

“CROSSING THE WATER’S EDGE: ELITE RHETORIC, MEDIA COVERAGE, AND THE RALLY-ROUND-THE-FLAG PHENOMENON, 1979-2003”

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

1. Control Variables

Definitions and Coding

Days Bet. Polls: Number of days between Gallup polls at time t and $t+1$.

MC Appearances: Number of appearances—with or without explicit evaluations of the president/administration—by MC’s on network newscasts during poll period.

Pres. Elec. Yr.: Coded 1 for cases occurring within 365 days of a presidential election, 0 otherwise.

Mid. Elec. Yr.: Coded 1 for observations occurring within 365 days of a midterm election, 0 otherwise.

Party Leader: Number of observations-per-poll-period in which MC evaluator was a party leader. Party leaders were coded as members of the chamber-wide party leadership (i.e. not committee chairs), including the majority/minority leaders in the Senate, their assistants/whips, and the president pro tempore. In the House, we counted the Speaker, Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, Minority Whip, and the heads of the party caucus/conference.

Second Term: Coded 1 if a President is in second term in office, 0 otherwise.

Δ Cons. Sent: Subtracts prior month's consumer sentiment score from the current month's score as measured by the University of Michigan's Index of Consumer Sentiment.

Unified Gov't: Coded 1 if presidential party has majority control of both chambers of Congress, 0 otherwise. (Control is assumed to pass with the election of a new speaker or majority leader).

Transition: Coded 1 if observation occurs after election but prior to inauguration day, 0 otherwise.

Dem. President: Coded 1 if a Democrat was in office at the time of a given poll, 0 otherwise.

Any KIA: Coded 1 if the U.S. suffered any combat deaths during a given poll period, 0 otherwise.

Post-Deploy: Coded 1 if the statement was made on the day of the major U.S. force deployment, or within 30 days after such an event, 0 otherwise.

Pre+Post Deploy: Coded 1 if statement was made both within 30 days *after* a force deployment and within 30 days *before* another deployment, 0 otherwise.

Major War: Coded 1 for U.S. invasions of Grenada, Panama, Iraq (1991 and 2003), and Afghanistan, 0 otherwise.

Post-Cold War: Coded 1 if observation occurred after fall of Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989), 0 otherwise.

NY Times Cov.: Count of the number of mentions of the adversary nation on the front page of the *New York Times* during a given poll period, divided by the average number of front page stories in the *New York Times* during the same poll period.

One Day Event: Coded 1 if a given rally event lasted only one day, 0 otherwise.

Cap. Ratio: Correlates of War (COW) National Material Capabilities summary statistic (Singer & Small 1993). It takes the form of $C_A/(C_A+C_B)$, where C_A = U.S. capabilities and C_B = adversary capabilities.

Terrorism: Coded 1 if the event involved international terrorism, 0 otherwise.

US Crises-per-yr: Count of the number of foreign policy crises (Brecher and Wilkenfelds 2006) in the same calendar year as a given event, in which the U.S. is the crisis actor. (This variable consistently outperforms the number of rally events per year, drawn from the dataset employed in this study.)

US Ally: Coded 1 if the adversary is involved in a formal alliance relationship with the United States at the time of a rally event, 0 otherwise. These data are derived from the Correlates of War Interstate Alliance Data set, version 3.03 (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004).

Trade Depend.: This indicator is derived from the “UN World Trade Flows” data set (Feenstra *et al.*

2005). It represents the sum of U.S. exports to the adversary, as a proportion of all U.S. exports, plus U.S. imports from the adversary, as a proportion of all U.S. imports.

Foreign Policy Restraint (FPR), Internal Political Change (IPC), Humanitarian Intervention (HI): Coded 1 if a US goal in conflict was imposing FPR, IPC, or HI, respectively (Jentleson 1992, Jentleson & Britton 1998).

Expert Assess.: Scale measuring extent to which, on average, 38 foreign policy experts considered each event “successful” and “worthwhile” for the U.S. The scale runs from -5 to +5, with -5 (+5) indicating least (most) successful or worthwhile ($\mu = 5.57$; $\sigma = 3.67$).

References

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- Jentleson, Bruce. W. 1992. The pretty prudent public: post post-Vietnam American opinion on the use of military force. *International Studies Quarterly* 36:49-74.
- _____ and Rebecca L. Britton. 1998. Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42: 395-417.

