

Appendix A: Measurement of Institutional and Contextual Variables

To collect data on the internal institutional arrangements survey instruments were designed for structured telephone interviews with news personnel in each of the organizations in the sample. The first drafts of questions were derived from the literature on news organizations, and from informal interviews of personal contacts in the media. For the most part respondents held the following positions: news director, managing editor, editor, or reporter. Questions focused on institutional factors within the newsroom such as hierarchy, division of labor, and specialization . The survey instrument used to interview media personnel was designed to provide measures of these variables.

To improve response rates and participation, anonymity to both individuals and their organizations was guaranteed. Tables A3 and A4 describe the market and ownership information for the news organizations. The number of newspaper stories from Colorado and Washington was 297 and 335, respectively. The number of television news stories from Colorado and Washington was 285 and 122, respectively. Further information on news organizations and the markets in which they are embedded is provided in Tables A3 and A4 below. Table A1 outlines the theoretical concepts and operational definitions of the institutional variables of interest. Table A2 gives the operational definition, descriptive statistics, and data sources for the contextual and control variables in the analysis.

Table A1 Theoretical Concepts and Operational Definitions: Institutional Variables

Theoretical Concept	Operational Definition	Descriptive Statistics		Data
		Newspaper	Television	
Division of labor	Number of reporters	Range 3,35 Mean 21.9 Std. Dev 9.13	Range 1,125 Mean 49 Std. Dev 32.4	Interview Q3: About how many reporters do you have on the news staff?
Division of labor	Number of political reporters	Range 0,12 Mean 5.4 Std. Dev 4	Range 1, 20 Mean 2.65 Std. Dev 5.5	Interview Q4: Daily, about how many reporters in the organization usually cover politics and elections?
Division of labor	Percent political reporters	Range 0,100 Mean 14.2 Std. Dev 13	Range 0,100 Mean 12.46 Std. Dev 27.5	Interview Q3, Q4
Specialization	Newsbeat assignments	Range 1,3 Mean 1.87 Std. Dev .99	Range 1,3 Mean 2.7 Std. Dev .50	Interview Q5: Are these reporters on general assignment, or “Beat” assignments, or both?
Specialization	Percent political newsbeats	Range 0,100 Mean 22.3 Std. Dev 21	Range 0,40 Mean 14.9 Std. Dev 17	Interview Q5a: (If yes to Q5) Overall, about how many newsbeats are there? Survey Q5b: (If yes to Q5) About how many of the newsbeats generally cover politics?
Separation of Ownership and Control	Owned by publicly traded corporation controlled by corporate shareholders.	Range 0,1 Mean .41 Std. Dev .49	Range 0,1 Mean .75 Std. Dev .43	2004 Editor and Publisher International Yearbook; 2002-2003 Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook.

Table A2 Operational Definitions, Descriptive Statistics, and Data Sources – Contextual and Control Variables

Variable	Operational Definition	Source Newspapers	Descriptive Statistics	Source Television	Descriptive Statistics
<i>Income</i>	Median income in market area divided by 1000.	<i>2004 Editor and Publisher International Yearbook</i> 2000 U.S. Census	Range 20,63.9 Mean 41.3 Std Dev 6.1	<i>2002 – 2003 Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook</i> <i>2000 Census</i>	Range 32,42 Mean 38.5 Std Dev 3.05
<i>Education</i>	Percent of residents in DMA with high school degree.	N/A	N/A	<i>2002 – 2003 Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook</i> <i>2000 Census</i>	Range 78,86 Mean 83.5 Std Dev 2.18
<i>% Young Audiences in Market</i>	Percent of market ages 20-44.	<i>2004 Editor and Publisher International Yearbook</i> 2000 U.S. Census	Range 28.7,51.5 Mean 43.1 Std Dev 4.2	<i>2002 – 2003 Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook</i> <i>2000 Census</i>	Range 21,34 Mean 25.9 Std Dev 5.49
<i>% Female in Market</i>	% of Females in market.	<i>2004 Editor and Publisher International Yearbook</i> 2000 U.S. Census	Range 42.1,52.9 Mean 50 Std Dev .985	<i>2002 – 2003 Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook</i> <i>2000 Census</i>	Range 48,50 Mean 49 Std Dev .70
<i>Circulation</i>	Circulation numbers, logged	<i>2004 Editor and Publisher International Yearbook</i>	Range 7.87, 13.32 Mean 11.62 Std Dev 1.4	N/A	N/A
<i>Market Competition</i>	Number households in DMA/competitors in market, divided by 1000.	N/A	N/A	<i>2002 – 2003 Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook</i>	Range 54.4, 823.6 Mean 127.47 Std Dev 66.16
<i>State</i>	Colorado=1 Washington=0	News Content	Range 0,1 Mean .469 Std Dev .499	News Content	Range 0,1 Mean .70 Std Dev .46
<i>Election Week</i>	Number of weeks into the Election	News Content	Range 1,9 Mean 6.64 Std Dev 2.65	N/A	N/A
<i>Week 8</i>	Next to last week of the campaign.	N/A	N/A	News Content	Range 0,1 Mean .299 Std Dev .458
<i>Week 9</i>	The last week of the campaign.	N/A	N/A	News Content	Range 0,1 Mean .338 Std Dev .474

