

Globalization, Policy Constraints, and Vote Choice*

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Abstract. Despite much attention to global markets and domestic politics, political scientists know very little about how globalization influences the most fundamental aspect of representative democracy, the vote. This article presents a model of party choice when the capacity of elites to deliver policy is limited by the global economy. I argue that voters evaluate parties differently when elected representatives are perceived to be constrained by exogenous conditions. Voters respond to globalization by reducing the weight assigned to economic performance evaluations and to party positions on economic issues. To compensate, they increase the salience of non-economic issues. Analyses of French and British survey data support theoretical claims. Results show that market integration carries greater consequences for domestic politics than implied by recent work on the political economy of industrial democracies.

The consequences of economic globalization for advanced industrial democracies remain a source of much debate among students of comparative and international political economy. According to the “globalization thesis,” policymaker attempts to pursue strategies that diverge from neoliberal prescriptions will be undercut by impersonal market actors. The implication for democracy appears straightforward: By limiting national room to maneuver, globalization reduces policy efficacy and impinges on popular sovereignty. Yet despite the plausibility of strong and multifaceted relationships, we know very little about the consequences of economic globalization for the key mechanism of democracy—the voter’s choice at the polls. Does globalization affect vote choice? Do exogenous constraints give voters reason to doubt the capacity of elected policymakers? And if so, what are the implications for elite behavior?

This paper directs the focus away from globalization’s effect on policy outcomes to its influence on the voter’s decision. Current scholarship remains focused on the effects of trade and capital flows on national policy outcomes without direct consideration of how perceptions of these flows influence mass politics. Aggregate indicators, however, are only indirect proxies for what many studies actually purport to test: the effect of globalization on government policy levers (Brune and Garrett 2005). I examine policy constraints and the micro-foundations underlying them—rather than on trade and capital flows *per se*—with the intent of understanding the wider implications of the global economy for democratic performance. I draw on recent voting behavior research to develop a set of expectations for how voters evaluate parties differently when they believe policymakers to be constrained by the global economy. I argue that connections between globalization and policy capacity should matter for vote choice by *reducing* the economic bases of the vote and, to compensate, by *increasing* the salience of non-economic issues and non-policy considerations. Parting from the usual practice of comparing policy

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outcomes against aggregate indicators, I employ micro-level analyses of individuals' perceptions of the international economy, policy evaluations, and vote choice. This study thus advances scholarship on globalization beyond its current state on both theoretical and empirical grounds.¹

Study implications are several. First, results push us to reconsider the conventional wisdom about globalization and policy efficacy. Taking issue with the globalization thesis, many political economists contend that the effects of integrated markets for policy outcomes are, overall, limited. The bases for such conclusions generally stem from comparing trade and capital movements with measures of national economic performance and policy outcomes (e.g., Boix 1998; Burgoon 2001; Clark 2003; Garrett 1998; Hicks and Zorn 2005; Swank 2002). I demonstrate, however, that perceptions of globalization affect the salience of political issues, causing voters to downgrade the importance of the very issues political economy research strives to explain—economic performance and economic policy outcomes. Second, study results have implications for elite behavior. According to spatial models of party competition, parties face a trade off between proposing policies that reflect their sincere beliefs and the need to appeal to the median voter. I show that this dilemma is contingent on the type of policy proposed as well as on the voter's beliefs over the party policy capacity. By moderating the salience of position-taking on the economy, a globalized economy means that parties will pay a smaller electoral penalty for announcing noncentrist economic policies. At the same time, exposure to world markets implies that parties will have *less* leeway in areas not related to the economy. And third, this paper shows how perceptions of market constraints cause voters to reassess the way they evaluate political elites. Representation flourishes when agents have an incentive to provide principals with a set of substantive policy positions from which to choose. Perceptions of globalization, however, are shown to reduce this incentive in terms of the traditionally dominant economic left/right

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dimension. More generally, by diffusing the role of economics and increasing the salience of other factors, I demonstrate that globalization upsets the bases of mass-elite linkages in established democracies.

In what follows, I present a model of the vote when policymakers are constrained by global markets and then test it using individual-level data from recent French and British elections. After evaluating the robustness of the statistical results, I conclude by outlining areas for further research on the electoral consequences of globalization.

Selecting Policymakers under Room to Maneuver Constraints

Research on the determinants of vote choice in advanced industrial democracies generally focuses on three factors: performance evaluations, policy positions, and non-policy factors. These relate, respectively, to the relationship between the state of the economy and incumbent support, to the policy proposals of competing parties, and to the role of non-policy motivations. Recent scholarship has taken these approaches in two directions. The first investigates the relative importance these factors have on the vote (Adams *et al.* 2005; Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Blais *et al.* 2004), and the second examines how the diffusion of policymaking control conditions the strength of economic voting (Duch and Stevenson 2008), policy voting (Kedar 2005), and partisan attachments (Huber *et al.* 2005). The theoretical framework developed here is informed by both of these extensions.

