

**Appendix to accompany
“Globalization, Policy Constraints, and Voter Choice”**

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This appendix has four parts:

1. A data appendix reporting variable measures, coding practices, and descriptive statistics
2. Calculating estimation uncertainty in the conditional logit models
3. Statistical results not reported in the main text
These include:
 - A. Replication of Table 2 reporting first differences for six French parties separately
 - B. Multinomial logit model of vote choice in French 1997 election with 3 choices (Center-Left, Center-Right, and Front National)
 - C. First differences on the effect of party identification on vote choice in the 1997 French Election
 - D. First differences on the effect of party identification on vote choice in the 2001 British Election
 - E. First differences on the effect of *Exposed Sector* as conditioning variable on vote choice in the 2001 British Election
4. Sensitivity analysis documentation

Part 1. Survey Questions and Variable Codes

A. 1997 French Legislative Election

Unless noted otherwise, all variables are from CEVIPOF (2001).

Vote choice: “How did you vote on the first ballot last Sunday?” Variable coded 1 for RPR, 2 for PCF, 3 for PS, 4 for Greens (Verts + “autres ecologistes”), 5 for UDF, and 6 for FN. All other responses (= less than 10% of sample) are treated as missing.

RMC: “According to you, does globalization still leave the French government a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or hardly any room to maneuver in the economy?” (“*Selon vous, est ce que la mondialisation laisse encore au gouvernement français dans le domaine économique des marges de manœuvre très grandes, assez grandes, assez faibles, ou très faibles?*”) Responses coded 0 for “a great deal,” 1 for “quite a lot,” 2 for “not very much, and 3 for “hardly any.”

Prospective Economy: “In the next 12 months, do you think that the economic situation in the country will improve, worsen, or stay the same?” Responses coded 1 for improve, 0 for stay the same, and -1 worsen.

Economic policy position: Party position is from Marks and Steenbergen (1999) and is the mean value from county experts’ evaluations of each of the six parties according to the following statement: “Political scientists often classify parties in terms of the ideological stance they take on economic issues. Parties to the right on economic issues tend to emphasize a reduction of the economic role of the government; they want lower taxes, less regulation, privatization, reduced government spending, and a leaner welfare state that poses fewer burdens on employers. Parties to the left on economic issues want the government to retain an active role in the economy. Using these criteria, please indicate where the parties are located in terms of their economic ideology [on a 0-10 scale].”

The voter economic policy position measure is from Boy and Mayer’ additive index made up of three sets of survey items, rescaled to a 0-10 scale: “For each of the following words, please tell me if it evokes something very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative:” “profit,” “private school,” “privatization,” “public service.” Responses coded 3 for “very positive,” 2 for “somewhat positive,” 1 for “somewhat negative,” 0 for “very negative,” with codes reversed for public service. “During the election campaign the following propositions were heard. For each could you please tell me whether you are very much for, somewhat for, somewhat against, or very much against?” Items include: “reducing the number of civil servants,” “alleviating the social benefits paid by businesses,” “raising the minimum wage by 1000 francs,” “creating 350,000 public sector jobs,” “reducing the work week to 35 hours without reduction in pay.” Responses coded 3 for “very much for,” 2 for “somewhat for,” 1 for “somewhat against,” 0 for “very much against,” with codes reversed for minimum wage, public sector jobs, and work week reduction. “In the coming years, do you think priority should be given to the competitiveness of the French economy or improving the situation of salaried employees?” Responses coded 1 for “competitiveness,” 0 otherwise.

Social policy position. Party positions are the mean value from county experts' evaluations of each party's position on "freedoms and rights" from Marks and Steenbergen (1999). Low values on the 11-point scale connote "libertarian" or "post-materialist" and high values connote "traditional" or "authoritarian" values.

Voter social policy position is measured using an additive index of responses to the following items: "In France 90% of deputies are men and this is serious for democracy;" "Muslim scarf-wearing should be permitted at school." Both coded strongly agree 0, somewhat agree 1, somewhat disagree 2, strongly disagree 3; "The death penalty has to be restored." Coded strongly agree coded 3, somewhat agree 2, somewhat disagree 1, strongly disagree 0; "Regarding education, which one of the two opinions to you agree the most with: school should primarily develop a sense of discipline and effort (coded 1), school should primarily form sharp-minded people who think critically (coded 0).

Party Identification: "Here is a list of parties and political movements. Could you tell me the one you feel the closest to or in any case the least remote?" Coded 1 if respondent named a party and if s/he responded "very" or "somewhat" close to the question "Would you say that you usually are very close, somewhat close, somewhat not close, or not close at all to a particular political party?" All other responses coded 0.

Attitude toward State: "For each of the following, could you tell me if it evokes something very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative? The State." 0 = "very negative," 1 = "somewhat negative," 2 = "somewhat positive," 3 = "very positive."

Interest in Politics: "How interested are you in politics?" 1 = "not at all," 2 = "not much," 3 = "somewhat," 4 = "very much."

Religion: "How often do you go to mass?" Coded 4 for "at least once a week," 3 for "once or twice a month," 2 for "from time to time," 1 for "ceremonies only," and 0 for never/non-Catholic/dk/na.

Self Employed, White Collar: created from coding profession of the respondent. For those who said they never worked, I substituted responses of the head of household.

Education: four-category scale based on highest grade obtained so that 1 = no degree or primary school, 2 = secondary school, 3 = baccalauréat, 4 = advanced degree.

The remainder of demographic variables are dummy variables and are self-explanatory. The baseline for the regional dummies is Ile-de-France.