Note: The high school education variable is used in the television model because the income measure and the measure indicating a college degree were too highly correlated with other key independent variables in the model. As noted in the text, the election week variable in the television model was converted into dichotomous variables indicating the final weeks of the campaign (weeks 8 and 9). These are used because the continuous weeks variable was too highly correlated with other key independent variables in the television model. Finally, demographic variables for age and gender are not included in the television models due to similar problems with high correlation and multicollinearity.

Table A3: Newspaper Market and Ownership Information

<i>Organization</i>			
<i>Number</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Market Size</i>	<i>Ownership</i>
3	Colorado	94673	Public Corporate
6	Colorado	360890	Private
8	Colorado	554636	Public Corporate
9	Colorado	554636	Private
10	Colorado	554636	Private
11	Colorado	13922	Private
12	Colorado	118652	Public Corporate
13	Colorado	11034	Private
16	Colorado	41986	Private
33	Washington	16461	Private
34	Washington	1737034	Private
39	Washington	91488	Public Corporate
42	Washington	42514	Public Corporate
46	Washington	563374	Private
47	Washington	563374	Private
48	Washington	195629	Private
50	Washington	193556	Public Corporate
51	Washington	143560	Private
55	Washington	71845	Private

Table A4: Television Market and Ownership Information

<i>Organization Number</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Market Size</i>	<i>Ownership Structure</i>	<i>Market Competition</i>	<i>Competition Level</i>
70	Washington	1647230	Private Public	-205.9	Low
71	Colorado	1381620	Corporate Public	-125.6	Medium
72	Washington	1647230	Corporate	-205.9	Low
73	Washington	380480	Private Public	-54.4	High
74	Washington	1647230	Corporate	-205.9	Low
75	Washington	1647230	Private	-205.9	Low
76	Colorado	305730	Private Public	-76.4	High
77	Colorado	1381620	Corporate	-125.6	Medium
78	Washington	1647230	Private Public	-205.9	Low
79	Washington	1647230	Corporate Public	-205.9	Low
80	Washington	380480	Corporate Public	-54.4	High
81	Washington	380480	Corporate Public	-54.4	High
82	Colorado	1381620	Corporate Public	-125.6	Medium
83	Washington	1647230	Corporate Public	-205.9	Low
84	Colorado	1381620	Corporate	-125.6	Medium
85	Washington	380480	Private	-54.4	High

Note: Market competition is calculated by number households in DMA divided by the number of competitors in market, divided by 1000. The measure is then multiplied by -1 so that larger numbers reflect more competition. The measure reflects only the general competition level within each market by giving an indication of the potential market share for each outlet.

Appendix B: Collection and Coding of Newspaper and Television News Stories

As described in the text, the dependent variable involved coding the focus of the news stories. This variable was originally coded according to how coders answered the following question: In your opinion, what is the *primary* focus of the story? The answer choices were: issue coverage, adwatch coverage, coverage of personal characteristics, horse race coverage, strategy coverage or other. If the primary focus of the news story was not one of the types listed, coders were to choose the “other” option. Each coder was trained and provided a coding help sheet which they could continually refer to while coding. In the coding help sheet were descriptions of each type of coverage.

Establishing Reliability with Content Analysis

To test for inter-coder reliability Cohen's Kappa is used. Kappa approaches 1 as coding is perfectly reliable and goes to 0 when there is no agreement other than what would be expected by chance (Haney et al., 1998; Stemler 2001). Kappa is preferred because it accounts for the fact that coders are expected to agree with each other a certain percentage of the time simply based on chance (Cohen 1960; Stemler 2001). Kappa assumes independence of the objects being coded, mutually exclusive categories, and that the coders arrive at their coding decisions independently. The coding rules employed meet these criteria. Kappa is computed as:

$$K = \frac{P_A - P_c}{1 - P_c}$$

P_A = proportion of units on which the coders agree

P_C = the proportion of units for which agreement is expected by chance.