The utility of voter i for party j can be expressed as:

$$U_{ij} = \alpha(y_{ij} - y^*) - \beta(v_i - p_j)^2 + \delta t_{ij}. \quad (1)$$

The first term on the right-hand side represents a simple sanctioning mechanism: y_{ij} is i 's evaluation of the level of economic performance with j contributing to the management of the economy. This evaluation is assessed against y^* , the expected level of economic performance

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absent j 's contribution to economic management.² The second term represents policy voting: v is the ideal point of voter i and p is the position of party j .³ The third term captures the non-policy motivation of partisan attachments such that t_{ij} is equal to one if the voter identifies with j and to zero otherwise. Finally, α , β , and δ are unknown constants measuring the respective salience to the voter of economic evaluations, issue positions, and partisan attachments.

How, then, do the room to maneuver constraints (RMC) associated with economic globalization affect the voter's preferences over the set of political parties? First consider the influence of RMC on evaluations of the national economy. For most of the postwar era, Keynesian macroeconomic models and their monetarist alternatives implied that policymakers could directly influence the health of the national economy. In recent years, however, external demand pressures, price levels from abroad, and shocks from commodity and financial markets have influenced larger segments of state activity. These global economic developments should give pause to many voters, leading them to question the credibility of government control over macroeconomic policy levers. If the voter thinks opportunities for policy manipulation have narrowed, then she should reduce the salience of economic performance evaluations.

What about the effect of RMC on policy-based voting? If it detracts from the salience of economic evaluations, then globalization may increase the salience of political issues as voters shift their bases of evaluation from those factors over which policymakers have little control—the national economy—and toward those which they continue to have an impact—the issues. However, there is considerable variation across issue types. Issue concerns in postindustrial democracies have been shown to cluster onto two dimensions. The first is well known and concerns the proper role for the state in the market. The second dimension concerns positions on non-economic issues and includes matters such as preferences toward authority, the

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environment, minority rights, and cultural diversity. Preferences on these non-economic issues tend to be orthogonal to economics-oriented left/right issues (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Hooghe *et al.* 2002; Kitschelt 1994). Globalization should affect the salience of these two issue dimensions differently. If market integration is thought to reduce the credibility of domestic policy levers—regardless of which party controls them—then elite positions on economic issues have relatively little bearing on the voter’s decision. The world economy, however, should prove to be less of a constraint on policymaker capacity over non-economic issues. Instead, the non-economic dimension should play a *compensating* role, increasing in salience as the rational voter searches for a basis for evaluating elites.

Finally, we must allow for the possibility that globalization leads voters to rely more on non-policy appeals. When confronted with a situation hostile to policy activism, the voter may fall back on less tangible attributes as personal appeals, charisma, and other psychological attachments. Although connections with globalization have not been previously explored, there is some evidence at the aggregate level to support this “partisanship compensation” hypothesis (Kayser and Wlezien 2006).

Incorporating expectations about the world economy and policy constraints, the argument can be restated as follows. I expect RMC to reduce the salience of economic voting. Economic perceptions, be they positive or negative, should have a large effect on voter choice when the global economy’s influence on policy efficacy is perceived to be low but have only a negligible effect when these constraints are high (H1). Second, RMC should reduce the weight voters assign to party economic policy positions: The influence of elite-mass proximity on economic issues should be weaker for individuals who believe policy action is constrained by the international economy (H2). Third, RMC should have an opposite, compensating effect on non-

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economic issue positions, with the influence of these issues greater for individuals who perceive high policy constraints under globalization (H3). Finally, if the partisan compensation hypothesis is correct, then partisan attachments should matter more for individuals who perceive high room to maneuver constraints (H4).

These expectations can be assessed by estimating statistical model of the following form:

$$U_{ij} = \omega_{i0}\alpha(y_{ij} - y^*) - \omega_{i1}\beta_1(v_{i1} - p_{j1})^2 - \omega_{i2}\beta_2(v_{i2} - p_{j2})^2 + \omega_{i3}\delta t_{ij}. \quad (2)$$

All is defined as in equation (1), with two exceptions. First, to reflect the differential effects of

RMC on issue voting, I partition the policy proximity component, $\beta(v_i - p_j)^2$, into

$\beta_1(v_{i1} - p_{j1})^2$ and $\beta_2(v_{i2} - p_{j2})^2$ such that v_{i1} is i 's ideal point on the economic policy dimension

and v_{i2} is her ideal point on the non-economic policy dimension. These correspond to the party's

positions p_{j1} and p_{j2} . Second, to each term I attach individual-specific discount parameters to

measure the voter's perception about the room to maneuver. The compound parameters

$\omega_{i0}\alpha$, $\omega_{i1}\beta_1$, $\omega_{i2}\beta_2$, and $\omega_{i3}\delta$ thus are "performance weights" which incorporate not only the

party's own "competence" but also the "situational [room to maneuver] constraints" (Grofman

1985). In this way, the voter's decision depends not only on individual attributes and

perceptions, but is also determined by perceptions of the party's capacity to influence policy

outcomes.