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Analysis of the French National Election Study

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Prospective Economy	0.111	0.675	-1.000	1.000
Economic Issues	1.527	1.293	0.000	8.357
Social Issues	0.294	2.475	0.000	8.000
Party Identification	0.300	0.450	0.000	1.000
RMC ^a	0.098	0.749	-1.500	1.500
Attitude toward State	1.743	0.799	0.000	3.000
Political Interest	2.578	0.864	1.000	4.000
Religion	1.212	1.156	0.000	4.000
Self Employed	0.102	0.302	0.000	1.000
White Collar	0.528	0.499	0.000	1.000
Age	46.596	17.280	18.000	88.000
Female	0.505	0.500	0.000	1.000
Education	2.266	1.111	1.000	4.000
Northwest	0.225	0.418	0.000	1.000
Northeast	0.256	0.436	0.000	1.000
Southwest	0.171	0.376	0.000	1.000
Southeast	0.199	0.399	0.000	1.000

Number of observations = 1670

^a RMC = Room to Maneuver Constraint. As discussed in the main text, RMC is coded 0, 1, 2, 3. As an aid in interpretation, I rescaled the variable prior to estimating the model reported in Table 1 using the codes -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, 1.5.

B. 2001 British Election

Except where noted otherwise, all variables are from Heath *et al.* (2002). With the exception of *Retrospective Economy*, all questions used in the analysis are from wave 8 of the panel study, for which fieldwork was carried out after the June 7th vote. (*Retrospective Economy* is taken from wave 7 so as to avoid perceptions contaminated with the known election outcome). When necessary, missing values are filled in using earlier waves of the study.

Vote choice: “Which party did you vote for in the general election? Variable coded 1 for Labour, 2 for Conservative, and 3 for Liberal Democrat. All other responses treated as missing.

RMC: “In today’s worldwide economy, how much influence do you think British governments have on Britain’s economy, a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or hardly any?” Responses coded 0 for “a great deal,” 1 for “quite a lot,” 2 for “not very much, and 3 for “hardly any.”

Prospective Economy: “How do you think the general economic situation in Britain will develop over the next 12 months?” Responses coded 1 for get (a lot/little) better, 0 for stay the same, and -1 for get (a little/lot) worse.

Retrospective Economy: “How do you think the general economic situation in Britain has changed over the last 12 months?” Responses coded 1 for got (a lot/little) better, 0 for stayed the same, and -1 for got (a little/lot) worse.

Economic Issues: For both voters and parties, I take the average response from four policy proximity variables: *Phillips Curve*, *Taxes*, *Redistribution*, and *Privatization*.

Policy Proximity variables

Note: Per discussions in the text, for all issue positions, “Box A” is the position furthest to the “left,” and “Box K is the position furthest to the “right.”

Phillips Curve: “Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the government’s top priority. These people would put themselves in Box A. Other people feel that keeping prices down should be the government’s top priority. These people would put themselves in Box K. And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here. In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own view about unemployment and inflation. Now where to you think the political parties stand? First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the view of the Conservative Party?” (Repeat for Labour Party and Liberal Democrats). I assigned a value of 1 to Box A and 11 to Box K as 11, with values of 2-10 assigned to Boxes B-J.

The next three policy proximity variables positions follow same format as *Phillips Curve*:

Taxes: “Some people feel that the government should put up taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box A. Other people feel that the government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box K,” etc.

Redistribution: “Some people feel that the government should make much greater efforts to make people’s incomes more equal. These people would put themselves in Box A. Other people feel that the government should be much less concerned about how equal people’s incomes are. These people would put themselves in Box K,” etc.

Privatization: “Some people feel that the government should nationalize many more private companies. These people would put themselves in Box A. Other people feel that the government should sell off many more nationalized industries. These people would put themselves in Box K,” etc.

Social Issues: Values for political parties are from Benoit and Laver (2006). The expert survey asks respondents to place parties on a 1-20 point social dimension scale where low (high) values are assigned to parties that favor (oppose) “liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia.” I rescaled the measure to an 11-point scale. Values for voters are from the following BEPS items: “Women should always have the right to choose abortion,” “Homosexual relations are always wrong,” and “People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives.” Each item has a five-choice agree-disagree response, which I recode and place on an 11-point scale so that low (high) values reflect a more liberal (conservative) policy preference.

Party Identification: Choice-specific indicator coded 1 if respondent named a party in response to “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, or what?” Respondent coded 1 only if they identify themselves as “very strong” or “fairly strong” partisans in a follow-up question.

Trust in Government: “How much do you trust British governments of any party to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their own political party?” 1 = “almost never,” 2 = “only some of the time,” 3 = “most of the time,” 4 = “just about always.”

Political Interest: “How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics?” 1 = “none at all,” 2 = “not very much,” 3 = “some,” 4 = “quite a lot,” 5 = “a great deal.”

Labour Competence: “[T]he Labour Party nowadays, is it capable of being a strong government, or, not capable of being a strong government?” 1 = “not capable,” 2 = neither or both (volunteered), 3 = “capable.”

Exposed Sector: dummy variable coded 1 if respondent is employed in a traded sector of the economy and 0 otherwise. Following Hays *et al.* (2005), I identify tradable industries using the OECD’s Industry Structural Analysis database and pair these scores with International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) codes provided in the BEPS. Respondents employed in tradable industries are those who identify themselves as skilled agricultural and fishery workers (ISCO-88 codes 611-21), as craft and related trade workers (711-44), as plant and machine operators and assemblers (811-34), or as working in elementary occupations in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and transportation (921-33).

Public Sector: dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who work for nationalized industry or public corporation or for other public corporation.

Manual Worker: created from five-category social class of respondent so that 1 = manual worker, 0 = otherwise.

Family Income: coded on 20-point scale with missing values recoded to median value.

Education: four-category scale based on terminal education age in which 1 = up to age 15, 2 = age 16, 3 = age 17-18, 4 = age 19 and above.

The remaining variables are self-explanatory and build on those used in previous research.

