracy. Since we have been asked to present brief working papers at this conference, this paper will simply show the correlations between various measures of mass attitudes, and both formal and effective democracy. For much more extensive multivariate analyses that demonstrate that these correlations reflect underlying causal connections, see Inglehart and Welzel (2005), especially chapters 7, 8 and 11.

We will examine the linkages found between various types of mass attitudes and democracy—starting with a set of attitudes that have figured prominently in the literature: confidence in institutions.

The Legitimacy Approach

Confidence in institutions has been declining for several decades, in almost all advanced Western democracies (Pharr, Putnam and Dalton 2000; Newton and Norris, 2000; Newton, 2001). Since it is often assumed that high confidence in institutions is crucial to democracy, this sharp decline of confidence has drawn much attention, reviving the thesis of a legitimacy crisis that Huntington, Crozier and Watanuki (1975) presented in the 1970s. But *is* a high level of confidence in institutions actually crucial to the flourishing of democracy? Do lower levels of confidence in institutions produce less effective democracies? In order to answer these questions we measured each public’s average level of confidence in core institutions of the state (“confidence in state institutions”) and in all types of institutions for which public confidence has been measured (“overall confidence in institutions”).

Confidence ratings are positively correlated across all types of institutions, with factor analyses showing no polarity between confidence in different types of institutions: this means that one can summarize institutional confidence over various institutions. Surprising as it may seem, we find virtually

no significant relationship between people's confidence in institutions and a society's subsequent democratic performance, as the first two rows in Table 1 indicate.

(Table 1: about here)

Conceivably, confidence in institutions does not operate in the same way across different types of societies but is conducive to democracy only within the limits of a democratic heritage. In this case the impact of confidence in institutions would only become evident if one controls for prior experience under democracy. Regression analyses in Inglehart and Welzel (2005) control for a society's prior democratic tradition, showing that even when one holds prior democracy constant, public confidence in institutions has no significant impact on a society's subsequent democratic performance. This holds true whether one analyzes the role of confidence in state institutions or confidence in all types of institutions. Indeed, if public confidence in institutions has any impact, it tends to be negative rather than positive, as the negative signs of the various correlation and regression coefficients indicate.

Surprising as it may seem in the light of the literature on this subject (see Pharr, Putnam and Dalton, 2000), public confidence in institutions does *not* seem to affect a society's democratic performance in any systematic way. High or low levels of confidence in institutions can be found in any type of political system, regardless of its democratic performance. Some long standing authoritarian states, such as China, show high levels of confidence in institutions; while some long established democracies, such as the U.S., show low levels of confidence in institutions. Public confidence in institutions does not systematically differ between societies that have a long or a short experience with democracy. And it has no significant impact on a society's subsequent democratic performance, regardless of whether we control for prior democracy or not. This finding casts serious doubt on the importance that has been ascribed to confidence in institutions and its recent decline in most developed societies. It confirms the interpretation that the

**Table 1. Correlates of Democracy Emphasized by Three Approaches
(using data from earliest available survey)**

Correlates	Correlations with Formal Democracy in 2000-2002	Correlations with Effective Democracy in 2000-2002

The Legitimacy Approach:		
Confidence in State Institutions (early 1990s)	.13 (61)	.33** (61)
Overall Confidence in Institutions (early 1990s)	-.12 (61)	-.04 (61)
Approval of Democracy (mid 1990s)	.38** (60)	.42** (60)
Preference for Democracy over Autocracy (mid 1990s)	.57*** (60)	.68*** (60)
The Communitarian Approach:		
Voluntary Activity in Social Associations (early 1990s)	-.06 (60)	-.06 (60)
Overall Voluntary Activity in Associations (early 1990s)	-.13 (60)	-.11 (60)
Norm Obedience (early 1990s)	.13 (61)	.25* (61)
Interpersonal Trust (early 1990s)	.37** (61)	.63*** (61)
The Human Development Approach:		
Postmaterialist Values (early 1990s)	.70*** (61)	.80*** (61)
Tolerance of Sexual Liberty (early 1990s)	.50*** (60)	.67*** (60)
Signing Petitions (early 1990s)	.64*** (61)	.76*** (61)
Life satisfaction (early 1990s)	.59*** (61)	.73*** (61)
Self-Expression Values Syndrome (early 1990s)	.72*** (61)	.89*** (61)

Early 1990s: data from earliest available survey of VS II-III (1989-91 or 1995-97).

Mid 1990s: data from earliest available survey of VS III-IV (1995-97 or 1999-2001).

Significance levels: * $p < .10$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

decline of confidence in institutions does not pose a threat to democracy. On the contrary, it reflects the emergence of less deferential, more elite-challenging publics in modern societies, which we interpret as conducive to democracy.