Landis & Koch (1977, p.165) have suggested the following standards for interpreting kappa: <0.00=Poor; 0.00–0.20=Slight; 0.21– 0.40=Fair; 0.41–

0.60=Moderate; 0.61–0.80=Substantial; 0.81– 1.00=Almost Perfect. In addition, Kvalseth (1989) suggests that “a kappa coefficient of 0.61 represents reasonably good overall agreement.” (Wheelock et al.2000; Stemler 2001). Since the Kappa scores reported here for newspaper stories and television stories are .66 and .62 respectively, I have confidence in the reliability of my coding scheme. Agreement was calculated using 10% of the sample as is standard practice (Stemler 2001). Two trained paid undergraduates coded the entire samples of newspaper and television news content. The coding they provided was used in the analysis.

Table B1: Overall Inter-Coder Agreement Coding the Focus of News Stories

<i>Medium</i>	<i>Average Inter-Coder Agreement</i>	<i>Cohen's Kappa</i>
Newspaper	.74	.66
Television	.69	.62

Table B2: Inter-Coder Agreement for Coding of Newspaper Stories by Outlet

<i>Organization Number</i>	<i>Market Size</i>	<i>Agreement by Percent</i>	<i>Kappa Coefficient</i>	<i>Kappa Rating</i>
3	94673	100	1	Perfect
6	360890	.60	.50	Moderate
8	554636	.90	.88	Almost Perfect
9	554636	.83	.79	Substantial
10	554636	.33	.16	Poor*
11	13922	100	1	Perfect
12	118652	.75	.69	Substantial
13	11034	100	.38	Fair
16	41986	.60	.50	Moderate
33	16461	100	1	Perfect
34	1737034	.75	.69	Substantial
39	91488	.60	.50	Moderate
42	42514	.66	.58	Substantial
46	563374	.85	.81	Almost Perfect
47	563374	.80	.75	Almost Perfect
48	195629	100	1	Perfect
50	193556	.66	.58	Moderate
51	143560	100	1	Perfect
55	71845	100	1	Perfect

*Fewer than five news stories in the sample.

Table B3: Inter-Coder Agreement for Coding of Television News Stories by Outlet

<i>Organization Number</i>	<i>Market Size</i>	<i>Agreement by Percent</i>	<i>Kappa Coefficient</i>	<i>Kappa Rating</i>
70	380480	100	1	Perfect
71	1381620	100	1	Perfect
72	1647230	0.75	0.68	Substantial
73	380480	100	1	Perfect
74	1647230	100	1	Perfect
75	1647230	0.75	0.68	Substantial
76	305730	100	1	Perfect
77	1381620	0.75	0.68	Substantial
78	1647230	0.66	0.58	Moderate
79	1647230	0.71	0.64	Substantial
80	380480	100	1	Perfect
81	380480	100	1	Perfect
82	1381620	100	1	Perfect
83	1647230	100	1	Perfect
84	1381620	100	1	Perfect
85	380480	0.66	0.58	Moderate

Collection of Newspaper and Television News Content

Following Kahn and Kenney (2002), all election news stories between September 1 and Election Day (November 1) were examined. Collection of newspaper stories regarding the races was relatively simple. Using online news databases such as LEXIS/NEXIS and Newsbank, keyword searches were used to identify all stories about the races that occurred during the timeframe noted above.

Collecting television news stories was appreciably more difficult. Clips of local news programs are very expensive and difficult to obtain, in the few instances in which they are available. There are several reasons for this. First, many news organizations contract out their clippings services to companies who operate for profit. As providing news clips is their livelihood, these services are quite expensive. Second, some of these services and/or the news organizations who manage their own clips only retain them for a

few weeks after the program aired, making their archives very short lived. To ensure the collection of as many stories as possible, calls were made to every television news outlet in Colorado and Washington that produce their own local news programs immediately following the election. Information was recorded as to what stories had aired, how news clips and transcripts were handled for that station, and what the timeframe would be for the availability of news content. From that point, stories were collected in the order of length of availability. Some of the news organizations contacted and identified refused to make their content available. Unfortunately, this resulted in the exclusion news stories of some outlets from the study. In most cases, clipping services were able to provide electronic transcripts of news stories, which are much less expensive than actual video clips. Those stations handling their own archives and willing to share the content, performed keyword searches to locate the stories, and then located and provided transcripts of the stories. In only a few instances (fewer than 5) video clips of stories (as opposed to transcripts) were the only option available.