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for Analysis of the British Election Panel Study

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Prospective Economy	0.133	0.771	-1.000	1.000
Retrospective Economy	0.321	0.742	-1.000	1.000
Economic Issues	1.878	2.227	0.001	5.764
Social Issues	2.721	3.077	0.001	7.530
Party Identification	0.658	0.474	0.000	1.000
RMC ^a	-0.132	0.721	-1.500	1.500
Trust in Government	2.244	0.692	1.000	4.000
Labour Capable	2.550	0.826	1.000	3.000
Interest in Politics	3.428	0.913	1.000	5.000
Exposed Sector	0.211	0.408	0.000	1.000
Public Sector	0.292	0.455	0.000	1.000
Manual Worker	0.186	0.389	0.000	1.000
Homeowner	0.808	0.394	0.000	1.000
Age	53.814	15.777	22.000	93.000
Female	0.513	0.500	0.000	1.000
Family Income	9.158	5.325	1.000	20.000
Education	2.240	1.138	1.000	4.000
North	0.249	0.433	0.000	1.000
Midlands	0.174	0.379	0.000	1.000
Southwest	0.100	0.300	0.000	1.000
Southeast	0.256	0.437	0.000	1.000
Wales	0.059	0.236	0.000	1.000
Scotland	0.064	0.245	0.000	1.000

Number of observations = 1332

^a RMC = Room to Maneuver Constraint. As discussed in the main text, RMC is coded 0, 1, 2, 3. As an aid in interpretation, I rescaled the variable prior to estimating the model reported in Table 1 using the codes -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, 1.5.

Part 2. Calculating Estimation Uncertainty in the Conditional Logit Models

Tables reporting parameter estimates and standard errors (such as Tables 1 and 3) have been found to be inadequate for inferring the substantive impact of parameter estimates from interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003; Brambor *et al.* 2005). This part of the appendix therefore details how I calculate the uncertainty associated with expected probabilities, first differences, and differences in first differences reported in the article and in parts 3 and 4 of this appendix.¹

1. I first use the following log-likelihood function for multinomial choice to estimate a vector of parameters for $m = 1, 2, \dots, J$ party choices:

$$L(\beta_2, \dots, \beta_J | y, X) = \prod_{m=1}^J \prod_{y_i=m} \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_{im}\beta)}{\sum_{j=1}^J \exp(\mathbf{x}_{ij}\beta)}, \text{ where } \beta_1 \text{ is arbitrarily constrained to}$$

equal 0.

Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the β 's and covariance matrix $\hat{\Sigma}$.

2. Repeat from the following procedure 10,000 times, indexing each iteration by l .
 - A) Draw a vector $\tilde{\beta}$ from a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector $\hat{\beta}$ and covariance matrix $\hat{\Sigma}$.
 - B) Calculate two probabilities that voter i selects party m : $\hat{p}_{im}^l = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}'_{im}\tilde{\beta})}{\sum_{k=1}^m \exp(\mathbf{x}'_{ij}\tilde{\beta})}$ and $\hat{p}_{im}^{l,*} = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}'_{im}\tilde{\beta})}{\sum_{k=1}^m \exp(\mathbf{x}'_{ij}\tilde{\beta})}$ where \mathbf{x}_i is a covariate vector unique to voter i and \mathbf{x}_i^* is a particular modification of \mathbf{x}_i .
 - C) Let $\delta_{im}^l = \hat{p}_{im}^l - \hat{p}_{im}^{l,*}$, where δ_{im}^l is the difference between the probability that i selects m based on $\tilde{\beta}$ and \mathbf{x}_i and the probability i selects m based on $\tilde{\beta}$ and \mathbf{x}_i^* .
3. After calculating 10,000 values of δ_{im}^l , take the mean of the draws and use its standard deviation as a measure of uncertainty about the impact on \hat{p}_{im} of a change from \mathbf{x}_i to \mathbf{x}_i^* .

As an example, consider how *Prospective Economy* affects vote choice in Britain in 2001. Let \mathbf{x}_i be the covariate vector for the hypothetical voter described in notes to Table 4 who a) perceives that the economy will get better in the future and b) perceives that the British government has a great deal of room to maneuver. To do so, I set *Prospective Economy* to +1 and *RMC* to -1.5. Voter i 's score on the *Prospective Economy* x *RMC* interaction is therefore (1)*(-1.5) = -1.5. Under this scenario, the expected probability i chooses Labour is .45, as shown in the northwest corner of Table 4 (that is, $\hat{p}_{i,Labour}^l = .45$). Next, let \mathbf{x}_i^* be identical to \mathbf{x}_i in every way with the exception that i now perceives the economy will get worse (*Prospective Economy* = -1, implying that *Prospective Economy* x *RMC* = +1.5). This expected probability

¹ Notational conventions are taken from Herron (2000).

of selecting Labour under this scenario is .07 ($\hat{p}_{i,Labour}^{l,*} = .07$). Finally, I calculate the first difference of .54 with confidence intervals as described above such that $\delta_{i,Labour}^l = \hat{p}_{i,Labour}^l - \hat{p}_{i,Labour}^{l,*}$ and obtain the 90% and 95% confidence intervals reported in the tables by taking percentiles of the distribution of $\delta_{i,Labour}^l$ after 10,000 iterations.

Obtaining the difference in first differences is straightforward. First, I repeat the process discussed above for when i perceives that the British government has “hardly any” room to maneuver. This eventually yields a $\delta_{i,Labour}^l$ for when $RMC = +1.5$. To get the difference in first differences (= +.40, in this case), I subtract the two first differences: $\delta_{i,Labour}^{l,NoRMC} - \delta_{i,Labour}^{l,HighRMC}$ by taking percentiles of the distribution the 10,000 differences in first differences.

Repeating this process for different values of RMC interacted with *Prospective Economy*, *Retrospective Economy*, *Economic Issues*, and *Social Issues*, and then doing the same for the French analyses, produces the expected probabilities and first differences reported in the paper.