The 1997 French Election

The first test of the constrained policymaker model uses data from the 1997 French National Assembly election. The French case contains several partisan and institutional features of interest to a contextual study of vote choice. Politically, France's two-round rules mean that voters are offered more choices—choices which may affect our ability to detect room to

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maneuver effects. Economically, France's *dirigiste* tradition means a tradition of strong state involvement in citizens' lives. Due in part to this tradition, threats to domestic control from extra-national forces have been frequently highlighted by political elites. The far right National Front, in particular, capitalized on the anti-globalization movement that gained prominence following the public sector strikes during 1995 and 1996. These strikes—famously dubbed the world's "first revolt against globalization"⁴—introduced the global economy to the French voter, making the 1997 election ideal for assessing the implications of room to maneuver constraints.

Data are from the 1997 French National Election Study (CEVIPOF *et al.* 2001). The dependent variable, self-reported vote choice in the first round, has six response categories corresponding with vote for the Communist Party (PCF), the Socialists (PS), the Greens, the incumbent RPR and UDF parties, and the National Front (FN). Over 90% of respondents selected one of these parties. The key explanatory variable, *Room to Maneuver Constraints* is measured using a survey question which captures citizens' evaluations of their government's policymaking capacity in light of economic globalization: "In your opinion, does globalization still leave the French government with a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or hardly any room to maneuver in the economy?" I assign a code of 0 to "a great deal" (5.0% of respondents), 1 to "quite a lot" (38.6%), 2 to "not very much" (44.6%), and 3 to "hardly any" (11.8%). High values on the measure convey beliefs that national policymakers are heavily constrained by globalization. Low values connote beliefs that the international economy matters little for policy decision-making.

Economic perceptions are measured using a prospective evaluations measure. It asks respondents if the economy will improve, worsen, or stay the same in the coming year.⁵ Per equation (2), policy proximity is measured on two dimensions. Each compares voter and party

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placements on issue scales. Voter positions on economic issues are measured using an economic liberalism index developed by Boy and Mayer (2000). This is paired with a measure of party economic ideology from a survey of party experts (Marks and Steenbergen 1999). Voter positions on non-economic issues are measured using a libertarian-authoritarian index. This index is then paired with Marks and Steenbergen's (1999) measure of party placement on "libertarian-authoritarian freedoms and rights" to produce the policy proximity variable. Both issue proximity scores are calculated as the squared difference between the party's position and the respondent's. The last of the key explanatory variables is *Party Identification*, which is a choice-specific variable coded 1 if the respondent identifies themselves as "very" or "somewhat" close to a political party.

The statistical model also includes a pair of controls to address competing explanations for why economic or social bases of the vote may matter more for certain voters than others.⁶ The first of these relates to general sentiment toward the French government. It might be argued that voters who trust their government leaders are also more likely to base their decisions on their evaluations of, say, the state of the national economy. The conjecture would be that a minimal level of trust is required in order to assign the responsibility of improving a poor economy (or maintaining a healthy one) to government policymakers. I control for this possibility by including an item, *Attitude toward State*, which asks respondents whether "the state" evokes positive or negative sentiments. Tendencies to link economic and social policy positions to vote choice might also be conditioned by one's engagement in politics in general. Thus, a second control is an item which queries the respondent's subjective level of interest in politics. Finally, the model includes a battery of background and cleavage variables (*les variables lourdes*).

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Measurement details for all variables employed in the analyses can be found in an appendix available from *The Journal of Politics* website.

To combine party-specific (policy proximity and party identification) and individual-specific (economic evaluations and demographics) determinants of the vote, I estimate models using conditional logit.⁷ Table 1 presents model results. The incumbent RPR is the reference category. Parameter estimates are again generally consistent with expectations. Coefficients on the individual-specific *Prospective Economy* variable are negatively signed for all choice pairs, suggesting that positive evaluations do not aid non-incumbent parties. Coefficients on the *Economic Issues* and *Social Issues* proximity variables are negative, while the coefficient on *Party Identification* is positive. Wald χ^2 tests, reported in table notes, show that each of these variables interacted with RMC are jointly statistically significant.

[Table 1 about here]

Given the conditional nature of the theoretical claims, I perform a series of post-estimation simulations as a means to assess quantities of interest (Herron 2000; King *et al.* 2000).⁸ After estimating the model, I draw a vector of coefficients from a multivariate normal distribution with mean equal to the vector of parameter estimates and variance estimated from the variance-covariance matrix. I then calculate the predicted probability that a hypothetical voter selects each of the three parties using the formula for the conditional logit model. Expectations pertaining to the effect of economic evaluations, policy proximity, and partisanship are examined through a series of counterfactual scenarios by manipulating the values of these variables—while holding all remaining variables at their mean or modal values—and examining how vote probabilities change as a result. To incorporate estimation uncertainty, I repeat the

procedure 10,000 times for each counterfactual and construct confidence intervals using the distribution of expected probabilities.⁹

Post-estimation analyses report the effect of room to maneuver constraints on the vote probabilities of a hypothetical member of the electorate.¹⁰ District-level coordination by political parties meant that the choice set facing each voter in the 1997 election was effectively reduced to choosing between the Center-Left (PS, PCF, and Greens), the Center-Right (RPR and UDF), and the FN (Boy and Mayer 2000).¹¹ So given the voter's choice set, it makes sense to examine these three choices. Thus, Table 2 reports expected probabilities and first differences for these anticipated coalitions; probabilities for each party separately found in the appendix.