Our findings suggest that high levels of public confidence in institutions are not a valid indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture. By the same token, low levels of public confidence in institutions do not necessarily pose a threat to democracy. This does not mean that confidence in institutions is entirely irrelevant-- it may be relevant in more specific ways that have not been tested here. But even if this were the case, it remains true that confidence in institutions has no general impact on democracy that operates in

the same way across all units of observation. This finding invalidates confidence in institutions as a *general* indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture.

Mass confidence in institutions is unrelated to democracy at the system level but this might not be true of people's support for democracy in general. Intuitively, one would assume that mass support for a democratic system creates pressures to attain or sustain democracy. No doubt, this is why many regional survey programs, including the New Democracies Barometer, the LatinoBarometer and the AfroBarometer, have included questions on people's satisfaction with, and approval of, democracy. We will examine these measures. We agree with Klingemann (1999), Rose (1995), and Linz (199x) who argue that one should not only examine people's support for democracy, but also their rejection or acceptance of non-democratic alternatives. Thus, we measure people's preference for democracy vs. autocracy by subtracting their approval of autocracy from their approval of democracy, producing a measure that reflects people's net preference for democracy. Measuring regime preferences in this way is important because some people do not have a clear understanding of democracy, expressing strong support for *both* democratic and non-democratic forms of government. In such cases, the individual's support for democracy is partly offset by their support for authoritarian regimes, indicating that they have mixed views. By contrast, other people express strong support for democracy *and* strong rejection of authoritarian forms of government, showing a strong net preference for democracy. These people are classified as "solid democrats."

One would expect that agreement with such statement as "democracy is the best form of government," should show a significant positive correlation with subsequent measures of both formal and effective democracy and it does, as Table 1 indicates. But when one controls for prior democracy this impact becomes insignificant (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, chapter 11). But people's preferences for democracy over authoritarian alternatives show a different pattern. Table 1 shows relatively strong and significant correlations between a public's preference for democracy over autocracy, and subsequent measures of both formal and effective democracy. Controlling for prior experience under democracy, this effect remains highly significant, explaining 25 percent of the variation in effective democracy that is unexplained by prior democracy.

Low levels of confidence in public institutions can and do go together with strong preferences for democracy over autocracy. Even if people live in a democracy and strongly prefer democracy to authoritarian rule, they may be critical of how specific institutions are currently run by their elites—which results in low confidence in these institutions. This is the case in many Western democracies today, where overwhelming majorities of the public support democracy over alternative forms of government-- but a large share of them express low confidence in institutions and low satisfaction with how democracy is functioning (Klingemann, 1999; Newton, 2001). Living under high degrees of existential security leads people to place priority on self-expression and democracy—but at the same time, they become increasingly critical of authority.

Declining confidence in institutions does not necessarily reflect an erosion of democratic values. And clearly, these orientations are not valid indicators of a pro-democratic civic culture. Preferences for democracy versus autocracy, by contrast, *do* seem to be a valid indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture, and one that operates in the same fashion across all units of observation.

The Communitarian Approach

Both the social capital and the communitarian school emphasize the importance of voluntary associations, arguing that they sustain the communal life and the civil society on which strong democracy rests (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Norris, 2002: chapter 8). This view can be traced to de Tocqueville (1994 [1837]) who viewed voluntary associations as the “schools of democracy.” We created two indices measuring a society’s level of voluntary activity in associations, one measuring the percentage of people who are active in specifically social associations and another measuring the percentage of people who are active in *any* kind of voluntary association.

Surprising as it may seem in the light of the extensive literature on social capital, a society’s level of activity in associations shows no significant effect on its level of democracy whatever, regardless of whether or not we control for prior democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, chapter 11). Voluntary activity in associations does not explain a significant amount of variation in either formal or effective democracy. This finding holds for activity in social associations and overall activity in associations. Like public confidence

in institutions, voluntary activity in associations does not affect democracy in any general way—and probably for the same reasons. Neither public confidence in institutions nor activity in associations is necessarily linked with a preference for democracy. Simply knowing a society’s level of activity in associations does not tell us whether its people support authoritarian principles or democratic principles. Germany was noted for its high rates of activity in voluntary associations under the Kaisers, but until post-war times Germany’s flourishing associational life did not help foster democracy.

This finding would surprise anyone who assumes that active membership in associations plays a key role in making democracy possible—but the empirical evidence is unequivocal: it gives no support to this assumption-- even if a society’s democratic heritage is held constant, in order to test whether associational activity helps only within the limits of existing democracy. This does not necessarily mean that the level of people’s associational activity is entirely irrelevant to democracy-- but its relevance may depend on the type of *values* motivating these activities.