Part 3. Additional Statistical Results

Table A3. Effects of Room to Maneuver Constraints on Economic Evaluations and Party Issue Positions, 1997 French Legislative Election, Individual Parties

	Expected Vote Probabilities with No Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 0)			Expected Vote Probabilities with High Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 3)			
Prospective Economy	Economy Better	Economy Worse	FD	Economy Better	Economy Worse	FD	Difference in FDs
PCF	.11 (.04)	.05 (.03)	.06 (.05)	.15 (.05)	.18 (.06)	-.02 (.07)	.08 (.10)
PS	.17 (.04)	.21 (.05)	-.03 (.07)	.29 (.06)	.15 (.04)	.14** (.07)	-.17 (.11)
V	.09 (.04)	.13 (.06)	-.04 (.09)	.14 (.06)	.17 (.06)	-.03 (.09)	-.01 (.15)
UDF	.36 (.08)	.18 (.06)	.18* (.10)	.08 (.03)	.10 (.04)	-.01 (.04)	.19 (.14)
RPR	.24 (.07)	.15 (.06)	.08 (.08)	.09 (.03)	.08 (.03)	.02 (.04)	.07 (.12)
FN	.03 (.02)	.28 (.09)	-.25** (.09)	.24 (.08)	.33 (.08)	-.09 (.11)	-.16 (.17)
Economic Issues	Left	Right	FD	Left	Right	FD	Difference in FDs
PCF	.38 (.08)	.00 (.00)	.38** (.08)	.52 (.09)	.00 (.00)	.51** (.09)	.13 (.12)
PS	.38 (.06)	.03 (.01)	.35** (.06)	.29 (.06)	.03 (.02)	.26** (.05)	.09 (.06)
V	.15 (.05)	.02 (.01)	.13** (.04)	.16 (.05)	.03 (.02)	.13** (.04)	.00 (.05)
UDF	.05 (.02)	.34 (.07)	-.28** (.06)	.02 (.01)	.10 (.03)	-.08** (.03)	-.20** (.06)
RPR	.04 (.02)	.28 (.07)	-.24** (.06)	.01 (.01)	.10 (.03)	-.09** (.03)	-.16** (.06)
FN	.00 (.00)	.34 (.06)	-.33* (.10)	.00 (.00)	.74 (.08)	-.74** (.08)	.40** (.14)
Social Issues	Liber- tarian	Author- itarian	FD	Liber- tarian	Author- itarian	FD	Difference in FDs
PCF	.07 (.02)	.09 (.02)	-.03* (.01)	.12 (.04)	.18 (.05)	-.06* (.03)	.03 (.03)
PS	.32 (.06)	.12 (.03)	.20** (.07)	.36 (.06)	.10 (.03)	.25** (.07)	.05 (.11)
V	.22 (.07)	.04 (.02)	.19** (.07)	.34 (.08)	.03 (.02)	.31** (.09)	-.12 (.12)
UDF	.24 (.05)	.31 (.06)	-.07* (.04)	.07 (.02)	.09 (.03)	-.02 (.02)	-.04 (.04)
RPR	.12 (.04)	.28 (.06)	-.17** (.06)	.04 (.02)	.12 (.03)	-.08** (.03)	-.09 (.07)
FN	.03 (.02)	.16 (.05)	-.13** (.05)	.07 (.04)	.47 (.09)	-.40** (.10)	.28** (.12)

Notes: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party. Values generated by using estimates from Table 1 and iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a female from northwest France, who is a Catholic who attends mass only for ceremonies, who is a white-collar worker, and who possesses mean values on age and education. PCF = French Communist Party, PS = Socialist Party, V = Greens, UDF = Union for French Democracy, RPR = Rally for the Republic, FN = National Front
** $p < .05$ for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the model reported in Table 1 of the main text.

Table A4. Multinomial Logit Estimates of the 1997 French Legislative Election
Dependent variable: Respondent vote choice
Baseline Choice: Vote for Center-Right (RPR+UDF)

	Center-Left/ Center-Right		Front National/ Center-Right	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Prospective Economy	-.177*	(.091)	-.862**	(.150)
x RMC	.314**	(.118)	.425**	(.182)
RMC	.373**	(.084)	.660**	(.129)
Attitude toward State	-.263**	(.078)	-.451**	(.114)
Political Interest	.251**	(.073)	.023	(.110)
Religion	-.602**	(.055)	-.401**	(.088)
Self Employed	-1.201**	(.205)	-.971**	(.328)
White Collar	-.149	(.135)	.004	(.205)
Age	-.014**	(.004)	-.020**	(.006)
Female	.078	(.120)	-.473**	(.190)
Education	-.114*	(.062)	-.363**	(.102)
Northwest	.161	(.186)	-.464	(.302)
Northeast	.588**	(.185)	.253	(.278)
Southwest	.301	(.198)	-.106	(.310)
Southeast	.310	(.189)	.364	(.279)
Intercept	1.877**	(.349)	2.032**	(.533)
<i>Joint Tests</i> ^a				
Prospective Economy	41.26**			
-2 Log Likelihood	2815.43			

Note: Cells report parameter estimates from a conditional logit regression where the outcomes are vote for one of six parties with robust standard errors in parentheses. The first column presents the choice-specific parameter estimates for the effect of issue distances and partisanship. The second through sixth columns report the probability of individual-specific variables for voting for each party relative to the Center-Right (RPR+UDF). RMC = *Room to Maneuver Constraint*, as defined in the text. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, two-tailed tests. Number of observations = 1727.

^a Joint tests report the joint significance of the coefficient of the variable of interest and its interaction with RMC.

Table A5. Effects of Room to Maneuver Constraints on Party Identification, 1997 French Legislative Election

Party Identification	Expected Vote Probabilities with No Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 0)			Expected Vote Probabilities with High Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 3)		
	Identify w/ Party	Non- identifier	First Difference	Identify w/ Party	Non- identifier	First Difference
PCF	.33 (.08)	.08 (.02)	.25** (.07)	.65 (.08)	.17 (.04)	.48** (.06)
PS	.58 (.07)	.21 (.03)	.38** (.06)	.72 (.06)	.22 (.04)	.51** (.04)
V	.40 (.10)	.11 (.03)	.29** (.07)	.63 (.09)	.15 (.04)	.47** (.06)
UDF	.68 (.08)	.28 (.05)	.39** (.05)	.49 (.09)	.09 (.02)	.40** (.07)
RPR	.59 (.08)	.21 (.04)	.38** (.06)	.47 (.08)	.09 (.02)	.39** (.07)
FN	.37 (.10)	.10 (.03)	.27** (.07)	.79 (.07)	.28 (.07)	.50** (.04)

Note: Cells report expected probabilities of vote for party. Values generated as explained in Table 2 with the exception that expected probabilities are calculated separately for each political party based on partisan identification.

