

THE LOCATION OF THE POOR IN RIO DE JANEIRO:

The Influence of Race on Favela

Ney dos Santos Oliveira

Universidade Federa Fluminense

The metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro has suffered more intensely than other parts of Brazil the economic decay of the country in the last decade (Guimarães Neto, 1990). Metropolitan Rio has seen an intensification of the poverty rate in its population as well as a peripheralization of the poor. These have hurt more the African descendants than other racial group. Blacks represent a majority of the population in the more distant municipalities. Between the last two censuses (1980 and 1991) and 1991 to 1996, the population in the central municipality increased only 0.66% and 0.21% annually respectively, while the rate for the peripheral municipalities was 1.47 percent.¹

The impact of the Brazilian recession of the last decade on Rio de Janeiro State was so severe that the Internal Gross Product fell 8.5%, despite growth of 16.7% in the nation's IGP. There are many reasons for the state's relative economic decline. Guimarães Neto (1990) attributed the economic decay in the state to among other reasons: Cuts in the Federal budget and investment; the slowdown in industrial production; and the resultant reduction in all levels of economic activity, including in the financial system. Moreover, the consequences of this process have been not only a decrease in the formal sector and an increase in the informal economy, but also an enlargement of the income inequalities (Ribeiro et al., 1993).

These trends have resulted not only in a concentration of poor people on the periphery, but also in the overall growth of poverty in both, the center (the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Niterói) and suburbs. Official poverty data for the city of Rio de Janeiro, including those used to determine the location of favelas and other poor housing areas do reflect this trend within the limits of the central city of Rio de Janeiro. While the favelas are predominantly located close to the center, the other settlements of the poor (Irregular Lots and Public Housing) are highly concentrated on the more distant districts of the West Zone (See Maps).

However, the impoverishment of the population in metropolitan areas and the view that the 1980s were a 'lost decade' for Brazil have been challenged by some studies indicating that the impact of economic decay was not so detrimental to the social fabric. Eichenberg Silva et al. (1992) found some improvements in social measures, including in education, housing, health, diet and sanitation. They say that these benefits may have arisen because of lower population growth, a decrease in urbanization and smaller family sizes. They note that the rise in per capita income masks the continuing concentration of wealth in the hands of fewer people, which is a historical trend. Also, Pastore and Haller (1993), comparing data from 1973, 1982 and 1988, showed that inter- and intra-

¹ The concept of suburbs in Rio de Janeiro is quite different from New York. Usually, the other cities of the metropolitan region are considered as the periphery of the central core of the metropolitan region, formed by the cities of Niterói and Rio de Janeiro. Usually, in Rio de Janeiro, suburbs are considered the immediate periphery of the central area, and periphery the more distant municipalities. In the dissertation, suburbs and periphery will be concomitantly used to describe these areas.

generational social mobility fell in the 1980s, in sharp contrast to previous decades and especially the 1970s.² There was a relative fall in the numbers of people who improved their socioeconomic situation and a rise for those whose living standards fell.

In a study of metropolitan Rio in the 1980s Valladares and Batista (1993) noted a number of changes in the city's social indicators. These changes included: higher educational standards (more years of study and higher literacy rates); an increase in the economic activity rate, especially in the periphery due to higher participation by female labor; a reinforcement of the trend towards the primacy of the services sector; and a process of 'de-salarization' of the economy with substantial decline in the numbers of people employed in the formal economy. It is in this metropolitan context that the increase in poverty in both the suburbs, as well as in the central cities, must be seen. There are also indications that the process of peripheralization and favelization is being shared by higher income sections of the population, such as those lower-middle class segments found in some of these settlements. These could prove not only the rise in poverty throughout the periphery, but also a declining housing standard for the lower-middle class, who were also affected by the contraction in the housing market and absence of effective public policy to attack the problem.

Today's Favelas

The location characteristics of favelas today are not only defined by their proximity to middle- and higher-income areas of the central city. Their tendency now is to spread throughout the metropolitan region. Although the figure is considered low, the National Census Bureau (IBGE) in Brazil estimated that 5 million people live in favelas in the country (IBGE, 1991). They are primarily concentrated in metropolitan areas such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Recife, which together account for 44.7% of all the favelas in the country. Of the 5.42 million residents in the Rio municipality, 17.3% of the residents live in favelas, typically with a population density of more than 5,000 inhabitants per hectare (IPLAN-RIO, 1993). Considering the predominance of one- and two-store housing in the area, this figure is extremely high. There are also indications that some new forms of squatter settlements are forming on the periphery, but they physically differ from the old favelas, especially in density and accessibility. They have been defined as irregular or clandestine lots.

As defined above, favelas are squatter settlements lacking the basic infrastructure provision, housing construction, and legal ownership. They are usually identified as an urban phenomenon. Nevertheless, there are differences in the criteria used by IBGE, which tends to underestimate the number of favelas, and other local institutions.³ The Planning Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IPLAN-RIO) estimated that, in 1991, 32.9% of households within Rio de Janeiro's boundaries were located in poor neighborhoods. It included households in favelas (15.3%), illegal subdivisions of land on the periphery -- the irregular or clandestine lots -- (5.5%), and public housing (12.1%). They add up to 33% of the total households in the city. These numbers also reveal that more than 20% of the households (favelas and irregular lots) in the city are illegally (albeit legitimately) constituted. This gives us some idea of the scale of the difficulties faced by the poor population in acquiring affordable housing in a very unfair system.

² Inter-generation social mobility is based on a comparison of the occupational status of individuals with their parents. The intra-generational measure compares the jobs of individuals at the beginning and end of their careers.