**TABLE A-1. Positive vs. Negative MC Rhetoric
Appearing on Network News**


	<u>All Issues</u>	<u>Foreign Policy Only</u>
<i>ABC</i>	<i>N=361</i>	<i>N=148</i>
Percent Negative	80	73
Percent Positive	21	27
<i>CBS</i>	<i>N=384</i>	<i>N=143</i>
Percent Negative	77	62
Percent Positive	26	41
<i>NBC</i>	<i>N=459</i>	<i>N=188</i>
Percent Negative	80	73
Percent Positive	21	28
<i>Overall</i>	<i>N=1204</i>	<i>N=479</i>
Percent Negative	79	70
Percent Positive	22	31
<i>Pre-Deployment</i>	<i>N=560</i>	<i>N=238</i>
Percent Negative	77	67
Percent Positive	24	34
<i>Post-Deployment</i>	<i>N=644</i>	<i>N=241</i>
Percent Negative	81	72
Percent Positive	21	29
<i>No Casualties</i>	<i>N=1079</i>	<i>N=389</i>
Percent Negative	80	70
Percent Positive	22	31
<i>Any Casualties</i>	<i>N=125</i>	<i>N=90</i>
Percent Negative	74	68
Percent Positive	27	32

Notes: (1) Sums exceed 100% because some evaluations include both praise and criticism; (2) ABC=ABC World News Tonight, CBS=CBS Evening News, and NBC=NBC Nightly News.

TABLE A-2. Summary Statistics

<u>Type of MC Rhetoric</u>	<i>Mean Frequency-per-Poll-Period (Standard Deviation)</i>	
	<u>Overall</u>	<u>Ground Invasions</u>
Presidential Party Praise	0.95 (1.58)	0.53 (.86)
Presidential Party Criticism	1.44 (2.69)	0.39 (.89)
Non-Presidential Party Praise	0.67 (1.32)	0.74 (1.43)
Non-Presidential Party Criticism	4.42 (6.11)	2.71 (4.20)
	<u>% of Total Observations</u>	
<u>Dichotomous Causal Variables</u>		
Divided Government	.74	
Democratic President	.55	
Presidential Election Year	.21	
Midterm Election Year	.28	
Second Term President	.34	
During Presidential Transition	.02	
Any Casualties	.12	
U.S. Ground Invasion	.22	
Post-Cold War	.83	
Terrorism-related	.20	
U.S Ally	.09	
Post-Event-Initiation	.66	
Foreign Policy Restraint Goal	.90	
Internal Political Change Goal	.31	
Humanitarian Intervention Goal	.12	
One Day Event	.25	
<u>Other Causal Variables</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std. Dev.</u>
Δ Consumer Sentiment	0.18	4.61
Days Between Polls	10.23	9.55
Party Leader	6.13	8.50
Total MC network news appearances-per-Poll-Period	31.76	34.96
Expert Assessment of Whether Event was Successful/Worthwhile (-10 to +10 scale)	-0.13	3.67
<i>New York Times</i> Front Page Mentions of Adversary-per-Poll-Period	0.12	0.16
U.S. Crises-per-Year	1.02	0.72
U.S. Trade Dependence vis-à-vis Adversary	0.003	0.01
U.S. Capability Ratio vis-à-vis Adversary	0.94	0.11

FIGURE A-1. Trend in Positive & Negative Foreign Policy Evaluations ± 30 Days From Crisis Onset



2. TABLE A-3. Summary of Hypotheses, Test Results, and Locations

Hypothesis	Where Tested?	Proportion (%) of Tests Supporting Hypothesis
H1: Oversampled Pres. Party Criticism	Table 2	1/1 (100%)
H2: Salient Rally Novelty	Table 2, Model 6 & 10 of Table 3	3/4 (75%)
H3: Partisan Credibility	Models 7 & 8 of Table 3; Simulations in Figure 1	3/4 (75%)
H4: Costly Credibility	Models 7, 8 & 9 of Table 3; Simulations in Figure 1	5/6 (83%)
H5: Combined Credibility	Models 7 & 8 of Table 3; Simulations in Figure 1	2/2 (100%)
H6: Salient Rally Criticism	Models 11, 12, & 13 of Table 3, Simulations in Figure 1	6/6 (100%)
H7: Salient Rally Praise	Models 11, 12, & 13 of Table 3, Simulations in Figure 1	5/6 (83%)
	TOTALS:	25/29 (~86%)