** $p < .05$ for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the model reported in Table 1 of the main text.

Differences in first differences are as follows: PCF .24** (.10), PS .13 (.09), V .18 (.11), UDF .01 (.10), RPR .01 (.10), FN .23** (.10)

Table A6. Effects of Room to Maneuver Constraints on Party Identification, 2001 British Election

Party Identification	Expected Vote Probabilities with No Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 0)			Expected Vote Probabilities with High Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 3)		
	Identifies w/ party	Identifies with no party	First Difference	Identifies w/ party	Identifies with no party	First Difference
Labour	.77 (.09)	.20 (.08)	.57** (.06)	.84 (.07)	.20 (.07)	.63** (.06)
Conservative	.92 (.04)	.47 (.09)	.45** (.07)	.95 (.03)	.48 (.10)	.47** (.08)
Liberal Democrat	.87 (.06)	.33 (.09)	.53** (.06)	.90 (.05)	.31 (.09)	.59** (.06)

Note: Cells report expected probabilities of vote for party. Values generated from estimates reported in Table 3 of the main text by iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a male from greater London who owns his home, who is neither a manual nor a public sector worker, and who possesses mean values on economic evaluations, issue distances, age, family income, and education, unless otherwise noted. Expected probabilities are calculated separately for each political party based on partisan identification. ** $p < .05$ for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the model reported in Table 3 of the main text. *Differences in first differences* are as follows: Labour: .07 with standard error .10; Conservative: .01 with standard error .10; Liberal Democrat: .05 with standard error .08.

Table A7. Examining Alternative Explanations: The Conditional Effects of Sector of Employment on Voter Choice in Britain 2001

Variable values manipulated for:		Not Employed in Exposed Sector FD	Employed in Exposed Sector FD	Difference in FDs
Prospective Economy	Labour	.20** (.07)	.23 (.15)	-.03 (.15)
	Conservative	-.15* (.08)	-.29** (.14)	.13 (.16)
	Liberal Democrat	-.05 (.07)	.06 (.15)	-.10 (.16)
Retrospective Economy	Labour	.17** (.06)	-.02 (.13)	.18 (.15)
	Conservative	-.26** (.07)	.05 (.15)	-.31* (.16)
	Liberal Democrat	.09 (.07)	-.03 (.15)	.12 (.16)
Economic Issues	Labour	-.27** (.08)	.00 (.14)	-.26 (.16)
	Conservative	.62** (.09)	.01 (.25)	.61** (.27)
	Liberal Democrat	-.35** (.08)	-.01 (.12)	-.35** (.14)
Social Issues	Labour	-.11* (.06)	-.20* (.11)	.09 (.11)
	Conservative	.18** (.08)	.57** (.23)	-.39 (.25)
	Liberal Democrat	-.07 (.04)	-.36** (.17)	.29* (.17)

Note: Results correspond to footnote 24 of the main text. Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party. Values generated by using estimates from a conditional logit model identical to that reported in Table 1 of the main text with the exception that an objective measure of respondent susceptibility to the world economy, *Exposed Sector*, is substituted for RMC. Estimates are iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a male from greater London who owns his home, who is neither a manual nor a public sector worker, and who possesses mean values on economic evaluations, issue distances, age, family income, and education, unless otherwise noted.

** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix. FD = First Difference. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Part 4. Sensitivity Analysis Supporting Evidence

This section provides results of analyses referenced in the sensitivity analysis section of the paper.

The first topic addressed in the sensitivity analysis pertains to the *Room to Maneuver Constraint* (RMC) measures. As noted in the first paragraph of the sensitivity analysis section, the objective is to ensure that the RMC measures taken from the FNES and BEPS are indeed measuring what they are intended to be measuring—that is, individual perceptions of policy constraints attributable to the world economy. To do so, I re-estimated the conditional logit models but specified variables of interest as contingent not on RMC but on other factors. For France, I substituted *Attitude toward State* and *Interest in Politics* for RMC. For Britain, I estimated models which consecutively substituted *Trust in Government*, *Labour Capable*, and *Interest in Politics*.² For information on question wording for this and other times, see part I of this appendix.

Tables A8 through A12 report the results. The tables report the post-estimation calculations of expected vote choice probabilities from conditional logit estimates. Tables A8 and A9 report results of the ancillary analyses from models estimated on the French 1997 survey and Tables A10 through A12 use the 2001 British data. In every case I report three sets of figures:

1. first differences when the conditioning variable of interest is set to its high(est) value – such that it approximates RMC=0
2. first differences when the conditioning variable of interest is set to its low(est) value – such that it approximates RMC=3
3. the difference between these two first differences.

Table A8 reports post-estimation results using the French survey's proxy for government trust, *Attitude toward State*, as conditioning variable. Results show that, as with RMC=0, economic issue proximity matters more among those with a positive view of the French state. However, social issue proximity also matters more among those with a *positive* view of the state. This implies that, unlike RMC, *Attitude toward State* exerts no compensating influence in the voter's decision.³ Moreover, *Attitude toward State* has no effect on economic voting. Table A9

² Following Green and Hobolt (nd), the *Labour Capable* variable serves as a proxy for government managerial competence in the British survey. The French survey does not include a similar measure suitable as proxy for competence. The item which comes closest is "*Laquelle des trois phrases se rapproche le plus de votre opinion: J'ai confiance dans la gauche pour gouverner le pays; J'ai confiance dans la droite pour gouverner le pays; Je n'ai confiance ni dans la droite ni dans la gauche pour gouverner le pays.*" This item has two fundamental shortcomings. First, since "confiance" might be interpreted either as "trust" or as "confidence," the meaning of the item is ambiguous. Second, responses are highly linked to partisan identification: fully 84% of Center-left partisans say they trust/have confidence in the left to govern and fully 90% of partisans of center-right parties trust/have confidence in the right to govern.