³ The census data on favelas collected by IBGE, the National Census Bureau, conflict with IPLAN's data. The difference is due to the different criteria used by the two agencies. IBGE took into account the agglomerations with more than 50 domiciles, while IPLAN considered all agglomerations of more than 20 domiciles. Usually, the numbers collected by the Planning Institute of Rio de Janeiro are closer to reality.

Also, as with ghettos, favelas do not constitute the only form of low-income housing scheme in Brazil. In other cities, such as São Paulo, the number of poor people living in ‘cortiços’ (tenement houses) is still significant, much like the situation in Rio de Janeiro until the beginning of the century. Especially in metropolitan Rio, besides the favelas, there has been a trend for some decades for the poor to live in peripheral settlements (lotes periféricos). Although “lotes periféricos” have some similarities with the favelas in the absence of infrastructure and services, and the low standard of construction, the situation is not similar regarding population density, and not always similar in the forms of ownership or land occupation. Many of the “lotes periféricos” were legally purchased and municipal taxes are paid even though they do not benefit from the corresponding services.

The Illegal Subdivisions of Land

Favelas which used to be distinguished from lotes periféricos, being considered above all as enclaves within higher-income urbanized areas, are growing along with other forms of occupation on the periphery.⁴ They are forming in the other metropolitan municipalities as well as within the city of Rio de Janeiro. Planners and officials call some of these illegal subdivisions of land “loteamentos clandestinos” (clandestine lots) or “lotes irregulares” (irregular lots). The definition is based on the differences in the level of legality of these dwellings. Clandestine plots are those lacking initial formal approval by the local authority and which were sold by land brokers to the residents. In these kinds of subdivisions, the buyers rarely even have unregistered land titles and typically have no deeds at all. Irregular plots are those which have official permits and a land title, but which were not legalized due to the breaches of contract or partial absence of infrastructure and other amenities considered necessary by zoning legislation. They should be provided by the land broker.

There is, however, a portion of these illegal subdivisions that are being created by squatters on land available on the periphery, and not measured by officials. Some of these squatter subdivisions are being created by an organized process of squatting, but there is also news that some have been organized by individuals with personal or political intentions.⁵ The units rudimentary were formed on open land, on lots marked out in a fashion allocating space for streets much like other settlements on the periphery. An “Associação de Moradores” (Neighborhood Association) was established, responsible for the initial sale and administration of the plots. The president acted as a patron permitting the free occupation of some lots or charging a monthly payment, supposedly to benefit the neighborhood association. The association performed some local services, such as distribution of mail, food and even the small provision of loans to some of the residents. According to their internal rules, 30% of any sale went to the association and the buyers had to build at least a shack in the next 6 months after the sale, otherwise they lost their ‘property rights’. As in the central favelas, the residents provided their houses with makeshift infrastructure, making illegal connections with the water, sewage, and electrical systems existing in the area around the loteamento. Also, each ‘owner’ paid a monthly fee to the neighborhood association. Despite the illegal nature of the situation, I can verify there exists an internal housing market with different prices, varying according to their location within the loteamento and improvements made by the former resident. A particular feature of these loteamentos is that many of their residents referred to these places as

⁴ “Lotes Periféricos” differ from the favelas basically by their location in the periphery, the low-density patterns of their occupation, and the form of acquisition, not predominantly squatted, although squatters existed as well.

⁵ “Our favela was built by ...(a political candidate in Rio de Janeiro), and he helped us to organize the neighborhood association there” (told to me by a resident of a clandestine lot).

favelas, despite the efforts of the neighborhood association to give bucolic names to the settlements.⁶

The process of occupation of these particular lands is not romantic. What was observed is that there is communal participation, besides mechanisms for political co-optation. Moreover, there is also a possibility that other interests, profitable and political, are involved in the process. Also, the occupation is not always carried out free from internal conflict, which leaves dwellers with insecurity. In a particular place studied, the residents and the association somehow became subject to criminal gang which temporarily inhabited the place. There, they performed some of the duties, which were supposed to be handled by the local community association. The position of the residents is one of apparent submission, although they do not necessarily support the belligerent and criminal actions of these groups. Several stories were told to me by the residents about their relationships with local drug traffic groups. Although some of those interviewed were visibly trying to impress me with their stories, the truth is that the residents, as in the favelas and other settlements of the poor, have to deal with impositions of the local criminal groups.⁷

The illegal subdivision of land is not a newer phenomenon in Rio de Janeiro and its peripheral municipalities. It started in the 1940s and grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the other peripheral municipalities of the metropolitan region (mainly in the “Baixada Fluminense”). The only figures referring to these illegal settlements are those provided by IPLAN-RIO, the Rio de Janeiro municipal planning agency. The total number of illegal subdivisions in Rio de Janeiro in 1991 was 577 (IPLAN-RIO, 1991), but there is no official estimate of the number of people living in these dwellings. According to information collected by the Press, the population of the irregular lots is almost 1 million.⁸ Faerstein and Oliveira (1992) estimated the population of irregular and illegal plots at 600,000 in 1992. The authors characterized the inhabitants of the clandestine lots and irregular lots as having varied socioeconomic status, though they belonged to a predominantly low-income population. This was particularly visible on the irregular plots, where land titles are less available. Moreover, according to Faerstein and Correa de Oliveira, 91% of the inhabitants on the irregular lots already lived in Rio de Janeiro before they come to these places. Thus, the phenomenon can not be considered as caused by immigration.