Appendix C: Secondary Analyses

Table C1: Multinomial Probit Estimates, Focus of Newspaper Stories

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Issue Coverage/Strategy</i>	<i>Candidate Personal Characteristics/Strategy</i>	<i>Adwatch Coverage/Strategy</i>	<i>Horserace Coverage/Strategy</i>
Corporate Ownership	-.701*** (.132)	-.233** (.119)	-.126 (.390)	-.251 (.177)
Median Income	.046*** (.010)	.032** (.016)	-.075 (.072)	.036** (.018)
% Young in Market	-.050** (.021)	-.013 (.027)	.087 (.104)	-.058** (.026)
% Female in Market	-.322*** (.124)	-.030 (.113)	.220 (.342)	-.209* (.133)
Circulation	.142 (.093)	.184 (.114)	.566* (.318)	.339** (.149)
# Political Reporters	.076*** (.018)	.007 (.016)	-.032 (.056)	-.077*** (.030)
% Political Reporters	.018*** (.004)	.004 (.007)	.005 (.014)	.004 (.014)
% Political Newsbeats	.007** (.004)	.008*** (.003)	.009 (.013)	.008** (.004)
Election Week	-.039 (.043)	.034 (.055)	.054 (.066)	.142*** (.052)
State	-.330 (.241)	-.426 (.252)	-.751 (.646)	-1.06*** (.338)
Constant	14.3 (6.05)	-2.12 (5.59)	-20.3 (19.0)	5.72 (7.66)

N= 506

Note: Strategy coverage is the base outcome. This is another of the superficial forms of news stories, only discussing the strategies candidates and campaigns are employing and describing their activities.

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.01

Table C2: Multinomial Probit Estimates, Focus of Television News Stories

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Issue Coverage/Strategy</i>	<i>Candidate Personal Characteristics/Strategy</i>	<i>Adwatch Coverage/Strategy</i>	<i>Horseshoe Coverage/Strategy</i>
Corporate Ownership	-1.61*** (.644)	-1.04 * (.691)	.435 (.707)	-1.10** (.601)
Market Competition	-.005** (.003)	.004 (.006)	-.005** (.002)	-.033* (.002)
% High School	.119 (.107)	.098 (.143)	-.032 (.122)	-.053 (.101)
% Political Reporters	.007*** (.002)	.011*** (.003)	-.001 (.008)	.012*** (.005)
% Political Newsbeats	.019*** (.005)	.017** (.009)	.001 (.022)	.022** (.012)
Week 8	-.506* (.365)	.097 (.591)	.635 (.716)	.312 (.274)
Week 9	-.612* (.459)	.165 (.376)	1.21** (.737)	.621** (.368)
State	.129 (.553)	-.512 (.658)	.139 (1.01)	-1.63*** (.482)
Constant	-10.6 (8.81)	-9.12 (11.4)	-.951 (10.5)	4.27 (8.36)

N= 401

Note: Strategy coverage is the base outcome. This is another of the superficial forms of news stories, only discussing the strategies candidates and campaigns are employing and describing their activities.

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.01

Multinomial Logit and Multinomial Probit generate nearly identical predictions (Long and Freese 2006). Indeed, after running both, the correlation between the predicted probabilities for the first outcome for both models is .9998, revealing very little difference between the two models. As such, I present the MNL results below and generate the changes in predicted probabilities for the MNL models, as it is less cumbersome than doing so for the MNP models.