The finding that voluntary activity in associations is not inherently favorable to democracy, leads us to examine the values that are claimed to be conducive to democracy. Within the communitarian camp, it has been argued that a public whose citizens show a high level of trustworthiness and follow social norms and obey the laws, is particularly important for democracies. These values have been described as “trustworthiness,” “civic morality,” or “civic honesty” (Coleman, 1990; Tyler, 1998; Uslaner, 1999; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Rothstein, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 2001). Following these writers, we created an index of “norm obedience” based on people’s disapproval of dishonest behavior, such as cheating on taxes or avoiding transport fares.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) demonstrate that norm obedience has no significant relationship with formal or effective democracy, regardless of whether we control for prior democracy or not. The problem here, again, is that norm obedience does not necessarily reflect a preference for democratic values. It can reflect loyalty to democratic norms, but it can also reflect Adolf Eichman’s loyalty to Nazi procedures. Norm obedience is not necessarily a sign of civic health. If strong disapproval of norm violations is widespread, this could simply reflect awareness of the fact that high rates of norm violations are a major

problem in one's society—as is suggested by the fact that the Russians score higher on norm obedience than the Finns. In any case, norm obedience shows no impact on a society's democratic performance and does not seem to be a valid indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture.

Interpersonal trust, by contrast, *does* show a significant positive linkage with both formal and effective democracy, as Table 1 indicates. When Inglehart and Welzel (2005) control for prior experience with democracy, the impact of interpersonal trust on formal democracy becomes less significant, but its impact on effective democracy remains highly significant, explaining 15 percent of the cross-national variance.¹ Interpersonal trust does have a significant impact on effective democracy, and does seem to be a valid indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture.

So far we have a mixed picture. Two indicators emphasized by the legitimacy approach—public confidence in institutions and approval of democracy—have no consistent impact on democracy; while one indicator—preferences for democracy over autocracy—does have a consistent and significant impact on democracy. Similarly, two indicators emphasized by the communitarian camp—voluntary activity in associations and norm obedience—turn out to have no general impact on democracy; while another indicator—interpersonal trust—does have a significant impact on democracy.

The Human Development Approach

When we examine the indicators emphasized by our version of human development theory, the evidence is unequivocal. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) demonstrate, every component of the self-expression values syndrome has a highly significant impact on a society's subsequent level of democracy, regardless of whether we control for prior levels of democracy or not. We have already seen that this is true of interpersonal trust, which belongs to this syndrome. But the other components of self-expression values show even stronger effects on democracy, and they explain considerably more of the variation in effective democracy, controlling for the length of time a society has lived under democratic institutions. This is especially true of the orientation that focuses most directly on human freedom: postmaterialistic aspirations for personal and political liberty. Postmaterialist values show the strongest partial effect on a society's

democratic quality, explaining 37 per cent of the variance in effective democracy, controlling for the length of a society's democratic tradition.

Elite-challenging activities also have a significant independent impact on democracy, reflecting the fact that these activities put pressure on elites to be more responsive, and helped to topple authoritarian regimes and establish many of the Third Wave democracies such as those in the Philippines, South Korea, South Africa, and the Czech Republic (Bernhard, 1993; Diamond, 1993; Foweraker and Landmann, 1997; Paxton 2002: 255-257). But although elite-challenging activities often exert pressure for democracy, they can be also directed toward undemocratic goals, if they are not linked with self-expression values. This explains why elite-challenging activities have a slightly smaller impact on democracy than Postmaterialist values, the central element of the syndrome of self-expression values. In addition, even though elite-challenging activities can put institutions under pressure for democracy, these activities are in turn facilitated when democratic institutions are in place--simply because democratic institutions provide the civil and political rights that make elite-challenging activities legal, lowering the risks of participating in them. Elite-challenging activities are therefore influenced by prior experience under democracy, so the democratic tradition captures part of the impact of elite-challenging activities on subsequent measures of effective democracy. But even controlling for how long a society has experienced democracy, elite-challenging activities still have a significant independent impact on subsequent democracy. Elite-challenging activities are not just a product of democracy--they are also a motor of democratization, especially when they are motivated by self-expression values. Democracy is rooted in People Power.

As we have seen, interpersonal trust has a significant impact on democracy, but this effect is considerably weaker than that of liberty aspirations. The same applies to two other components of self-expression values—tolerance of homosexuality and life satisfaction, a measure of people's emphasis on subjective well-being. The reason why tolerance of homosexuality and life satisfaction show a more modest impact on democracy is similar to the case of interpersonal trust: neither trust, nor satisfaction nor tolerance are as sharply focused on civil and political liberties as are Postmaterialist values. Nonetheless trust, life

satisfaction and tolerance do have some impact on democracy, as parts of the broader syndrome of self-expression values. This leads us to examine the impact of this syndrome as a whole.