Important too is that some of these illegal “loteamentos” were exclusively developed and inhabited by middle-income levels. These illegal middle-class settlements, though few in number, are located in the regions of Barra da Tijuca and Jacarepaguá the most recently developed areas of the city. A survey was carried out by the City government in four relatively old and illegal subdivisions in West and North Zone of the city. The research found those 33.6% of the household incomes were of 2 minimum salaries, which can be considered poor. In the same research, the very poor (households with income less than a minimum salary) were 11.5 percent. At the other extreme, 11.9% of the

⁶ I do not disclose the name of the neighborhood to guarantee the security of the local informants.

⁷ “I was recovering from the birth of my baby at the home of relatives when the drug dealers invaded my shack. I went to talk with them. My home was a gun deposit... They charged me payment for the roof they made on my shack and I promised to pay after my payday. Then, they asked me for my watch as a guarantee... But, after that, the head of the gang was killed by another group and I didn't need to pay anybody. These new drug dealers do not invade any houses any more. I was scared, and I said to everyone that I didn't see anything. I greet them and so on, but I don't get involved.” (My translation of an interview with one of the residents).

⁸ “Cesar wants to legalize 262 irregular plots...The Mayor, Cesar Maia, intends to legalize 262 irregular plots where around 250 thousand people live, ... These 262 areas represent almost a quarter of the irregular plots in the city.” (In O Globo, October 12, 1993, p. 16-Rio).

households had an income of over 6 minimum salaries, undoubtedly a middle-class constituency (Faerstein and Oliveira, 1991). Although the insufficiency and particularities of the research made them illustrative of the income variation in these kinds of settlements.

Housing Developments in Rio de Janeiro

The situation with housing developments in Rio de Janeiro is very particular to the city. Not all the housing developments defined by the IPLAN-RIO census can be considered as low-income settlements. Also, there are no income level data to be compared with other kinds of poor settlements. As observed in the previous chapter, the number of units built for the poor by CEHAB -- the state housing agency -- since 1964 did not exceed 100,000 units.⁹ Furthermore, the low-income units built before this date were few in number. Also, as the public housing system in Brazil was based on home ownership, and the rules were not rigorously enforced to prohibit the resale of units, a vast number of informal sales were made by the original occupants of the dwellings (see Valladares, 1978).¹⁰ Accordingly, there is no guarantee that the targeted poor population is still living in these settlements. Nevertheless, there are indications that in the more distant periphery the poor and lower-middle classes still inhabit these housing developments.

The construction of housing developments for the poor by the state housing agency has been relatively limited since the closure of the National Housing Bank in 1986. Today, Federal government investments have exceeded by funds from the municipalities and the state. No more large Federal economic incentives to finance housing exist to develop newer housing in Brazil as a whole. During 1991, only 2,964 units were under construction and planned by CEHAB in the city of Rio de Janeiro (IPLAN-RIO, 1991) and 8,691 housing development were revised by the IPLAN-RIO in 1998. Moreover, within this total, 1,736 (58%) were to be built in the more distant districts, not well served by infrastructure in the West Zone of the municipality.

RIOURBE, the local housing agency created after the termination of the Housing Finance System (SFH), completed only 1,894 units in the same year. Only 7,512 units were built or planned by this municipal agency in 1991. In the local agency the location options for the developments are even more unequally distributed, contributing to an intensification of the peripheralization of the poor. Around 84% of the total units built by RIOURBE are located in the Western peripheral region of the city. Despite the small numbers of units being constructed for low-income segments of the population, the emphasis on the more faraway districts in the Western limits of the city is still prevalent.

Homelessness

There is a substantial section of the poor, particularly the very poor, who live in the streets, having neither a place in the favelas nor the peripheral lots. The size of this population is almost totally unknown and there are only some estimates made by the Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social (Rio's Department of Social Development). Martins (1993) estimated that 7,000 people live

⁹ The Housing Finance System defined low-income portions as those families with incomes up to 5 minimum salaries. This number is not so precise, since the poverty level is usually defined as those families with a per capita income of a quarter of the minimum salary.

¹⁰ The rules of the Housing Finance System prohibited the sale of houses without previous approval from the State Housing Agency. This was done to keep the target population in the projects. However, informal sales were made, and CEHAB did not enforce the legislation because the sale of a unit to a higher income family represented better possibilities for economic return.

in Rio de Janeiro's streets. The population who lives in the streets has been the object of sporadic attempts by government to evict them. Also, despite some media attention on the situation, there have been insufficient academic studies. A few anthropological and sociological studies have been made (Pessanha, 1983; and Martins, 1993). Martins (1993) listed some of the reasons contributing to the structural causes which have raised the street population. As a complement to the process of urbanization and the absence of public policies, Martins (1993) listed, among others: the loss of housing in floods; increase in the costs of urban transportation (combined with losses in earnings and income); unemployment of workers who used to live in employee accommodation; and family conflicts. These people usually live in handcarts, sidewalks or below the city viaducts, typically in the more middle-class areas of the South and North Zones, or in the business district of the center. The greater part of the population researched by Martins has a history of cyclical unemployment, and their lives in the streets are not only dedicated to begging, (as is usually believed), but to several other informal economic activities, such as street vendors, parking cars, paper collectors. The favela is usually considered home to these street residents at some time in their lives, and there is sometimes a crossover between the population living in the settlements and on the streets. In both cases, it is a question of survival at the lowest possible cost.

Where the Poor Live in Rio de Janeiro

A partial but clear indication of where housing developments and irregular lots are located vis-à-vis the favelas. While the favelas have become less unevenly distributed throughout the city, they are particularly prevalent in the old suburban north (42.7% of the total favelas in the city). Around 95% of the irregular lots are situated on the periphery, obviously the region with the most vacant land, a condition which facilitates these types of settlements. Also, the extent of state intervention can be seen by the predominance of housing developments in these more distant places. These factors are strongly inducing the poor to move periphery of the city.