³ This should not be surprising, since attitudes toward the state (or trust in government) items do not distinguish between government control in economic versus non-economic areas.

reports post-estimation calculations from a model where *Interest in Politics* is the conditioning variable. While political interest has some effects on voting behavior, its effect are not consistent with expectations in terms of the room to maneuver. For one, economic voting is stronger among those “very much” interested in politics, though not in the way we would expect: results show that a swing from “economy worse” to “economy better” would *benefit* the opposition Center-Left and have no effect on the incumbent Center-Right. This result is not intuitive from either the perspective of the model advanced in this paper or from standard models of economic voting. In terms of issue proximity, for a voter who professes to be “very interested” in politics, both economic and social issues have an effect on the decision to vote for the Center-Left and the Front National but not the Center-Right. In contrast, for a voter who is not interested in politics, the two issue proximity variables influence the probability of supporting the Center-Right but not the Center-Left or the Front National. Again, it is difficult to see how this result could be explained in terms of room to maneuver constraints.

Turning to the British analyses, Table A10 reports post-estimation results with *Trust in Government* as the conditioning measure. Results show that individuals who are not trusting of the government are more likely to vote on the bases of issue proximity. But unlike when RMC is the conditioning variable, there is no difference between economic and social issue salience on the basis of *Trust in Government*—that is, trust levels do not play the same compensating issue voting role as we see (and expect) for *Room to Maneuver Constraints*. Table A11 displays results using *Labour Capable* (our proxy for government competence) as the conditioning measure. The effect of the conditioning variable are different for different parties. For Labour vote probabilities, social issues matter more when voters see the party as capable of being a strong government. For Conservative vote probabilities, social issues matter more when voters see Labour as *not* capable of being a strong government. This suggests that attitudes towards the parties in general bias respondent assessments. Finally, Table A12 reports results for *Interest in Politics* as conditioning variable in the British model. Results regarding the issue proximity variables are similar to the *Trust in Government* analysis: issues matter, but there is not compensating effect. We also see some significant results for the economic voting items, though the effects differ along with political interest levels, with those not interested in politics more apt to employ prospective evaluations and those interested more likely to use retrospections.

In short, as noted in the text, in no case does the conditioning variable (i.e., the RMC substitute) perform in a similar fashion to the conditional influence of the *Room to Maneuver Constraints* items.

Table A8. Examining Alternative Explanations: The Conditional Effects of Attitude Toward State on Voter Choice in France 1997

Variable values manipulated for:		Very positive view of the state	Very negative view of the state	Difference in FDs
Prospective Economy	Center Left	.22* (.13)	.22** (.11)	.00 (.20)
	Center Right	.02 (.04)	.09 (.06)	-.07 (.08)
	Front National	-.24* (.14)	-.31** (.10)	.07 (.20)
Economic Issues	Center Left	.96** (.03)	.85** (.08)	.11 (.09)
	Center Right	-.05 (.04)	-.17** (.05)	.11** (.05)
	Front National	-.91** (.06)	-.68** (.11)	-.23* (.13)
Social Issues	Center Left	.60** (.10)	.33** (.11)	.28 (.17)
	Center Right	-.03 (.03)	-.07** (.03)	.04 (.04)
	Front National	-.57** (.11)	-.26** (.10)	-.31** (.16)

Notes: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party coalition. Center-Left Parties equal the cumulative expected probabilities, PCF + PS + Greens. Center-Right Parties equal the cumulative expected probabilities, UDF + RPR. Values are generated using estimates from a conditional logit model identical to that reported in Table 1 of the main text with the exception that *Attitude toward State* is substituted for RMC as the conditioning variable in the interactive terms. Expected probabilities are produced by iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a female from northwest France, who is a Catholic who attends mass only for ceremonies, who is a white-collar worker, and who possesses mean values on age and education. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$ for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix. FD = First Difference. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A9. Examining Alternative Explanations: The Conditional Effects of Political Interest on Voter Choice in France 1997

Variable values manipulated for:		Very Much Interested in Politics FD	Not Interested in Politics FD	Difference in FDs
Prospective Economy	Center Left	.39** (.12)	.14 (.10)	.25 (.17)
	Center Right	.04 (.03)	.05 (.08)	-.01 (.09)
	Front National	-.43** (.12)	-.19** (.09)	-.24 (.17)
Economic Issues	Center Left	.98** (.02)	.77** (.09)	.21** (.09)
	Center Right	-.03 (.02)	-.25** (.06)	.22** (.05)
	Front National	-.94** (.04)	-.52** (.11)	-.42** (.11)
Social Issues	Center Left	.49** (.12)	.48** (.10)	.01 (.18)
	Center Right	.02 (.02)	.18** (.06)	-.16** (.06)
	Front National	.47** (.12)	.30** (.08)	.17 (.15)

Notes: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party coalition. Center-Left Parties equal the cumulative expected probabilities, PCF + PS + Greens. Center-Right Parties equal the cumulative expected probabilities, UDF + RPR. Values are generated using estimates from a conditional logit model identical to that reported in Table 1 of the main text with the exception that *Interest in Politics* is substituted for RMC as the conditioning variable in the interactive terms. Expected probabilities are produced by iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a female from northwest France, who is a Catholic who attends mass only for ceremonies, who is a white-collar worker, and who possesses mean values on age and education. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$ for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix. FD = First Difference. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A10. Examining Alternative Explanations: The Conditional Effects of Trust in Government on Voter Choice in Britain 2001