[Table 2 about here]

Research hypotheses are assessed by examining changes in expected vote probabilities for each party or party group as a given variable changes under low and then high room to maneuver constraints. First consider *Prospective Economy*. When the voter perceives that the French government still has “a great deal” of room to maneuver in the economy, results are in line with economic voting models of electoral accountability. For example, if she thinks conditions will improve in the coming year, the voter selects the incumbent Center-Right with probability of .60. If she believes the economy has gotten worse, she selects a party on the Center-Right with probability of .34. This produces a first difference of +.26. This substantial and statistically significant difference does not appear when the government is perceived as having “hardly any” room to maneuver (RMC=3; right-hand side Table 2). In fact, when policy constraints associated with globalization are perceived as being high, economic projections are of no consequence for distinguishing between the Center-Right, the Center-Left, or the FN.¹²

I assess the effect of economic issues by moving the voter's preferred position, v_{i1} , to the left-most on the economics issue scale while holding constant the party's position, p_{j1} . The squared distance between these two values, $(v_{i1} - p_{j1})^2$, is used to produce the expected vote probabilities. The hypothetical voter is then moved to the right-most position on the economic issue scale and the process is repeated. Results show that when the voter holds left-of-center positions on the economy she is more likely to vote for a party on the Center-Left (the Communists, Socialists, or Greens) than for one on the Right. The electoral consequences of positions on the economy are much larger for parties on the Center-Right when RMC is low than when it is high—the respective first differences are -.53 and -.17. Globalization perceptions, however, do not affect the salience of economic positions for the three parties on the left. Rather, perceived constraints produce voter movement *within* the right side of the spectrum, away from the center and towards the extreme. Relative to selecting a member of a prospective Center-Right coalition, perceptions of policymaker debility in the economy reduces the costs of casting a protest vote for the far right National Front.

I next consider the effect of party positions on the non-economic policy dimension. The influence of room to maneuver constraints is evident in all cases. When $RMC = 0$, party placements on this libertarian-authoritarian dimension produce first differences of +.37 for the Center-Left, -.24 for the Center-Right and -.13 for the FN. For high RMC, these predictions change to +.51, -.10 and -.43, respectively. Model expectations are therefore supported for the FN and the Center-Left but not the Center-Right. The existence of a credible force on the extreme right may interact with concerns about globalization to affect the salience of the mainstream Right's policy appeal on the non-economic dimension (Meguid 2005).¹³

Lastly, I examine whether perceptions of the room to maneuver cause voters to increase the weight they assign to their partisan loyalties. I do this by comparing expected probabilities when the voter identifies with a party to the counterfactual of when he does not feel close to any party. Results show that while partisanship always exerts an effect on voter choice, it matters even more for some parties' fortunes when voters believe that policymakers are restrained by world markets (see appendix). For example, when $RMC=0$, partisanship affects the likelihood of casting a vote for the FN by only 27%. But when $RMC=3$, partisan sentiment increases the FN's chances to the level of 50%. While a result equal in magnitude is found for the Communists, I find that RMC does little to condition the effect of partisan sentiment on voting for mainstream parties—the PS, UDF, or RPR. I revisit these findings for partisanship in the discussion of Britain.

The last column of expected values in Table 2 reports results of calculating the mean and standard deviation of the *difference of first differences*. These provide a test of whether these pairs of first differences (for when $RMC=0$ and when $RMC=3$) are statistically different, not from zero but from one another. Results show that first differences between when $RMC=0$ and $RMC=3$ are statistically significant for at least one party or party coalition in each of the three cases, *Prospective Economy*, *Economic Issues*, and *Social Issues*. Evidence from the 1997 French vote thus shows that when voters perceive policymakers to be constrained they reduce the salience of the economy and compensate by emphasizing non-economic considerations.

The 2001 British Election

To see whether voters in other industrial democracies behave similarly to the French respondents, I conduct a similar analysis of the 2001 British election. The British case provides a useful contrast in several respects. Britain's political institutions produce policy-oriented parties

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and clear lines of responsibility which should facilitate economic and issue voting. Moreover, Britain's exposure to the international economy, relative to the size of its domestic market, places it among the least globalized economies in the OECD. Beliefs over government constraints should therefore be no more and probably less likely to affect voting behavior in Britain than in countries with larger public sectors, like France, or in smaller, more open political economies. Britain, therefore, serves as something of a critical case for our model of constrained policymakers.

Data are from the 1997-2001 British Election Panel Study (BEPS, Heath *et al.* 2002). The dependent variable is self-reported vote choice for one of the three main British parties, Labour, the Conservatives, or the Liberal Democrats, in the 2001 election.¹⁴ Respondents who voted for regional or marginal parties (i.e., parties attaining less than 3% of the vote) are left out of the analysis (Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000; Blais *et al.* 2004). Room to maneuver constraints are measured using the following survey item: "In today's worldwide economy, how much influence do you think British governments have on Britain's economy, a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or hardly any?" Respondents are evenly split between those who respond with "a great deal" (9.3%) or "quite a lot" (45.9) and those who respond "not very much" (39.4) or "hardly any" (5.4).¹⁵ All but 3% of respondents offered an answer. *Room to Maneuver Constraint* is created by assigning a score of 0 to those responding "a great deal," 1 to "quite a lot," 2 to "not very much," and 3 to "hardly any."