3. Event List

1. Hostage crisis in Iran. November 1979.
2. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: Carter Doctrine. January 1980.
3. Marine Barracks Bombing. October 1983.
4. Invasion of Grenada. October 1983.
5. Further attacks on/by U.S. troops in Lebanon. December 1983.
6. Operation El Dorado Canyon: U.S. airstrikes against Libya in response to Berlin disco bombing. April 1986.
7. Operation Prairie Fire: U.S. engages Libyan aircraft, ships, and missile sites around Gulf of Sidra. April 1986.
8. U.S.S. Stark attacked by a missile. May 1987.
9. U.S.S. Vincennes shoots down Iranian civilian airliner. July 1988.
10. Response to Pan Am Flight 103 destruction. December 1988.
11. Two carriers, battleship groups moved to eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea after killing of Col. William Higgins in Lebanon. August 1989.
12. Invasion of Panama. December 1989.
13. Immediate U.S. response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. August 1990.
14. Larger U.S. deployment to Middle East in response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. August 1990.
15. First Gulf War begins (air war). January 1991.
16. First Gulf War begins (ground war). February 1991.
17. Military exercises conducted in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf to force Iraqi compliance with weapons inspections. July 1992.
18. 200 Air Force and Navy aircraft used to enforce "no-fly zone" in Southern Iraq. September 1992.
19. 30,000 American troops, carrier group deployed in Somalia to facilitate famine relief. December 1992.
20. Troop deployed in Kuwait and aircraft and missiles used to attack Iraqi military installations in January 1993.
21. Additional troops, aircraft carrier deployed to Somalia in October and November after U.S. soldiers killed in October 1993 clash with Somalis.
22. Military exercises in Caribbean simulate an invasion of Haiti. July 1994.
23. 20,000 troops occupy Haiti after agreement with military regime on September 1994.
24. Large ground force, ships, aircraft sent to Persian Gulf region in response to Iraqi threats to Kuwait. October 1994.
25. Carrier task force, Marine contingent, attack submarine, and other ships move into Adriatic on May 29-30 after UN observers taken hostage by Serbs in Bosnia. May 1995.
26. Troops, ships deployed to Persian Gulf region in response to Iraqi threats in August 1995.
27. Troop deployment to Bosnia as part of Dayton Agreement begins in December 1995.
28. Cuba shoots down American civilian plane. February 1996.
29. The US military launched cruise missile attacks against 14 Iraqi air defense bases following Iraq's invasion of the Kurdish "safe haven." September 1996.
30. Troops mobilized; b-52s, patriot missiles deployed near Iraq in response to Kurdish area invasion and inspection violations. September 1996.

31. Iraq ceases cooperation with UN inspectors. October 1997.
32. Iraq expels UN inspectors. November 1997.
33. Clinton threatens major attack on Iraq. February 1998.
34. Operation Infinite Reach—Cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan in response to bombings of two U.S. Embassies in Africa. August 1998.
35. Operation Desert Fox: Attacks on Iraq for inspections violations. November 1998.
36. Iraq orders UN inspectors to leave (again). December 1998.
37. Kosovo Air Campaign. March 1999.
38. Bombing of U.S.S. Cole in Yemen—October 2000.
39. Chinese air force forces down US reconnaissance plane—April 2001.
40. Initial deployment of troops to Afghanistan—September 2001.
41. Afghanistan invasion. October 2001.
42. Second Gulf War. March 2003.

4. A Few Words on Interpreting Interactive Relationships

In interpreting our results, it is important to bear in mind that in the presence of interaction terms, we cannot test our hypotheses by observing magnitudes or significance levels on individual coefficients, or even by comparing pairs of coefficients. There are two primary reasons for this. First, interaction terms necessarily produce colinearity between causal variables, thereby frequently dampening the significance of individual coefficients. Second, and more important, evaluating the substantive implications of interactive relationships requires comparisons across *combinations* of variables (e.g., whether or not the sum of base category w plus interaction term x is statistically distinguishable from the sum of base category y plus interaction term z). Consequently, we cannot evaluate our hypotheses by comparing any two individual coefficients in our models.