Initially, I want to give an explanation of the geographical divisions I have made in the following tables to give a clearer indication of the population distribution. First, I delineate as the Center-North/South region, the region formed by the districts of the central core, oceanic and tourist areas and the industrial North Zone districts close to the core. They are the regions of the Port Zone, downtown, and the adjacent neighborhoods of Rio Comprido, Botafogo, Copacabana, Lagoa, São Cristóvão, Tijuca, Vila Isabel, and Santa Teresa. The Suburban-North is formed by the neighborhoods to the North alongside the central railroad lines. These are the more industrialized parts of the city and are characterized by their mainly working class population. The Suburban-North comprises the administrative regions of Ramos, Penha, Inhaúma, Meier, Irajá, and Madureira. The periphery is defined by the boundary regions of the city throughout the North and West (the city boundaries in the South and East are formed by the ocean and the Bay respectively).

Considering that the great majority of the public housing built on the periphery of the city was aimed at the poor, the reinforcement of the trend for the poor to live in the periphery is more obvious. Seen individually, some neighborhoods in these regions, such as Ramos in the Suburban-North, have more favelado households than 'regular' domiciles. Areas in the North of the city, such as Pavuna, have housing developments and favela households in greater numbers than other kinds of households.

Also, newer irregular lots in Santa Cruz and Campo Grande, frontier regions in the West of the city, correspond respectively to 32.7% and 16.3% of the total households in these two districts. These are significant numbers, especially considering the relatively short life span of this phenomenon. Unfortunately, there are no similar data available for other peripheral municipalities in the metropolitan region. These facts are related only to the city of Rio de Janeiro, which with Niterói

form the center of the metropolitan region (see map). Also, the figures displayed correspond only to the public agency collection of data on this uncontrolled phenomenon, not always so familiar with the settlements of the poor.

Table 1
FAVELAS, HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS, AND IRREGULAR PLOTS
RIO DE JANEIRO

Place	Number of Households 1991							
	Favelas		Irregular Plots		Public Housing		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Center-North/ South	60,372	25.1	-	-	10,874	5.8	71,246	13.8
Suburban North	102,758	42.7	3,977	4.6	67,750	35.9	174,485	33.9
Periphery	77,369	32.2	81,655	95.4	110,216	58.4	269,240	52.3
Total	240,499	100.0	85,632	100.0	188,840	100.0	514,971	100.0

Source: Anuário Estatístico do Rio de Janeiro, IPLAN-RIO,

The Growth of Favelas in the Last Decade

A particular depiction of the development of favelas in the last decade is needed. Due to some particularities in the formation of the favelas, I will make a different regional division relating to the main geographical zones of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Also, this division was based on the corresponding socioeconomic levels and characteristics of each Zone. The Center-North of the city, the region where the first favelas were created, is separated from the South Zone, the wealthy tourist communities of the sea front. Because of this, in the region of Barra da Tijuca was included in the South Zone, and is considered a physical and socioeconomic extension of the South Zone. The North Zone was delineated, as in the former table, to include the Suburban-North industrialized region, as well as the northern boundaries of the city. The West Zone was defined as the geographical group of more distant neighborhoods in that direction. The estimates of IPLAN-RIO, the only local agency which regularly collects data about favelas in Rio.

Accordingly, the data determined that 197 new favelas were created from 1980 to 1991 in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In this period the number of households in favelas increased, corresponding to a growth of 45 percent. The favelado population increased 33%. The numbers indicate the intensification in the favelization of the city. While the growth in the number of favelas in the 1970s was only 19%, from 1980 to 1991 the growth was 52.8 percent. Also, the increase in the number of favelas is unevenly distributed throughout the various areas of the city. The peripheralization of the favelas within the limits of the municipality became visible as the number of favelas in the West Zone more than doubled in the period. The increase in the favelado population and households in the same region during the decade is also significant.¹¹ In this periphery of Rio de Janeiro, there are not only new favelas being created, but the number of favela households has also increased proportionately faster than the total population, probably indicating the favelization of newer, smaller family units which do not have other housing alternatives. These figures demonstrate that favela growth is related to the availability of services and social infrastructure. However, the favelados obviously also depend on the availability of land, even non-urbanized land, to settle their families. The region where the number of favelas increased most sharply was again the western (largely a rural area) and on the developing area of Barra da Tijuca, in the extension of the South Zone.

¹¹ Although no specific data are available for the other municipalities in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro, there are estimates that the growth in the number of favelas on the periphery is higher than in the center of the metropolitan region. "Favelas were indeed following the move towards the outskirts of the metropolis, developing strongly in the four municipalities of the periphery" (Valladares and Ribeiro, 1992:5).

The favelas are unevenly distributed through the metropolitan region and the city of Rio de Janeiro. In the Rio's South Zone, the increase is particularly due to the expansion of favelas in Barra da Tijuca, a new settlement for the middle class on the outskirts of the ocean front area, but that forms a continuum together other neighborhoods, such as Leblon, Ipanema and Copacabana. The expansion of the wealthy South Zone to Barra da Tijuca shows some characteristics typical of the suburbs in certain cities in the United States. Real estate developers created in Barra da Tijuca a system highly dependent on the private car. There are exclusive condominiums, but also a large number of high-rise buildings. The creation of several malls and hypermarkets, where access by public transportation is limited, is another similarity with American cities. However, the particular nature of socioeconomic differences in Brazil has not made the area exclusive to the upper-class, which is different from the United States. The settlement of poor people in Barra da Tijuca has generated much conflict, sometimes including murders and violent evictions, which have been amply reported by the media.