Economic evaluations are measured using the standard prospective and retrospective questions. Elite-mass proximity on economic issues is measured by averaging responses across using four survey items that ask individuals to place themselves and the main British parties on identical scales: government emphasis on inflation versus unemployment, cutting taxes versus

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providing services, income redistribution, and nationalization of industry.¹⁶ Since the BEPS does not ask about party positions on non-economic issues, I place the parties on a social policy dimension using data from Benoit and Laver's (2006) expert survey. Low scores on the measure reflect libertarian values and high scores authoritarian values. The party scores are paired with respondent positions on a libertarian-authoritarian dimension taken from an index of issue items from the BEPS.¹⁷ *Party Identification* is coded 1 if the respondent identifies themselves as "very" or "fairly" strong partisans and 0 otherwise (Blais *et al.* 2004).

Along with demographic variables found in the literature, I again include a set of controls designed to address competing explanations for the conditional effects attributable to RMC. Two of these are similar to those used in the French case, *Trust in Government* and *Interest in Politics*. The British survey also includes measures which allow us to address two additional considerations. One is the role of government competence. It may be the case that RMC item does not focus the survey respondent's attention on the constraining effect of "the worldwide economy" so much as it primes her to think about the government's ability—by virtue of its own managerial competence—to influence Britain's economy.¹⁸ Although experimental evidence suggests otherwise (see footnote 15), I include a measure of government competence in the model. The item asks respondents to decide whether the Labour Party is "capable of being a strong government" or not (Green and Hobolt forthcoming). Finally, unlike the FNES, the BEPS includes International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) codes which enable analysts to code respondents in terms of their occupational exposure to world markets. It may be that responses to the RMC item may be shaped by the individual's position in the labor market – with those employed in sectors of the economy exposed to international competition being more likely to recognize the constraints faced by globalization than those who are not.

Table 3 presents the conditional logit model results.¹⁹ Coefficients are generally consistent with their hypothesized effects. Coefficients on *Prospective Economy* and *Retrospective Economy* are negative, indicating that favorable prospective evaluations reduce the probability of selecting other parties over the incumbent Labour Party (the reference category). And, as expected, coefficients on the two choice specific proximity variables are negative, while *Party Identification* has a positive parameter estimate. Tests of the joint significance show that the cumulative effects of the interacted variables are statistically different from zero.

[Table 3 about here]

I again employ a series of post-estimation analyses to assess theoretical expectations. Results are reported in Table 4. First consider *Prospective Economy*. The left-hand-side of the table shows that economic prospections have a large influence on the voter's decision when he perceives no constraint on government capacity (RMC=0). If the voter thinks conditions will improve in the coming year, he votes for the incumbent Labour Party with a probability of .45, and if he believes the economy has gotten worse, he selections Labour with probability of only .06 for a first difference of +.38. Conversely, a swing from negative to positive prospective evaluations decreases the probability of voting for the main opposition party, the Conservatives, by one-third (first difference = -.33). Effects are far weaker, however, when the voter perceives room to maneuver constraints to be high. Perceptions of globalization also affect *Retrospective Economy* in a manner consistent with expectations. In the absence of RMC constraints, retrospective evaluations have statistically significant effect for the probability the voter supports the Tories (first difference = -.26). We observe no effect of economic retrospections, however, for the opposition's fortunes when room to maneuver constraints are high.

[Table 4 about here]

The bottom half of the table examines policy voting. Results show that when beliefs in policy capacity are low, economic policy proximity has a large and statistically significant effect on vote probabilities. For all three parties, however, the effect of shifting voter sentiment from left to right on the economic policy continuum is much less pronounced when RMC is high. Turning to mass-elite proximity on social policy, results show that, unlike economic factors, party placements on these non-economic issues have no influence on the vote *in the absence of room to maneuver constraints*. First differences show instead that the effects of social policy positions are large under high RMC. In fact, if the voter believes the government to have “hardly any” influence on Britain’s economy (RMC=3), then proximity on social policy exerts a *greater* cumulative effect than do party positions on the economy.²⁰

Finally, I examine whether globalization matters for the salience of non-policy factors by examining *Party Identification*. As with the French analyses, I compare probabilities of when the voter feels close to that party to when he has no partisan attachments. This exercise reveals, unsurprisingly, that partisanship has a strong effect on vote choice (see appendix). RMC, however, has no discernible effect on the strength of this relationship.²¹ When viewed in combination with the largely null findings on partisanship for the French data analysis, this yields an important finding: To the extent that voters compensate for a lack of policymaker control in the economy, they do so on policy grounds, not partisanship.