To embed this general discussion within the context of our particular analysis, in our models, we interact several distinct indicators of partisan rhetoric with a dummy for the presence of any U.S. fatalities during a given poll period. For purposes of this example, assume variable w represents one type of partisan rhetoric, while variable z represents the casualty dummy. When z equals zero, the effects of rhetoric are given by the coefficient on w alone. In that case, one can assess the statistical significance of effects of the rhetoric causal variable on the dependent variable by looking solely at the coefficient on w . However, when z takes a value of 1—indicating that the U.S. did suffer casualties in a given poll period—*then* to determine the effects of rhetoric on the dependent variable (approval), it becomes necessary to add the coefficient on w to that on the interaction term ($w \times z$). The key significance test thus becomes whether the *combined* (that is, sum total) effect of the coefficients on w and on $w \times z$, together, are statistically distinguishable from zero effect. This cannot be easily determined by reviewing the significance levels on the separate coefficients on w and/or $w \times z$. We therefore employ Clarify (King *et al.* 2000) to simulate the expected values of the dependent variable as the key causal variables vary *in combination*. These results, presented in Figure 1 of our paper, represent the key tests of our predictions concerning the effects of rhetoric on approval during periods involving U.S. casualties. In fact, it is frequently the case that individually insignificant variables combine to produce statistically significant effects on a given dependent variable, at least at certain values of one or both of the interacted causal variables. Indeed, this is the case in several of our results shown in Figure 1.

Lastly, to offer one concrete example, take the case of the effects of PP criticism on Independents, shown in Model 12 of Table 3. The coefficient on PP criticism is $-.309$, with a standard error of $.295$. The coefficient (standard error) on the interaction term (PP criticism x Any KIA) is $-.329 (.333)$. Obviously, neither approaches statistical significance. However, the combined effect—representing the effect of PP criticism on Independents for cases involving casualties—is much larger ($-.309 + -.329 = -.638$). Figure 1 indicates that this latter, combined effect is, in fact, significant at the $.05$ level (to be specific, given a 2 standard deviation change in PP criticism during rally events with at least one U.S. casualty).

5. FIGURE A-2. Expert Survey Results



6. Online Coding Form

alpha (grandfather)

Browse

Layout: Videotape

Record: 862

Total: 1217

Unsorted

Back To Login Page

AssignCode: Alpha44

AssignUID: 703091466

StoryID: N 1056

RecordNum: 1744

NAPATape: 57688

Date: 9/18/1996

Time:

Sen or Rep? Sen Rep Unidentified

Name: OmnHATCH

State:

Party Affiliation (if given): Dem Rep Ind Not Given

Rank or Position in Legislature?

Quoted? Yes No

	President			Government		
	Praise	Crit	Neu	Praise	Crit	Neu
Management of the U.S. Economy	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes
International Trade/Finance	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes
Government Budget/Deficit/Spending/Taxation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes
Foreign Policy/Military	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes
Domestic Policy	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes
Scandal/Personal Behavior	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes
Personal characteristics/Leadership	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes
Other Praise	<input type="text"/>			<input type="text"/>		
Other Criticism	<input type="text"/>			<input type="text"/>		

Quote (use back of paper if necessary)

[Sen. Hatch on President Clinton's intent on protecting a million acres of federal land in Utah from coal mining. The broadcast noted that the land was worth \$1 trillion if mined for coal]

"In all of my 20 years in the United States Senate, I have never seen a more clear example of the arrogance of federal power. Indeed, this is the mother of all land grabs."

PROBLEMS

Done Entering Yes No

7. Valence Coding Instructions Given to Coders

(Note that this coding scheme is adapted from that of the Center for Media and Public Affairs.)

Praise and criticism of the president must be unambiguous, and should be defensible (you should be able to point out the statement containing the praise or criticism to a reasonable person and have them agree that it's praise or criticism). Neutral statements raise the issue without making any judgment.

It's possible for a member's statement to contain lots of different types of praise and criticism of the president, and also neutral information. Something like "The president made the right decision regarding Afghanistan, but has erred tremendously in his handling of Iraq" contains both praise and criticism of the president's handling of foreign policy/military, so you would mark all that apply. If you have doubts about coding a statement a particular way, you should err on the side of caution (when in doubt, leave it out).