As in the past, the growth of favelas follows the city growth patterns. The newer favelas are forming where there is land available for squatting. Barra da Tijuca, where there are much land speculation and which is land reserve for real estate in coming decades, had a favelado population estimated at 4,609 in 1980. In 1991, the population increased more than 3 times (15,392 favelados). In the same period, some of the favelas in the South Zone (Copacabana and Botafogo), in the Center, and even in some Northern districts of the city, were losing population. Also, the decrease in population in some favelas is related to the integration of parts of these favelas with the urban web. Small areas are being legalized and granted postal zoning codes. In other cases, eviction by government agencies has also helped to reduce the number of favelados in some places. Nevertheless, there is insufficient data to distinguish clearly this opposite trend of a decline in the population of some favelas. Despite these losses, the opposite situation -- the rapid growth of favelas -- is much more apparent and visible in other parts of the city.

TABLE 2
FAVELAS
POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLDS BY ZONES
THE CITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO 1980-1991

Local Region	Favelas			Population			Households		
	1980	1991	% Growth	1980	1991	% Growth	1980	1991	% Growth
Center North*	67	82	22.4	141,161	155,995	10.5	32,387	39,019	20.5
South Zone**	41	62	51.2	70,205	95,043	35.4	17,014	25,034	47.1
North Zone***	196	268	36.7	417,268	533,129	27.8	94,645	133,196	40.7
West Zone****	69	158	129.0	92,583	177,008	91.2	21,297	43,250	103.1
Total	373	570	52.8	721,217	961,175	33.3	165,343	240,499	45.5

Source: IBGE - Censos Demográficos 1980, 1991 - Resultados Preliminares, IPLAN-RIO, Cadastro de Favelas and LIGHT - Programa de Eletrificação, 1990

* Administrative center and early residential districts of the Port, R.Comprido, São Cristovao, Tijuca and Vila Isabel

** The seaboard district areas of Botafogo, Copacabana, Lagoa, and Barra da Tijuca.

*** Industrialized and middle and lower-middle class districts of Ramos, Penha, Inhaúma, Meier, Irajá, Madureira, Ilha do Governador, Anchieta and Pavuna

**** The more distant districts and rural areas of Jacarepaguá, Bangu, Campo Grande, Santa Cruz and Guaratiba.

These figures are 33.3% in the Municipality, the total population increased only 7.5% (from 5,090,700 in 1980 to 5,472,967 inhabitants in 1991). The population of favelas suffer from the typical lack of infrastructure, as well as having higher crowding levels, when compared to the rest of the population. A comparable measure could be the ratio of inhabitants per household, which in the metropolitan region was 3.5 (for Blacks 3.7) in 1987, in the city 3.5, and in the favelas 4 people per household in 1991.

Another feature in the growth of favelas in Rio is that they can not be seen any longer as a result of rapid urbanization in the country as a whole. Indeed, as some of the central districts in Rio are losing population (the increase in the center was only 4.8%), the growth in the periphery between 1980 and 1991 was 15.8 percent. Valladares and Ribeiro (1992) attributed the spread of favelas to the increase in land values, pressures from the middle and upper-middle class housing market, legislation and urban renewal. These factors are associated with the rise in the level of poverty in the country, and particularly in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region, as described above. Interestingly, the authors analyzed the nature of favela growth and confirmed that the increase in their population was due not only to the creation of newer favelas. The study attributes the growth of favelas also to the expansion of the lands occupied and to the increase in population density in the original areas. Also, confirming our observations, despite the location of some favelas in the higher-income areas, the authors found that a more common pattern in the growth of newer favelas was the location of the favelados in lower-income areas of the northern old suburbs rather than in the wealthy South Zone. The lower the economic level of the administrative regions, the higher was the percentage of favelados living in these places.

The Influence of Race on the Favelas

Blacks have suffered the impoverishment experience more intensely than other racial groups. Blacks are not only the poorest of the poor, but are also underrepresented in the groups with the ability to define and influence the political agenda (such as education and achievement). Favelas can be seen as the 'natural' housing solution for many of the poor Blacks in metropolitan Rio de Janeiro. However, this also makes them the most vulnerable racial group to overdependence on the whims of state housing policies.

A figure for the growth of total population compared with the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. As demonstrated, population growth in the period from 1980 to 1991 was highest in the West and Center Zones (22% and 11.7% respectively), while the South Zone lost population (minus 6.5%). The number for the South region could be more meaningful if the area had not been included in the administrative region of Barra da Tijuca, which experienced unusual growth characteristics in the period. Barra is the only middle - and upper-middle class neighborhood in the tourist zone that did not suffer depopulation. Moreover, a significant part of the population growth in Barra da Tijuca can also be attributed to the formation of new favelas in the area. As observed, Barra was earlier one of the areas seeing the highest increases in the number of favelas and its total population.

The data previously shown on areas that saw exceptional population growth. Of the total increase in the Barra da Tijuca population in the last decade (57,264 inhabitants), 19% is accounted for by the favelado population. As observed above, the occupation of favelas is dependent on available land for squatting. Given that Barra da Tijuca is a region still not fully urbanized and has a great number of vacant plots, the formation of new favelas is more convenient there. Moreover, the occupation of this area by the upper-income level is bringing the necessary services and jobs which attract the favelados to move to a particular area in the first place. In Barra da Tijuca, the population of the favelas is growing at a higher rate than that other areas. While the population growth in the total population of Barra corresponded to an increase of 141%, for the favelas the increase was 234 percent. Also, Barra is characterized as containing 10% (9,475 unit plots) of the total irregular lots officially identified in the city.¹²

¹² Most of the irregular lots inhabited by middle-class groups are situated in Barra da Tijuca and adjacent neighborhoods.