Variable values manipulated for:		High Trust in Government FD	Low Trust in Government FD	Difference in FDs
Prospective Economy	Labour	.12 (.18)	.20** (.09)	-.08 (.23)
	Conservative	-.02 (.16)	-.28** (.11)	.26 (.23)
	Liberal Democrat	-.10 (.13)	.08 (.11)	-.17 (.21)
Retrospective Economy	Labour	.27 (.16)	.04 (.07)	.23 (.20)
	Conservative	-.35** (.14)	-.04 (.11)	-.31 (.22)
	Liberal Democrat	.08 (.14)	.00 (.11)	.09 (.22)
Economic Issues	Labour	-.20 (.20)	-.17** (.08)	-.02 (.23)
	Conservative	.29 (.28)	.57** (.15)	-.28 (.39)
	Liberal Democrat	-.09 (.10)	-.40** (.13)	.31 (.19)
Social Issues	Labour	-.16 (.09)	-.11* (.06)	-.05 (.10)
	Conservative	.04 (.14)	.59** (.16)	-.55** (.24)
	Liberal Democrat	.12 (.09)	-.48** (.14)	.60** (.21)

Note: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party. Values generated by using estimates from a conditional logit model identical to that reported in Table 3 of the main text with the exception that *Trust in Government* is substituted for RMC as the conditioning variable in the interactive terms. Expected probabilities are produced by iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a male from greater London who owns his home, who is neither a manual nor a public sector worker, and who possesses mean values on economic evaluations, issue distances, age, family income, and education, unless otherwise noted. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix. FD = First Difference. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A11. Examining Alternative Explanations: The Conditional Effects of Labour Capable on Voter Choice in Britain 2001

Variable values manipulated for:		Labour Capable FD	Labour not Capable FD	Difference in FDs
Prospective Economy	Labour	.28** (.08)	.03 (.09)	.25** (.11)
	Conservative	-.22** (.08)	-.07 (.13)	-.15 (.15)
	Liberal Democrat	-.06 (.07)	.04 (.14)	-.10 (.15)
Retrospective Economy	Labour	.17** (.07)	.10 (.09)	.08 (.11)
	Conservative	-.24** (.07)	-.09 (.12)	-.15 (.14)
	Liberal Democrat	.07 (.07)	-.01 (.12)	.08 (.14)
Economic Issues	Labour	-.29** (.09)	-.12 (.08)	-.17* (.10)
	Conservative	.54** (.12)	.37 (.21)	.16 (.24)
	Liberal Democrat	-.24** (.08)	-.25 (.15)	.00 (.15)
Social Issues	Labour	-.27** (.07)	.06 (.04)	-.33** (.10)
	Conservative	.33** (.08)	-.43** (.21)	.77** (.22)
	Liberal Democrat	-.07 (.05)	.37* (.19)	-.44** (.20)

Note: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party. Values generated by using estimates from a conditional logit model identical to that reported in Table 3 of the main text with the exception that *Labour Capable* is substituted for RMC as the conditioning variable in the interactive terms. Expected probabilities are produced by iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a male from greater London who owns his home, who is neither a manual nor a public sector worker, and who possesses mean values on economic evaluations, issue distances, age, family income, and education, unless otherwise noted.

** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix. FD = First Difference. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A12. Examining Alternative Explanations: The Conditional Effects of Political Interest on Voter Choice in Britain 2001

Variable values manipulated for:		Interested in Politics a Great Deal FD	Not Interested in Politics FD	Difference in FDs
Prospective Economy	Labour	.10 (.07)	.30** (.15)	-.20 (.18)
	Conservative	-.03 (.11)	-.31** (.15)	.28 (.22)
	Liberal Democrat	-.07 (.09)	.01 (.15)	-.07 (.21)
Retrospective Economy	Labour	.12* (.06)	.07 (.15)	.05 (.18)
	Conservative	-.25** (.11)	-.04 (.14)	-.22 (.22)
	Liberal Democrat	.14 (.10)	-.03 (.16)	.17 (.22)
Economic Issues	Labour	-.17** (.08)	-.20 (.14)	.03 (.18)
	Conservative	.48** (.16)	.37 (.25)	.11 (.35)
	Liberal Democrat	-.32** (.12)	-.18 (.13)	-.14 (.21)
Social Issues	Labour	-.15** (.07)	.02 (.08)	-.18 (.11)
	Conservative	.38** (.11)	-.14 (.29)	.52 (.36)
	Liberal Democrat	-.23** (.09)	.12 (.22)	-.34 (.28)

Note: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party. Values generated by using estimates from a conditional logit model identical to that reported in Table 3 of the main text with the exception that *Labour Capable* is substituted for RMC as the conditioning variable in the interactive terms. Expected probabilities are produced by iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a male from greater London who owns his home, who is neither a manual nor a public sector worker, and who possesses mean values on economic evaluations, issue distances, age, family income, and education, unless otherwise noted.

** $p < .05$, ** $p < .10$, for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix. FD = First Difference. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A13 reports results to accompany the second issue raised in the sensitivity analysis section of the main text. The table displays expected probabilities and first differences obtained when we use an alternative measure for non-economic issue proximity. As noted in the sensitivity analysis section, the measure is based on party and voter position on European integration. I do not report first differences for the remaining variables of interest since they are qualitatively identical to those reported in Tables 2 and 4 of the main text.

Measuring *European Integration*:

France: Voter positions on Europe are developed using two FNES survey items: “Taking everything into account, would you say that France has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?” and “If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry, indifferent, or very relieved?” For parties, I use Marks and Steenbergen’s (1999) expert survey which ranks parties according their overall orientation toward European integration. I placed both the voter and party measures on 11 point scales.

Britain: Voter and party positions are developed using the following BEPS survey item: “Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union. These people would put themselves in Box A. Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Union. These people would put themselves in Box K. And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here. In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own view about the European Union. Now where to you think the political parties stand? First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the view of the Conservative Party?” (Repeat for Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, and self). I assigned a value of 1 to Box A and 11 to Box K as 11, with values of 2-10 assigned to Boxes B-J.

