

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS:

**UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS DO
PRESIDENTS RESORT TO DECREE
POWER? THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM
THE BRAZILIAN CASE**

Carlos Pereira
University of São Paulo
pereirace@uol.com.br

Timothy J. Power
Florida International University
powertj@fiu.edu

Lucio Rennó
University of Arizona and SUNY Stony Brook
lucio.renno@lycos.com

The Journal of Politics
Volume 67, Issue 1
February, 2005

This document contains supplemental material for an article that appears in *The Journal of Politics*. The material is presented exactly as it was provided by the author. Neither the *JOP* Editor nor the Southern Political Science Association takes any responsibility for problems that may arise from the use of these materials (e.g., computer code, datasets, etc.). All inquiries and comments regarding this document and its contents should be directed to the author.

Carlos Pereira, Lucio Rennó, and Timothy J. Power

Codebook for data used in “Under What Conditions Do Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Theory and Evidence from the Brazilian Case” (forthcoming *JOP* vol. 67, no. 1, Feb. 2005)

for raw data, see separate Excel file: brazil-decrees-data.xls

Codebook version 1.3

September 15, 2004

email queries to powertj@fiu.edu

FOR ALL VARIABLES, the prefix “lag” indicates that the variable was lagged.

MONTH: Months are the unit of observation. The series extends from October 1988, when Article 62 became effective with the new Constitution, through August 2001. (On September 11, 2001, the 32nd Amendment became effective, modifying Article 62 and altering somewhat the nature of presidential decree authority, so we cease our observations with August 2001.) Note that the month of March 1990 is divided in half, with the first assigned to Sarney and the second to Collor.

ADMI: Names of each president.

YEAR: List of years of each observation.

TIME: Months elapsed since October 1988.

ADMICODE: Codes for the different presidents. Sarney = 1, Collor = 2, Itamar = 3, Cardoso = 4.

ELECTION: Attempts to gauge the disruption to normal parliamentary activity caused by an impending election. Coding for presidential election is 1 for September, October and November of 1989 and 1994; also scored 1 for September and October 1998. All other months coded 0.

CABINET SIZE: Nominal size of the cabinet’s political “coverage” expressed in terms of legislative seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Ranges from a high of 93.5% (first Sarney cabinet chosen by Tancredo Neves) to a low of 26.2% (third Collor cabinet, based only on PFL and PDS). Source: Amorim Neto 2002.

CABINET COALESCENCE: Cabinet coalescence rate. This is the variable CABINET created by Octávio Amorim Neto. It measures the proportionality between the fractional shares of parliamentary seats held by parties and their ministerial payoffs in terms of the presidential cabinet. From the author: “In order to arrive at the coalescence rate for a given cabinet, we add the absolute value of the difference between the percent of ministries and the percent of legislative seats for all parties joining the cabinet, whether or not these parties hold legislative seats, and for all ministers, whether party members or not, and then divide the total by two. Subtracting the result from 1 yields the coalescence rate. The index varies between zero (no correspondence between ministerial payoffs and legislative seats) and one, which defines an upper limit of perfect correspondence between cabinet shares and legislative weights. Any departure from this upper limit is detected.” For months in which there was a cabinet shakeup, we took the average of the values for the old and new cabinets. Source: Amorim Neto 2002.

INFLATION: INPC - A measure of inflation, using the consumer price index maintained by IBGE (Brazilian Census Bureau). Source: IPEA web site.

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY: Monthly average Presidential popularity. We used three sources: DataFolha (1988-2001), Vox Populi (1995-2001), and CNI/Ibope (1995-2001). Popularity is measured intermittently by all three institutes, so first we interpolated missing values to create full monthly series for all three. Then we checked for intersource reliability by performing correlational analysis of the interpolated time series. The interpolated DataFolha series correlates with the interpolated Vox Populi series at .95 (N=79) and with the interpolated Ibope series at .96 (N=78). Given the high reliability, we opted to create an average of the three polls for the 1995-2001 period and use the DataFolha for the early 1988-1994 period.

LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT: Monthly Average of the percentage of legislators following the floor recommendations (encaminhamentos) of the leader of the Government in the Chamber of Deputies. In cases where the executive recommends a NO vote, the denominator is the total of votes cast in the house. In the case where the executive recommends a YES vote, the denominator is the total number of seats in the house. This variable captures legislative support for executive initiatives. In months with no floor votes, we carry forward the previous value. Source: Banco de Dados Legislativos, CEBRAP (São Paulo), 2002 version, courtesy of Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi.

DECREE RELIANCE RATIO: Ratio of presidential decrees (medidas provisórias) to all executive initiatives sent to Congress, by month (equivalent to $MPV/(MPV+PL+PLC)$).

MPV: Number of original *medidas provisórias* (decrees) by month. Source: Câmara dos Deputados.

PL: Number of *projetos de lei* (ordinary bills) introduced by the executive, by month. Source: Câmara dos Deputados.

PLC: Number of *projetos de lei complementar* (enabling legislation, i.e., bills that aim to activate or regulate constitutional provisions that were non-self-executing to begin with) introduced by the executive, by month. Source: Câmara dos Deputados.

ECONOMIC PLAN: Coded as 1 in months in which there was a major economic “package” or “plan” introduced by the executive, and 0 in all other months. The relevant months are January 1989 (Plano Verão), March 1990-b (Plano Collor), December 1990 (Collor II), December 1993 (URV), and June 1994 (Plano Real). Source: coded by authors.

ITAMAR, COLLOR, CARDOSO, SARNEY: Dummy variables for the presidential administrations.

HONEYMOON: Honeymoon period variable. A dummy where 1 represents the first 3 months of each presidential administration (except Sarney, who had already been in office more than three years when our analysis began) and 0 the rest.

REELECTABILITY: Eligibility for re-election variable. Dummy where 1 represents the change in executive branch re-election rules in Brazil. June 1997 onward equals 1, the rest 0.