Here are some guidelines (adapted from the Center for Media and Public Affairs) about what exactly counts as praise or criticism:

PRAISE/POSITIVE/SUPPORTIVE/IN DEFENSE OF—

A positive evaluation would include direct praise of the official, as in "Clinton has really mastered dealing with Congress," or positive evaluations of what the individual has done, such as "Bush has impressed Western leaders with his latest plan on Liberia."

IMPORTANT NOTE: Positive evaluations of future political status are only coded here if they are not qualified based on any condition, as in, "Gore will be the Democratic nominee if he avoids incidents such as the one on last Thursday." This also applies to criticism, as we'll see below. Oh, and as another wrinkle, if they said something like "Bush's popularity will fall if he continues to mismanage the economy"... the implication that he is currently mismanaging the economy is built-in criticism, so you would count that part as criticism despite it being embedded in the hypothetical "if". We'll also be counting self-defensive statements as praise. For instance, if a source is reported to have panned a policy of an official, and that official then presents a defense of their own policy, that would be coded as a positive evaluation. For instance, if Daschle claims that Bush's tax plan is only for the rich, and Bush is then shown saying, "That's not true." You would code a positive evaluation on Bush from Bush on the issue of Government Budget/Deficit/Spending/Taxation.

CRITICISM/NEGATIVE/ATTACKING—

A negative evaluation would include direct criticisms of the president, as in "Bush has failed to grasp the fact that the defense budget will be between one third and one half smaller in the next five years," or negative evaluations of the president's policies, as in "Clinton's antagonistic attitude toward business has made him a political liability for the Democratic Party."

As with positive evaluations, negative evaluations of the future political status of the President cannot be coded here if they are qualified on a hypothetical condition, such as "Clinton will face a strong backlash in the U.S. if he attempts to impose rationing of health care services."

8. Data Underlying Figure 1 in Main Text

TABLE A-4. Effect of Different Types of Rhetoric on Presidential Approval

	<i>Marginal Effect of Evaluation^a</i>	<i>Difference from No Evaluation</i>
Presidential Party Approval (No evaluation=0.096)		
PP Praise	0.311	0.214
PP Criticism	-2.676	-2.772**
NPP Praise	2.586	2.489*
NPP Criticism	1.244	1.238
Non-Presidential Party Approval (No evaluation=1.564)		
PP Praise	0.231	-1.333
PP Criticism	0.344	-1.220
NPP Praise	4.690	3.126**
NPP Criticism	-1.363	-2.927*
Independents Approval (No evaluation=1.881)		
PP Praise	0.500	-1.382
PP Criticism	-0.876	-2.757*
NPP Praise	4.713	2.832**
NPP Criticism	-0.526	-2.407

Casualty (KIA) vs. Non-Casualty (No KIA) Period Interaction Models

	No KIA		KIA	
	<i>Marginal Effect of Evaluation</i>	<i>Difference from No Evaluation</i>	<i>Marginal Effect of Evaluation</i>	<i>Difference from No Evaluation</i>
Presidential Party Approval (No evaluation or KIA = -.637; No evaluation with KIA = 2.573)				
PP Praise	-.059	0.577	3.074	0.501
PP Criticism	-3.299	-2.663 [^]	-0.503	-3.076**
NPP Praise	1.981	2.617*	4.064	1.491
NPP Criticism	0.505	1.142	.762	-1.811
Non-Presidential Party Approval (No evaluation or KIA = 1.276; No evaluation with KIA = 6.435)				
PP Praise	-.477	-1.753	8.999	2.564
PP Criticism	1.206	-0.069	4.070	-2.365 [^]
NPP Praise	4.302	3.026**	11.983	5.547*
NPP Criticism	-2.026	-3.298*	-14.373	-20.808 [^]
Independents Approval (No evaluation or KIA = .685; No evaluation with KIA = 9.639)				
PP Praise	-0.176	-0.861	11.322	1.683
PP Criticism	-1.094	-1.779	6.253	-3.386*
NPP Praise	3.865	3.180**	11.635	1.996
NPP Criticism	-1.835	-2.521	-6.356	-15.995 [^]