As in Table 2, the last column of Table 4 assesses whether the two pairs of first differences are statistically significantly different from one another (the “difference in first differences”). Results show that these differences are statistically significant for the incumbent Labour Party’s vote probability for *Prospective Economy* and for the expected probabilities for the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats for *Social Issues*.²²

Sensitivity Analysis

I performed several additional analyses to assess the robustness of these results.²³ The first set relates to alternative explanations for the observed conditional effects of *Room to Maneuver Constraints* on economic evaluations and issue proximity. The RMC measures have several virtues that help set this study apart from previous work on globalization. First, instead of addressing specific components like preferences for protectionism (as in, e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Baker 2005; Kaltenthaler *et al.* 2004), they measure individual perceptions on economic globalization in broad terms. Second, the RMC items allow us to break new ground in the study of globalization and public opinion as it relates to policymaker capacity. And third, the use of two different survey items from two election studies helps demonstrate the robustness of the statistical results. These virtues aside, I re-estimated the conditional logit models using alternative conditioning variables in place of the RMC survey items as a further check that the contingent effects reported above are due to room to maneuver constraints and not some other factor. For France, I substituted *Attitude toward State* and *Interest in Politics*. For Britain, I estimated models which consecutively substituted *Trust in Government*, *Government Competence*, and *Interest in Politics* for RMC. In no case, however, does the alternative conditioning variable affect the bases of voter choice in a fashion similar to RMC.

A second measurement consideration pertains to the non-economic, or social, policy dimension. I argue that market exposure increases the salience of non-economic issues for the voter. While the components of the economic dimension are established in the literature, there is less agreement regarding what constitutes non-economic policy. I therefore investigated the robustness of the social dimension by substituting measures on positions on Europe. From its start as mainly an economic consideration, European integration has become closely linked to

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libertarian/authoritarian considerations in recent years, particularly in older member states (Evans 1998; Heath *et al.* 2001; Hooghe *et al.* 2002). Results of re-estimating the models using the squared distance between the positions of voters and parties toward the EU in place of the *Social Issues* variable show that *for all nine parties* in the two elections, the electoral effects of positions on integration are greater for the case of high room to maneuver constraints than for the case where globalization has no effect on national policy efficacy.

A final consideration pertains to the role of retrospective economic perceptions. Analyses of British data indicated that beliefs about globalization depress the utility of retrospective evaluations. An alternative explanation might be that voters use the global economy as a cognitive device to reduce inconsistencies between their preferred party and their assessment of the economy. For example, a voter who recognized that the economy had been performing well might associate it with the world economy—and not to the policies of the sitting government—if his intention all along was to vote for the opposition. To assess this rationalization conjecture, I used the BEPS data to predict *Room to Maneuver Constraint* as a function of *Retrospective Economy*, party vote intention, and their interaction. If this conjecture is correct, then the effect of retrospections on RMC should be conditioned by vote intentions. That is, among those intending to vote Labour, positive economic evaluations should result in *lower* RMC values since Labour voters should be happy to assign responsibility for a strong economy to the government. Results of these analyses, however, do not provide support for the rationalization conjecture. There is no evidence that vote intentions condition the relationship between the economy and globalization perceptions.²⁴

Conclusion

In a recent commentary on the state of the field of international political economy, Frieden and Martin (2002, 129) implore scholars to investigate “the relative intensities of actors’ policy preferences [and] the weights groups and individuals place on their various policy goals.” This study confronts this challenge head-on. More fundamentally, however, study findings about the constraining influence of room to maneuver perceptions challenge conventional treatments of globalization and domestic politics. Political economists often assert that governments in advanced welfare states retain much room to maneuver. The implication is that openness has little adverse bearing on democratic performance. The basis for this implication derives from macro analyses of objective indicators, however, and is never tested on the voters. By examining individuals, I show that how citizens think about globalization matters for a fundamental component of democracy, the vote.

Study findings point to at least three directions for future research. First, findings provide direction for work on party strategies. When globalization is salient, parties have less need to carve out distinct positions on the economy. Study results also show that RMC effects vary by party. In Britain, globalization perceptions have less influence on voter decisions to support the centrist Liberal Democrats than they do for the two larger parties. In France, RMC affects support for political incumbents but also has a large effect on the populist Front National. Building on recent work on party strategies (e.g., Adams *et al.* 2006; Meguid 2005), future studies should address how different types of parties either embrace or shy away from globalization as an issue. In particular, we must learn more about how the presence of a party, like the FN, whose appeal stems in part from “globalization” affects how all parties choose to address the world economy.

Second, we must revisit how political and economic context structures the vote. Recent scholarship has excelled at identifying how institutions shape election outcomes. By examining how institutions diffuse or concentrate power, we have learned a great deal about how context affects the economic bases of the vote. This study demonstrates that the global economic context matters too. Economic perceptions matter less when voters believe their policymakers to be constrained by globalization. But unlike other studies of the effect of context on economic voting, this study identifies a (perceived) context which causes voters to *compensate* for the loss of political control in certain areas by re-emphasizing other policy areas (non-economic issues). Future work on institutions and mass behavior should strive to identify other factors—in addition to economic globalization—which play a similar compensating role for the voter. And, informed by insights from psychology, researchers should also explore the extent to which beliefs about the constraining effects of globalization are formed exogenously from domestic politics.

Finally, the normative implications of globalization for democracy deserve reconsideration. On first blush, this study's normative implications are unclear. Globalization means one of the foremost mechanisms of accountability, the state of the national economy, is in decline. It would be premature, however, to interpret this to mean that the overall quality of democracy will suffer as a result. It may be that economic voting is being substituted for more effective ways of selecting policymakers. Or it may be that elections in the future will (increasingly) serve better as means of selecting “good types” rather than for sanctioning incumbents for poor performance (Fearon 1999). If globalization reduces the quality of economic considerations as a signal for evaluating politicians—a signal which, in reality, has always been noisy—then open markets may prove to be compatible with democracy after all.