Table A13. Results of first differences for voter-party distance on positions on European integration

	Expected Vote Probabilities with No Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 0)			Expected Vote Probabilities with High Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 3)			
Britain	Unite with EU	Indep. from EU	FD	Unite with EU	Indep. from EU	FD	Difference in FDs
Labour	.28 (.10)	.16 (.07)	.11 (.08)	.43 (.11)	.09 (.05)	.34** (.10)	.23* (.13)
Conservative	.28 (.12)	.54 (.12)	-.26 (.16)	.06 (.04)	.73 (.10)	-.67** (.11)	-.42* (.23)
LibDem	.44 (.11)	.30 (.09)	.14 (.09)	.51 (.11)	.18 (.07)	.33** (.10)	.19 (.15)
France – party alliances	Favor integration	Oppose integration	FD	Favor integration	Oppose integration	FD	Difference in FDs
Center-Left	.40** (.05)	.42** (.05)	-.02 (.02)	.53 (.05)	.45 (.07)	.09** (.04)	-.11** (.04)
Center-Right	.52** (.05)	.44** (.06)	.08 (.05)	.26 (.04)	.13 (.03)	.13** (.04)	-.05 (.08)
France - parties separately	Favor integration	Oppose integration	FD	Favor integration	Oppose integration	FD	Difference in FDs
PCF	.08 (.03)	.13 (.05)	-.05 (.03)	.13 (.04)	.21 (.05)	-.08** (.03)	.03 (.05)
PS	.22 (.04)	.18 (.03)	.04 (.03)	.28 (.05)	.13 (.03)	.15** (.04)	-.11* (.06)
V	.10 (.03)	.11 (.03)	-.01 (.01)	.13 (.03)	.11 (.03)	.02 (.01)	-.03** (.01)
UDF	.32 (.06)	.25 (.06)	.06 (.04)	.14 (.03)	.06 (.02)	.08** (.03)	-.02 (.06)
RPR	.21 (.05)	.19 (.04)	.02 (.01)	.12 (.03)	.07 (.02)	.05** (.02)	-.03 (.02)
FN	.08 (.03)	.13 (.05)	-.06 (.04)	.21 (.06)	.42 (.09)	-.22** (.07)	.16* (.09)

Note: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party based on iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter. Values are generated by reestimating the conditional logit model specified in Equation 2 and Table 1 (France) or 3 (Britain) substituting *European Integration* for *Social Issues* as the measure of non-economic issue proximity.

** $p < .05$, * $p < .15$ for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the model reported in Tables 1 or 3.

Finally, I address the rationalization conjecture. This conjecture is that rather than beliefs about the room to maneuver moderating the influence of retrospective evaluations on the vote, vote intentions might interact with retrospective evaluations to affect perceptions about economic globalization. As noted in the text, I test this conjecture by regressing *Room to Maneuver Constraints* on *Retrospective Economy*, respondent vote intention (for either an incumbent or opposition party), and the interaction of *Retrospective Economy* and vote intention. All variables are as described in Part 1 of this appendix, the only exception being that instead of using the post-election reported vote, I used respondent pre-election vote intention. *Incumbent Vote Intention* is coded 1 if the respondent planned to vote for the Labour Party and 0 otherwise, and *Opposition Vote Intention* is coded 1 if the respondent planned vote for a party other than Labour and 0 otherwise.⁴

I estimate the model using least squares regression to facilitate interpretation of coefficients of interest. Substantive findings using ordered probit regression are no different. Table A14 displays the results. Note that the parameter estimate on *Retrospective Economy* reported in the table is the effect of past economic evaluations when *Incumbent Vote Intention* and *Opposition Vote Intention* are both zero. To test the rationalization conjecture, I must calculate the effect of *Retrospective Economy* on RMC given the respondent's vote intentions. This is provided by the sum of the coefficients on *Retrospective Economy* (β_1) and its interaction with *Incumbent Vote Intention* (β_4) with standard error equal to $\sqrt{\text{var}(\beta_1) + \text{var}(\beta_4) + 2\text{cov}(\beta_1\beta_4)}$.

Using estimates from the table below, the conditional coefficient is $-.076 + .031 = -.046$, and using estimates from the variance-covariance matrix, the conditional standard error is .062. Since the standard error is greater than half the size of the coefficient, this result indicates that vote intentions do not condition the effect of the economy on globalization perceptions. This conclusion can also be reached by performing an *F* test of the joint effect of *Retrospective Economy* and its interaction with *Incumbent Vote Intention*. $F_{2, 1318}$ equals 1.64, with $p = 0.20$.

I repeated these calculations to obtain the effect of *Retrospective Economy* conditional on *Opposition Vote Intention*. Again, results fail to support a rationalization thesis: the conditional coefficient on *Retrospective Economy* is $-.029 (= -.076 + .047)$ with standard error .580 and the *F*-statistic fails to reject the null ($F = 1.54, p = 0.21$). The rationalization conjecture is therefore not supported.

⁴ Results do not change if actual reported vote is used instead – I use vote intentions because it is more consistent with the logic of the rationalization conjecture.

Table A14. Assessing the Conditional Effects of Retrospective Economic Evaluations on Room to Maneuver Constraints

		Coef.	Std. Err
β_0	Constant	1.369	(0.140)
β_1	Retrospective Economy	-0.076	(0.046)
β_2	Incumbent Vote Intention	-0.194	(0.065)
β_3	Opposition Vote Intention	0.006	(0.053)
β_4	Ret. Economy x Inc. Vote Int.	0.031	(0.078)
β_5	Ret. Economy x Opp. Vote Int.	0.047	(0.068)
β_6	Manual Worker	0.136	(0.054)
β_7	Public Sector	0.023	(0.046)
β_8	Homeownership	-0.049	(0.054)
β_9	Age	0.000	(0.001)
β_{10}	Female	0.063	(0.042)
β_{11}	Family Income	0.005	(0.005)
β_{12}	Education	-0.019	(0.022)
β_{13}	North	0.028	(0.073)
β_{14}	Midlands	-0.017	(0.079)
β_{15}	Southwest	0.132	(0.092)
β_{16}	Southeast	0.051	(0.073)
β_{17}	Wales	-0.019	(0.106)
β_{18}	Scotland	0.153	(0.104)
	N	1337	
	R ²	0.03	

Notes: Dependent variable is *Room to Maneuver Constraint*. Cells report OLS regression estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.