Table C3: Multinomial Logit Estimates, Focus of Newspaper Stories

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Issue Coverage/ Strategy</i>	<i>Candidate Personal Characteristics/ Strategy</i>	<i>Adwatch Coverage/ Strategy</i>	<i>Horseshoe Coverage/ Strategy</i>
Corporate Ownership Median Income	-.939*** (.193)	-.301** (.162)	-.048 (.721)	-.346 (.337)
% Young in Market	-.069** (.013)	-.012 (.037)	.068 (.512)	-.080** (.047)
% Female in Market	-.447** (.189)	-.016 (.150)	.423 (.656)	-.272 (.219)
Circulation	.176 (.146)	.218 (.160)	1.27 (1.74)	.461** (.247)
# Political Reporters	.103*** (.024)	.010 (.023)	-.065 (.099)	-.143** (.057)
% Political Reporters	.024*** (.005)	.004 (.011)	.014 (.050)	.008 (.020)
% Political Newsbeats	.009** (.005)	.011*** (.004)	.014 (.024)	.012* (.008)
Election Week	-.050 (.056)	.046 (.076)	.100 (.141)	.263*** (.104)
State	-.391 (.359)	-.511 (.348)	-1.65 (2.87)	-1.67*** (.618)
Constant	20.2** (9.31)	-3.82 (7.30)	-38.3 (36.7)	6.47 (12.5)

N=506

Pseudo R2=.07

Note: Strategy coverage is the base outcome. This is another of the superficial forms of news stories, only discussing the strategies candidates and campaigns are employing and describing their activities.

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.01

Table C4: Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Focus of Newspaper Stories

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Issue Coverage</i>	<i>Candidate Personal Characteristics</i>	<i>Adwatch Coverage</i>	<i>Horseshoe Coverage</i>	<i>Strategy Coverage</i>
Corporate Ownership	-.17	.01	.006	.0003	.15
Median Income	.06	.01	-.009	.004	-.06
% Young in Market	-.05	.009	.008	-.006	.04
% Female in Market	-.07	.02	.01	-.004	.04
Circulation	.0003	.01	.05	.01	-.08
# Political Reporters	.10	-.02	-.006	-.02	-.05
% Political Reporters	.05	-.01	.001	-.0003	-.04
% Political Newsbeats	.02	.02	.003	.005	-.05
Election Week	-.05	.02	.005	.03	-.01
State	-.02	-.04	-.03	-.04	-.13

Note: The changes in predicted probability reported are calculated by increasing the value by one standard deviation while holding all other variables constant at mean values, except in cases of dichotomous variables, in which case the reported probability is calculated by varying from its minimum to maximum value.

Table C4: Multinomial Logit Estimates, Focus of Television News Stories

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Issue Coverage/Strategy</i>	<i>Candidate Personal Characteristics /Strategy</i>	<i>Adwatch Coverage/Strategy</i>	<i>Horserace Coverage /Strategy</i>
Corporate Ownership	-2.22*** (.914)	-1.71* (1.14)	1.17 (1.18)	-1.45** (.784)
Market Competition	-.007** (.004)	.008 (.012)	-.008** (.003)	-.005* (.784)
% High School	.178 (.147)	.196 (.255)	-.006 (.196)	-.073 (.130)
% Political Reporters	.008*** (.003)	.018*** (.006)	-.005 (.014)	.015** (.007)
% Political Newsbeats	.024*** (.009)	.027* (.017)	-.004 (.035)	.028** (.017)
Week 8	-.722* (.499)	.229 (1.02)	1.38 (1.27)	.419 (.405)
Week 9	-.991* (.766)	.237 (.610)	2.32** (1.24)	.820** (.501)
State	.333 (.877)	-.566 (1.17)	.686 (1.57)	-2.09*** (.593)
Constant	-15.8 (12.1)	-17.5 (20.4)	5.97 (17.1)	5.81 (10.7)

N=401

Psuedo R2=.13

Note: Strategy coverage is the base outcome. This is another of the superficial forms of news stories, only discussing the strategies candidates and campaigns are employing and describing their activities.

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.01

Table C5: Changes in Predicted Probabilities Television News Stories

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Issue Coverage</i>	<i>Candidate Personal Characteristics</i>	<i>Adwatch Coverage</i>	<i>Horseshoe Coverage</i>	<i>Strategy Coverage</i>
Corporate Ownership	-.27	-.03	.04	-.13	.39
Market Competition	-.04	.03	-.01	-.04	.06
% High School	.05	.01	-.001	-.03	-.03
% Political Reporters	.01	.01	-.007	.06	-.08
% Political Newsbeats	.04	.009	-.007	.06	-.10
Week 8	-.09	.005	.05	.07	-.04
Week 9	-.13	.001	.10	.13	-.10
State	.09	-.001	.03	-.39	.27

Note: The changes in predicted probability reported are calculated by increasing the value by one standard deviation while holding all other variables constant at mean values, except in cases of dichotomous variables, in which case the reported probability is calculated by varying from its minimum to maximum value.

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