The figure for the West Zone would be more representative of this trend if we could focus on the administrative regions of Campo Grande and Santa Cruz in Table 4.4.1. Both districts lie in the more distant western part of the city. In these two regions the growth of the population corresponded to an increase of 30% and 72% respectively. In the same period the favelado population increased 242% in Campo Grande (the highest percentage increase in the city), and 68% in Santa Cruz. The favelado population increase in Campo Grande corresponded to 26.3% of the total new population added to this region. Campo Grande is also the region where was created the highest number of new irregular lots in the city (35,696 lots, corresponding to 36.6% of the total).

There are further signs that these two peripheral regions, Campo Grande and Santa Cruz, are being consolidated as the areas for the poor in Rio de Janeiro. Of the 95% of the total irregular lots created in the internal periphery of the city, 51% (48,150 plots) are situated in Campo Grande and Santa Cruz. Also, 58.4% of the total population of housing developments is situated in the Western Zone, where these two districts are located. Unfortunately, there are no conclusive data about the population on the irregular lots. It is difficult to make an estimate since the occupation of the plots is in progress and only about 90% were considered occupied at the time of the research. However, it is clear that the total amount of population increase is related to the growth of the favelado population and irregular lot residents. Despite the difficulties in accounting for those living on irregular plots, the estimate made by the municipal agency must be high. If one considers that this population has similar characteristics to those of the favelados, the household ratio would not be only (nearly) 2 people per household, as shown on the estimate. This ratio corresponds to half of the median ratio for the population living in the favelas. Though further research needs to be made to identify and characterize this squatter population, the phenomenon is clearly linked to poverty and the lack of housing, as well as other contributory factors.

Clearly, there is a strong correlation between growing poverty and the peripheralization of the poor. If the growth of the poor is being predominant inside the limits of the city, the poor are being predominantly allocated in the more distant district zones of the city of Rio de Janeiro. In this manner, they are less able to benefit from a central localization, like in the favelas of the past.

TABLE 3
POPULATION GROWTH BY ZONES
RIO DE JANEIRO 1980-1991

Local Region	1980		1991		Growth %
	Number	%	Number	%	
Center North*	580,339	11.4	648,205	11.8	11.7
South Zone**	789,059	15.5	737,945	13.5	-6.5
North Zone***	2,274,092	44.7	2,321,317	42.4	2.1
West Zone****	1,447,210	28.4	1,765,500	32.3	22.0
Total	5,090,700	100.0	5,472,967	100.0	7.5

TABLE 4
FAVELAS AND TOTAL POPULATION GROWTH
SELECTED PLACES
RIO DE JANEIRO 1980-1991

Place	1980			1991			Growth %	
	Favelados	%	Total Pop.	Favelados	%	Total Pop.	Favelas	Total Pop.
Barra da Tijuca	4,609	11.3	40,726	15,392	15.7	97,990	234.0	140.6
Campo Grande	9,458	3.2	292,715	32,361	8.5	379,766	242.2	29.7
Santa Cruz	7,036	4.8	147,630	11,814	4.6	254,325	67.9	72.3

Source: IBGE - Censos Demograficos 1980, 1991 -

* Central districts and residential districts of Rio Comprido, São Cristóvão, Tijuca and Vila Isabel

** The Southern seabord district areas of Botafogo, Copacabana, Lagoa, and Barra da Tijuca.

*** Industrialized and middle and lower-middle class districts of Ramos, Penha, Inhaúma, Meier, Irajá, Madureira, Ilha do Governador, Anchieta, and Pavuna

**** The more distant districts and rural areas of Jacarepaguá, Bangu, Campo Grande, Santa Cruz, and Guaratiba

Favelas on the Periphery

Despite difficulties in finding recent data about favelas and irregular lots in other municipalities of metropolitan Rio, new data came from FEEMA (the state environmental agency) about the favelas in the Guanabara Bay basin. These data, which included some peripheral municipalities, can confirm that there is a process of favelization in the more industrialized peripheral municipalities. In the period from 1970 to 1980, the growth in number of favelas on the periphery (61%) was more than 3 times the growth in the center (18.5%). Also, as already demonstrated the growth of favelas was not limited to the new squatter settlements, but to densification and expansion of the old ones. According to these authors: "of the total of 545 favelas spotted in 1990, 198 (36.3%) had only densified, 69 (12.7%) had only expanded and 167 (30.6%) had both expanded and densified, while the formation of new favelas only represented 15.6% of these overall changes (Valladares and Ribeiro, 1992:8)."

These two processes refer to increase through verticalization and use of remaining space in the favelas, or horizontal expansion of the original boundaries of the old favelas. The process of densification is clearly linked, among other factors, to the rise in living standards of original favelados that remain without other options in the housing market.

Although central Rio de Janeiro has a more elevated proportion of its population living in favelas, peripheral industrial municipalities, such as Caxias, São João de Meriti, and Nova Iguaçu also have high level of favelization. These municipalities are predominantly occupied by loteamentos, and present a lower, but representative, percentage of their populations in favelas as well. Even the more distant municipality of Magé -- a predominantly rural area with a lower level of urbanization -- also contains almost 5% of favelados in its population. These suburban municipalities

are also characterized by the formation of squatter areas, such as the irregular and clandestine lots described above, but, unfortunately, there are no data available that measure it.