The broad syndrome of self-expression values links liberty aspirations with protest activism, tolerance of homosexuality, subjective well-being and interpersonal trust. Postmaterialist values have the highest loadings on self-expression values, followed by elite-challenging activities, life satisfaction, tolerance of homosexuality and interpersonal trust, which has the weakest loading. This creates an asymmetrical linkage with democracy, which is shaped most strongly by liberty aspirations and least strongly by interpersonal trust. But even though this linkage is asymmetrical, the self-expression values syndrome as a whole shows a stronger impact on democracy than any of its components, including liberty aspirations. The strength of self-expression values explains 55 per cent of the variation in effective democracy, controlling for how long a society has lived under democratic institutions. The whole is greater than the average of its parts.

These findings support the interpretation that the rise of a culture that emphasizes self-expression constitutes the single most important force in strengthening democracy. Considered in this light, effective democracy can be understood as the institutional manifestation of social forces emphasizing human choice and self-expression—as our theory of human development holds. Self-expression values seem to be the most crucial component of a democratic civic culture.

(Figure 1 about here)

Thus, Self-expression values also have an extremely strong linkage with the extent to which a society has effective liberal democratic institutions, as measured by the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores, multiplied by the World Bank's anti-corruption index. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship. The linkage between Self-expression values and effective democracy is remarkably strong ($r = .90$). Proving that this is a *causal* relationship is a much more complex task that we will not undertake here. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) carry out extensive causal analyses, concluding that mass values do indeed have a strong causal impact on a society's level of corruption, and of effective democracy. We

emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions at the societal level. Critics have expressed doubt that mass attitudes really play an important role in democratization. They were right to do so—for it turns out that mere lip service to democracy is not necessarily conducive to societal-level democracy: at this point in history, the term “democracy” evokes strong social desirability effects, being endorsed as a good form of government by strong majorities of the public in every one of the more than 80 societies studied by the World Values Survey.

But it is equally clear that well-designed batteries of questions actually do tap deeper and more robust mass attitudes that are closely linked with the emergence and survival of democracy. Thus, a battery that taps “Preferences for Democracy over Autocracy,” which has been used in various barometers, has considerable explanatory power in accounting for the extent to which given societies are democracies. And “Survival/Self-expression values” --a battery that makes no explicit reference to democracy, but measures a syndrome of tolerance, trust, activist orientations and the priority accorded to self-expression—is an even stronger predictor of the extent to which given societies have democratic institutions. Public support for democracy can be measured—and, if we wish to understand the conditions that lead to the emergence and spread of democratic institutions, it is important to do so.

Batteries used to measure Survival/Self-expression values

V1. Taking all things together, would you say you are:

[READ OUT]

- 1 Very happy
- 2 Quite happy
- 3 Not very happy
- 4 Not at all happy
- 9 Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]

V2. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

- 1 Most people can be trusted
- 2 Need to be very careful
- 9 Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]

SHOW CARD A

V3. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY UNDER "First Choice."

V4. And which would be the next most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY UNDER "Second Choice."

	First Choice	Second Choice
Maintaining order in the nation	1	1
Giving people more say in important government decisions	2	2
Fighting rising prices	3	3
Protecting freedom of speech	4	4
Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]	9	9

SHOW CARD B [LISTING "HAVE DONE," "MIGHT DO," "WOULD NEVER DO"]

Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.

	HAVE DONE	MIGHT DO	WOULD NEVER DO	DK
V5 Signing a petition	1	2	3	4
V6 Joining in boycotts	1	2	3	4
V7 Attending lawful demonstrations	1	2	3	4

V8 Joining unofficial strikes 1 2 3 4

SHOW CARD C

Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. READ OUT STATEMENTS. CODE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT

*

V9 Cheating on taxes if you have a chance
 Never Always
 Justifiable Justifiable
 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 DK = 99

V10 Homosexuality
 Never Always
 Justifiable Justifiable
 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10
 DK = 99

V11 Abortion
 Never Always
 Justifiable Justifiable
 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 DK=99

V12 Divorce
 Never Always
 Justifiable Justifiable
 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 DK=99

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ⁱ If we follow Norris (2002: chapter 8) in combining civic trust with civic activism in associations in order to create an overall index of social capital, it does not increase the amount of variance explained in a society's democratic performance. The impact of the overall social capital index comes entirely from civic trust: no further contribution is made by activism.