Endnotes

¹ This is true not only vis-à-vis the many works on policy outcomes but also for a smaller set of studies which consider globalization's consequences for political attitudes (Baker 2005; Fernández-Albertos 2006; Glasgow 2005; Hays *et al.* 2005; Hellwig 2001; Kaltenthaler *et al.* 2004; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Most of these studies stop short of examining connections between global markets and the vote, and those that do limit investigations to the effect of objective measures of globalization on voting for the political incumbent—disregarding 1) how globalization affects other aspects of voter choice, 2) decisions to select non-incumbent parties, and 3) the effects of globalization perceptions.

² While theories of economic voting typically apply onto to the relationship between the economy and incumbent party support, recent work highlights how the economy affects the fortunes of all parties competing in elections (e.g., Duch and Stevenson 2007). In equation (1), economic evaluations positively affect i 's utility for j if j 's contribution to economic performance exceeds what would be expected otherwise, or $y_{ij} > y^*$.

³ The term $(v_i - p_j)^2$ is the quadratic loss function commonplace in tests of spatial models. As shown in Equation (2), I model the salience of elite-mass congruence as a function of room to maneuver perceptions. Most analysts, however, assume homogeneity of issue salience. Exceptions are Rivers (1988) and Glasgow (2001).

⁴ Erik Israelewicz, "La première révolte contre la mondialisation," *Le Monde*, 7 Dec. 1995.

⁵ The French survey does not include a retrospective measure. There is reason, however, to assume that voters employed prospective economic perceptions as a tool for holding the incumbent to account in the 1997 vote. There was some uncertainty as to whether the legislative elections would produce another right-of-center government or government of the left. By

choosing to dissolve the legislature on April 21, President Jacques Chirac apparently believed the Right would prevail. Most voters assumed as much (see, e.g., polling data reported in Cautrès 2000). This uncertainty may have effected how voters evaluated parties in light of prospective economic performance, particularly on decisions to vote for the PS. All knew, however, that the Right would have at least partial influence on the future direction of policy through its hold on the presidency at least until 2002.

⁶ I include a larger set of these measures designed to deflect measurement concerns in the analysis of British survey data below. Though the British dataset includes a wider range of variables for this purpose, the French survey's measure of *Room to Maneuver Constraints* is arguably less ambiguous more precise in meaning. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

⁷ Hausman tests reveal no violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. Test statistics are as follows: without PCF: 40.77 ($p = 0.99$), without PS: 78.49 ($p = 0.53$), without Verts: 44.17 ($p = 0.99$), without UDF: 49.92 ($p = 0.99$), without RPR: 57.91 ($p = 0.97$), and without FN: 47.46 ($p = 0.99$).

⁸ Quantities of interest cannot be read directly from individual coefficients and standard errors in standard results tables such as Table 1. Reasons include the dependence of coefficients in non-linear probability models, the masking of party-specific effects for the choice-specific variables, and the use of multiplicative interaction terms requiring calculation of marginal coefficients and standard errors (Ai and Norton 2003).

⁹ Part II of the online appendix provides discusses the post-estimation analyses in greater detail.

¹⁰ For the French case, the hypothetical voter is a female from northwest France, who is a Catholic who attends mass only for ceremonies, who is a white-collar worker, and who possesses

mean values on age and education. I obtain the expected probability that the voter chooses a member of the Center-Left or Center-Right by calculating the exponentiated sum of estimated coefficients times variable values for each party and then adding these values together and placing them in the numerator of the formula for the conditional logit performing the simulations.

¹¹ On the Center-Right, the RPR and UDF governed in coalition from 1993 to 1997, and it was expected they would do so following the election. On the Left, the PS, PCF, and Greens had by early 1997 succeeded in presenting a united front. Of the major parties only the National Front contested the election alone (Cautrès 2000).

¹² The influence of RMC on economic voting in the 1997 French election can also be seen by estimating the model as a three category choice between the Center-Left, Center-Right, and the FN (without policy proximity measures). See the appendix.

¹³ Indeed, the unique position of the FN in French party politics may well account for what might otherwise be considered anomalous findings regarding the role of globalization perceptions. This suggests a direction for future inquiry.

¹⁴ Item availability limits analysis to the 2001 wave. Comparisons of respondents in this wave with those in the first shows only minor differences in relevant characteristics such as income, education, and political knowledge, suggesting that the data are not biased by attrition.

Following Adams *et al.* (2005), I randomly eliminated a number of Scottish respondents due to their overrepresentation in the survey. This has no effect on substantive results.

