

**SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS:**  
**ELECTORAL INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL  
CORRUPTION UNDER OPEN-LIST  
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION**

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# Appendix

## Robustness Check

As discussed in the paper, many question the reliability of judicial records as a proxy for corruption since they might reflect judicial efficiency rather than corruption. Simply put, less corruption as measured by less prosecution may simply result from the inefficiency of the magistrates in detecting it. To systematically guard against this potential threat, I include the ratio of completed judicial proceedings in the lower courts in the model.<sup>1</sup> If the corruption variable simply mirrors judicial efficiency instead of the actual incidence of corruption, then the coefficient should be positive since charges against deputies should increase as efficiency improves.

The results in Model 3 imply that the corruption measured here is not a spurious effect of judicial efficiency. The variable of judicial efficiency is negative rather than positive, suggesting higher level of corruption in districts where the courts are less efficient as indicated by a lower ratio of completed proceedings.<sup>2</sup> One reasonable and straightforward explanation is that legislators feel less monitored and hence are more likely to engage in corruption. More importantly, we can see that the coefficient of the key independent variable measuring electoral uncertainty remains positive and significant after controlling for judicial efficiency.

[Table 2 about here]

Another legitimate concern with the use of the judicial record as a proxy for corruption is that judicial accusations can be politically motivated. We certainly should

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<sup>1</sup>The data on judicial efficiency come from the Centre for North South Economic Research, and are not available for the period before 1970.

<sup>2</sup>I also controlled for judicial efficiency by using another variable, the average length of judicial process. Shorter trials or faster proceedings indicate improvement of efficiency, which should lead to fewer charges against deputies. The results again offer strong support for this hypothesis and reiterate that electorally insecure legislators are more likely to be corrupt as the main theory predicts. I did not include both variables on judicial efficiency in the same regression equation due to the very high correlation between these two ( $r = -.97$ ).

not rule out this possibility, since the evidence on whether judicial power is neutral in Italy remains mixed. While many emphasize the strong judicial independence due to the constitutionally protected self-governing organ, the High Council of the Judiciary (Di Federico 1989; Nelken 1996; Guarnieri 1997), others also point out the substantial influence of political parties on the judiciary and the illicit financial links between them (Koff and Koff 2000; della Porta 2001). This paper considers the question of whether judicial power is neutral or political to be an empirical one, and includes a dummy variable to indicate whether a legislator belongs to one of the governing parties. As Model 3 indicates, a legislator is indeed less likely to be charged with corruption if he is a member of the ruling parties. This result suggests the presence of “partisan targeting,” which is a phenomenon that has also been identified in the case of the American states (Meier and Holbrook 1992). Accounting for the important question of what underlies the existence of partisan targeting goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, what is reassuring is that the coefficient of uncertainty remains positive, reinforcing the important uncertainty effect on corruption which is insensitive to the potential partisan biases in those corruption charges.

While Model 3 controls for the influence of judicial efficiency and partisan targeting, it does not capture another important possibility, that is, that prosecuting corruption is a higher priority at some times than at others. The clean hand operation in Italy during the early 1990s was certainly a climax of Italy’s anti-corruption history, while corruption has not received the same attention in other periods. Therefore, to guard against the possibility that the RAPs may measure the time-varying importance of corruption, Model 4 includes a set of dummy variables for each legislative period to incorporate the impact of any unaccounted time-specific characteristics underlying the charges of corruption. Again, the evidence indicates that the coefficient of the uncertainty variable is positive, and substantive findings remain unaltered.

Finally, the analysis so far has ignored an important phenomenon: the same legislator

might be charged with corruption multiple times. In other words, the previous analyses ignored the issue of repeated events and simply assumed that the subsequent charges are generated identically and independently to the previous charges. Clearly, this heroic assumption is likely to be violated in reality. As argued by Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002), the issue of repeated events is consequential. In particular, when the subsequent events are affected by and therefore different from the first event, analyses that treat repeated events as independent are likely to yield optimistic inferences.

A closer examination of the data reveals that a substantial proportion of legislators were charged multiple times across legislatures. Moreover, as in criminal studies that differentiate first-time offenders from serial criminals, it is reasonable to believe that those who are charged repeatedly are fundamentally different in their propensity for corruption than those who are only charged once. Therefore, to handle the issue of multiple events, I follow BKT's suggestion and include a counter variable that calculates the number of previous charges. As Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002) suggest, the purpose of this counter variable is to allow the baseline hazard to change by the subsequent event. Substantively, the counter variable is expected to be positive since "ex-cons" are more likely than first-time offenders to break the law again. As Model 5 in Table 1 shows, this intuition is supported by the data.

## References

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**Table 2: Robustness Check**

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Uncertainty	1.7448*** [0.3203]	2.7900*** [0.2660]	2.7867*** [0.2648]
Corruption Network	0.1052*** [0.0173]	0.1037*** [0.0155]	0.1166*** [0.0148]
Number of Terms Served	0.3831*** [0.1260]	0.4581*** [0.1193]	-0.3064 [0.2051]
Elite Legislator	0.2133 [0.1376]	0.5946*** [0.1060]	0.5769*** [0.1053]
GDP per capita	-28.5693* [15.3474]	-43.2179*** [14.0234]	-32.2744*** [12.1252]
State Intervention	0.0003 [0.0002]	-0.0003 [0.0002]	0.0004** [0.0002]
Judicial Efficiency	0.0034** [0.0015]		
Ruling Parties	-1.8814*** [0.1570]		
Number of Previous Charges			2.0285*** [0.4216]
Constant	-2.1138*** [0.4775]	-3.6605*** [0.3900]	-3.5071*** [0.3627]
Observations	1950	2711	2711

Note: Standard errors in brackets. \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001. All tests are two-tailed. The individual legislature coefficients in the fixed-effects model (Model 4) and all coefficients of temporal dummies are omitted in the interest of space.