TABLE 5
FAVELA POPULATION BY MUNICIPALITY*
RIO DE JANEIRO METROPOLITAN AREA
1990

Place	Population 1990		
	Total	Favelas	%
Rio de Janeiro	5,472,967	877,738	16.0
Niteroi	435,658	24,843	5.7
Sao Joao de Meriti	424,689	13,726	3.2
Duque de Caxias	665,338	51,179	7.7
Nilopolis	157,936	2,261	1.4
Nova Iguacu	1,293,611	40,784	3.2
Mage	191,249	8,968	4.7
Total	9,666,940	1,019,499	10.5

Source: FEEMA - 1994

* No data available for the municipalities of Itaboraí, Rio Bonito, São Gonçalo, Itaguaí, Mangaratiba, Paracambi and Maricá.

Unfortunately, there are no recent income data available for the central and peripheral districts of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro and their favelas. I worked with numbers for 1980 and established a strong relation between favelas and poverty. The poorest regions within Rio de Janeiro's boundaries are those where new favelas are coming into view more prominently.

The main reason is that, besides the lack of infrastructure and the mostly low-quality housing in the favelas, what really distinguishes a favela from other housing arrangements is the illegal nature of favelas. Favelas are squatter settlements with their housing built without reference to the zoning and city building codes. Ghettos although they may be squatter areas also lacking infrastructure, are not usually formed in illegal neighborhoods.

Conclusion

The process of favelization and peripheralization in this city, Rio de Janeiro, increased in the last decade. This process, despite spatially opposing trends of the location of favelas, does not exclude other simultaneous processes also taking place in the urban fabric. The peripheralization of poverty is a pattern that defines the location trends of the poor in the city of Rio de Janeiro, but this has also been followed by the peripheralization of other segments of at least the lower-middle class constituencies. The favelization of the city of Rio de Janeiro, is being expressed not only in the spaces available in the more centralized and urban areas, but is also becoming visible farther from the central points of the metropolitan region.

Recent changes in global economic processes have exacerbated racial segregation and class inequality in the US (Sassen, 1991; Massey and Denton, 1993; Goldsmith and Blakely, 1992; Oliveira, 2000) while in Brazil the 1980s are considered a "lost decade" for the poor, and especially for Blacks and women (Silva, 1993; Velloso and Albuquerque, 1993). Relations between capital and labor have been fundamentally altered by recent economic changes in Brazil, forcing us to analyze the impact of the categories of race and class in a new political and economic context.

The reasons for the sharpening and concentration of poverty among particular groups are being intensely debated by scholars, activists and in the popular media. Others have identified racial segregation in the ghettos and the concentration of a population with “degraded” norms and behaviors as the key factors determining the perpetuation of poverty among Blacks. The pattern of human settlements may have exacerbated the prevalence of poverty among certain racial and ethnic groups through its effects on the nature of social interaction within the communities of the poor. Nevertheless, it is less clear how the lack of social contact with other social classes, or housing segregation per se, leads to inefficacious retrograde norms impeding social mobility. The process that determines the isolation of one group from another is not well understood. The pattern of human settlement is itself grounded in the struggle for political power between groups. And it reflects the outcomes of that struggle. Rather than rely on psychological explanations of segregation and temporary actions of the state to eliminate poverty, we must seek a better political understanding of its causes. This work asks whether the disproportionate number of Blacks among the poor has more to do with obstacles to their political organization than with any “culture of poverty” .

This comparative study of the significance of race in the urban settlement of Blacks in Brazil provided an opportunity to explore the debates over race and class as ultimate determinants of poverty. Although Brazil has a much higher percentage of Blacks in its population, a more unequal distribution of income, and a much lower per capita income than other countries, and notwithstanding differences in the historic socioeconomic processes which defined the demography of the poor, Blacks constitute a disproportionate part of the poor in the country. While officially Brazil has more than 46% of Blacks in his population and this can be considered an underestimate, is the first country in the World to have descendants of African.

This study examines the role that race and class have played in the formation of the settlements of the poor. It focuses on the government policies contributing to the patterns of this settlement, and the impact such settlement policies have had on the political organization of poor communities. The intention is to demonstrate that although residential segregation by race and class are interrelated, and driven by similar socioeconomic factors, the state, through public policies, plays a significant role in furthering the process of isolation of specific racial groups, which historically have been marginalized in the society. The state, representing the interests of the more powerful groups, acts not as a pure mediator of diverse interests but as a legitimator of the differences on which the society is based. The state does not acknowledge these differences. It is, rather, complicitous in perpetuating the myths socially created, which in the case of Brazil is the myth of “racial democracy”. On the other hand, the study demonstrates also that the state’s power is not totally absolute and monolithic. Groups which are discriminated against also use their relative power in resourceful ways to pursue their interests. Although they are alienated, they employ different strategies that sometimes change the balance of power in their favor.

Regardless of the differences in economic status, the government policies did not bring equal opportunities for the Black poor in either country. Race-based policies were sufficient to provide better conditions for only a fraction of the target. In Brazil, where race-based policies have never been systematically applied, social mobility among Brazilians of African descent has historically been the lowest among all ethnic groups. Recent studies have shown this gap to be ever increasing (Hasenbalg, 1990; Silva, 1992; Andrew, 1991). These observations point to evidence that there are mechanisms of discrimination based on race in Brazil. Silva (1985) found that the average income for Whites was about twice that for Blacks, and estimated that one-third of this difference is due to discriminatory labor market practices. In his more recent study, Silva (1993) also demonstrated that regional differences can explain unexpected lower levels of poverty for *pretos* in comparison with

pardos due to a higher proportion of *pretos* in the more developed regions of the country. However, these regional differences do not explain differences between them and Whites.