[^] $p^2.10$, * $p^2.05$, ** $p^2.01$

^abased on two standard deviation increase in type of rhetoric, with other types of rhetoric held constant at zero

9. TABLE A-5. Base, Political Control, and International Environment/Adversary Characteristic Control Models

Dep. Var:	-----Base Models-----				-----Political Models-----				-----International/Adversary Trait Models-----				
	1. Praise/ Crit Ratio	2. PP Approve	3. NPP Approve	4. Ind. Approve	5. Praise/ Crit Ratio	6. PP Approve	7. NPP Approve	8. Ind. Approve	9. Praise/ Crit Ratio	10. PP Approve	11. NPP Approve	12. Ind. Approve	
Approval _t		-0.215*** (0.053)	-0.082* (0.036)	-0.185** (0.059)		-0.317*** (0.081)	-0.200* (0.075)	-0.286*** (0.078)		-0.395*** (0.10)	-0.269* (0.13)	-0.401*** (0.10)	
PP Criticism		-0.404** (0.149)	-0.194 (0.132)	-0.469* (0.200)		-0.364* (0.17)	-0.040 (0.13)	-0.400 (0.24)		-0.440* (0.21)	-0.305 (0.21)	-0.512^ (0.26)	
NPP Criticism		0.061 (0.105)	-0.175 (0.121)	-0.186 (0.157)		0.065 (0.098)	-0.151 (0.090)	-0.198 (0.20)		0.089 (0.11)	-0.195^ (0.11)	-0.111 (0.16)	
PP Praise		0.001 (0.329)	-0.120 (0.325)	-0.207 (0.382)		0.001 (0.35)	-0.250 (0.34)	-0.291 (0.36)		-0.029 (0.34)	-0.335 (0.49)	-0.571 (0.51)	
NPP Praise		0.618^ (0.356)	1.220** (0.369)	1.124** (0.351)		0.672 (0.41)	1.282*** (0.35)	0.964* (0.38)		0.668 (0.47)	1.273* (0.48)	1.077* (0.48)	
Any KIA	-0.0812 (0.049)				-0.0372 (0.042)					-0.114* (0.048)	0.418 (1.41)	0.433 (1.62)	3.167* (1.54)
Evals-per-period		-0.026 (0.030)	0.016 (0.029)	0.025 (0.032)	0.0002 (0.001)	-0.019 (0.031)	0.04 (0.028)	0.050 (0.033)		.001 (0.001)	-0.016 (0.030)	0.031 (0.024)	0.041 (0.037)
Days Bet. Polls					-0.001 (0.002)	-0.038 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.051)		.002 (0.003)	-0.077 (0.052)	-0.053 (0.041)	-0.030 (0.062)
Post-Deploy										-.083 (.055)	1.980* (0.91)	2.707* (1.27)	1.209 (1.15)
Pre+Post-Deploy										.024 (.059)	-1.393 (1.01)	-0.607 (2.29)	0.740 (1.67)
Major War										.024 (.076)	4.870** (1.56)	11.03** (3.55)	10.24*** (2.11)
Pres. Elec. Year	-0.144*** (0.034)				-0.115** (0.038)	-1.337 (1.01)	-1.436 (1.62)	-2.206 (1.81)		-.142** (.053)	0.120 (1.23)	-1.865 (1.68)	-1.717 (1.57)
Midterm Election					0.0674^ (0.036)	-0.588 (0.64)	0.376 (0.84)	-0.292 (1.26)					
Party Leader					0.001 (0.002)	-0.00544 (0.067)	-0.139 (0.092)	-0.042 (0.12)					
Second Term	-0.109* (0.043)				-0.143** (0.047)	1.532^ (0.77)	-0.059 (1.15)	1.013 (1.35)		-.115 (.050)			
ΔCons. Sentiment					-0.006* (0.003)	-0.063 (0.094)	-0.201 (0.20)	-0.328 (0.22)					
Unified Gov't	-0.0890* (0.042)				-0.103* (0.043)	-1.766* (0.87)	-2.528 (1.60)	-2.288 (1.93)		-.092^ (.049)			
Transition					0.262** (0.081)	-7.552** (2.18)	-1.176 (1.19)	-1.563 (4.49)					
Dem. President					0.025	-1.050	-1.456	0.326					