By the 1970s, with the growing strength of the political power of the favelados, favelas resettlement was greatly reduced. A few more progressive governments in some local jurisdictions have begun directly to address these poor conditions by upgrading infrastructure and quality of services in some settlements. Although these programs are not being replicated on a national level, and despite continued attempts by some local governments to dislocate certain favelas near upper income areas, the danger of relocation faced by some more consolidated favelas is considerably diminished. This improved security of tenure is largely the result of the increasing power of a growing number of local neighborhood associations in the communities of the poor. This is one of the main points to be examined in this work. But, favelas are being more and more growing up.

Notwithstanding the economic downturn in Brazil, which has accelerated a process of favelization in the urban areas, some favelas are enjoying improved conditions as a result of their relative increase in community political power. Brazil is a much poorer country than others in the world, with greater distortions in its distribution of wealth. In 1988, the Brazilian per capita GNP (Gross National Product) was only 12.4% of its American counterpart, notwithstanding a rate of urbanization of 75.5% during the 1980's, there was a continued process of urbanization in the country. The population growth of the decade was heavily distributed in non-metropolitan areas with 100 to 500 thousand inhabitants. The economic recession reduced the influence of great cities in migration. The rate of growth in the last decade was only 2% for metropolitan areas, while in non-metropolitan areas the rate was 3.6% per year.

How are the urban poor situated in this new context if social mobilization is strongly and decisively dependent on spatial concentration in locales where ideas and experiences can be shared within the community? This is the question this work attempts to answer. In both classic work-based struggles, typical before economic restructuring, and race-based struggles in the place of residence of the 1960's, the geographic al concentration of workers and of Blacks was an important element in the development of ideas and strategies.

Bibliograph

Andrews, George Reid (1991)

Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988. Madison: University of Winsconsin Press.

Eichenberg Silva, Luiz Carlos et alii (1992)

Projeto Agenda. O que Mostram os Indicadores sobre a Pobreza na Década Perdida. Rio de Janeiro, IPEA, mimeo.

Goldsmith, William W. and Blakely, Edward J. (1992)

Separate Societies: Poverty and Inequality in US cities. Philadelphia: Temple Univerity Press.

Guimarães Neto, Leonardo (1990)

O Mercado de trabalho na Década Perdida, in São Paulo em Perspectiva, 4 (3/4), Fundação SEADE, São Paulo, p. 6-15.

Hasenbalg, Carlos (1990)

Pesquisa sobre Migrações, Urbanização, Relações Raciais e Pobreza no Brasil, São Paulo: IDESP. Pastore, Jose and Haller, Archibald O. (1993)

- “O que está acontecendo com a mobilidade social no Brasil?”. In Velloso and Albuquerque, orgs. *Pobreza e Mobilidade Social*. Nobel: Rio de Janeiro. 25-52.
- Pessanha, Neves D. (1983)
Mendigo, O Trabalhador que não deu Certo, in *Ciência Hoje*, no. 4, jan/fev 1983.
- Martins, Ana Lucia (1993)
Livres Acampamentos da Miséria. Série Terceira Margem, Obra Aberta. Rio de Janeiro.
- Massey, Douglas S.; Denton, Nancy A. (1993)
American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
- Oliveira, Ney dos Santos (2000)
Segregação em favelas e mobilização política: Um estudo comparativo de raça e classe. Colóquio Arquitetura Brasileira: Redescobertas. XVI Congresso Brasileiro de Arquitetos. Cuiabá. 26 a 29 de Setembro de 2000.
- Oliveira, Ney dos Santos (1999)
Cidades Negras. Um estudo sobre a questão da cor nos bairros pobres da Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro. VIII Seminário de Iniciação Científica e Prêmio UFF Vasconcelos Torres de Ciência e Tecnologia da Universidade Federal Fluminense.
- Ribeiro, Rosa; Saboia, Ana and Bregman, Silvia (1993)
Crise e Reprodução Social das Famílias na Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro: 1981-1990, paper presented to the XVII Encontro da ANPOCS, Caxambu-MG, October 22-25, 1993.
- Sassen, Saskia (1991)
Global Cities: Tokyo, London and New York, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Silva, Nelson do Valle. (1985)
"Updating the Cost of Not Being White in Brazil". In Fontaine, M. ed., *Race, Class and Power in Brazil*. Los Angeles: Center for Afro-American Studies, University of California.
- Silva, Nelson do Valle (1992)
Desigualdades Raciais no Brasil: Revisitando o Caso do Rio de Janeiro, paper presented to the Seminário Internacional sobre Racismo e Relações Raciais nos Países da Diáspora Africana, Rio de Janeiro, Abril 1992.
- Silva, Nelson do Valle (1993)
“Situação Social da População Negra.” in Velloso and Albuquerque (eds.), 1993, *Pobreza e Mobilidade Social*. Rio de Janeiro: Nobel (175-198).
- Valladares, Lícia (1978)
Passa-se Uma Casa: análise do programa de remoção de favelas do Rio de Janeiro. Rio, Zahar.
- Valladares, Lícia; Ribeiro, Rosa (1992)
The Return of the Favela: Recent Changes in Metropolitan Rio. Paper presented to the International Sociological Association, University of California, Los Angeles, april 23-25, 1992.
- Valladares, Lícia; Batista, Marta (1993)
A Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro na Década de 80: Perfil da População e do Mercado de Trabalho segundo as PNADs. Paper presented to the XVII Encontro da ANPOCS, Caxambu: October 22-25, 1993.
- Velloso, João Paulo; Albuquerque, Roberto C. (1993)
Pobreza e Mobilidade Social, São Paulo: Livraria Nobel S.A.