¹⁵ A variant of this survey item has been examined in a recent experiment of 514 American adults on the effect of the world economy on citizen perceptions of policy efficacy (Hellwig *et al.* forthcoming). Subjects were randomly selected to receive one of two versions of the question

employed BEPS. Version 1 is identical to that used in the BEPS: “In today’s worldwide economy, how much influence do you think the American government has on America’s economy?” Version 2 is identical in every way except the “worldwide economy” prime was removed. Experiment results found that respondents are less likely to respond that the American government has “a great deal” of influence when they receive the “worldwide economy” prime. The “a great deal” response was more likely to be given by those who received the prime (48% of the subjects) than by those not given the prime (33%), while those not receiving the prime were more likely to provide the “Quite a lot” response (57%) than the primed group (42%). This indicates that the item does more than just tap perceptions of government influence but that it also reflects the perceptions of constraints *attributable to the worldwide economy*.

¹⁶ For each of the four issue scales, the average placement of the Liberal Democrats lies to the right of Labour and to the left of the Conservatives.

¹⁷ See the appendix for a list of items included. Regarding party positions, of the dimensions included in the Benoit-Laver data, the social dimension is the furthest removed from economic concerns and therefore the most appropriate. Regarding voter positions, inclusion of additional social policy items were found to have no substantive effect on the results.

¹⁸ The absence of a government competence measure should be of less consequence for the French analysis since the RMC measure includes an explicit reference to the room to maneuver.

¹⁹ Hausman χ^2 test statistics are 22.95 ($p = 0.78$) with the Liberal Democrats removed from the choice set, 13.86 ($p = 0.99$) without the Conservatives, and 19.65 ($p = 0.90$) without Labour.

²⁰ This can be seen in approximate fashion by summing the absolute values of the two sets of first differences when RMC=3. For economic issues, the first differences sum to 0.51; for social issues, they sum to 1.31.

²¹ First differences measuring the change in vote probabilities based on whether or not the respondent identified with the party are as follows: When RMC=0, Labour .57, Conservative .45, Liberal Democrat .53; when RMC=3, Labour .63, Conservative .47, Liberal Democrat .59. All are statistically significant at $p < .05$ or better. I also experimented with other non-policy-based evaluations contained in the BEPS, such as items tapping the effectiveness of party leaders, but found no conditional effects based on RMC.

²² Note that while differences in first differences are not statistically significant for any party for *Retrospective Economy* or *Economic Issues*, when an objective measure of respondent susceptibility to world markets (*Exposed Sector*) is substituted for RMC in the model, then differences in first differences are statistically significant for *Retrospective Economy* (in the case of Conservative Party vote probabilities) and for *Economic Issues* (for Conservative and Liberal Democrat choice probabilities). See the online appendix for results tables. Future work should examine more closely the relationship between objective exposure to globalization and subjective evaluations of this exposure.

²³ Evidence supporting claims made in this section is reported in Part IV of the online appendix.

²⁴ I am unable to conduct a similar analysis for France since the French survey does not include a retrospective evaluations item.

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Table 1. Conditional Logit Estimates of the 1997 French Legislative Election
Dependent variable: Respondent vote choice

	Choice Specific		PCF/RPR		PS/RPR		Greens/RPR		UDF/RPR		FN/RPR	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Pros. Economy			-.008	(.175)	-.043	(.131)	-.309*	(.188)	-.027	(.162)	-.824**	(.167)
x RMC			-.105	(.213)	.180	(.171)	.068	(.274)	-.104	(.218)	.368	(.228)
Econ Issues	-.082**	(.006)										
x RMC	.003	(.007)										
Social Issues	-.030**	(.004)										
x RMC	-.002	(.005)										
Party ID	1.989**	(.103)										
x RMC	.196	(.133)										
RMC			.536**	(.151)	.314**	(.125)	.406**	(.177)	-.083	(.152)	.656**	(.182)
Attitude to State			-.315**	(.134)	-.200*	(.122)	-.418**	(.153)	.079	(.128)	-.259*	(.140)
Political Interest			.586**	(.132)	.280**	(.105)	.262*	(.151)	.301**	(.126)	.162	(.130)
Religion			-.716**	(.132)	-.287**	(.078)	-.196*	(.111)	.146*	(.084)	-.456**	(.110)
Self Employed			-.551	(.374)	-.623**	(.302)	-1.390**	(.519)	-.017	(.343)	-1.399**	(.402)
White Collar			-.388	(.247)	.096	(.197)	.247	(.263)	.128	(.247)	.077	(.254)
Age			-.009	(.008)	-.012**	(.006)	-.016**	(.008)	-.006	(.007)	-.029**	(.008)
Female			-.274	(.227)	-.323*	(.178)	.026	(.241)	-.128	(.213)	-.397*	(.232)
Education			-.139	(.125)	-.161*	(.095)	.112	(.123)	-.021	(.113)	-.531**	(.128)
Northwest			.531	(.350)	.340	(.278)	.774**	(.374)	.814**	(.351)	-.155	(.352)
Northeast			.646*	(.335)	.818**	(.263)	1.392**	(.356)	.738**	(.352)	.608*	(.335)
Southwest			.187	(.363)	.597**	(.290)	.168	(.426)	.974**	(.363)	.326	(.379)
Southeast			.939**	(.351)	.480*	(.289)	.972**	(.380)	1.270**	(.352)	.687**	(.348)
Intercept			.328	(.691)	1.129**	(.502)	-.311	(.691)	-1.499**	(.616)	3.766**	(.670)
Model Wald χ^2	1240.01**											

Note: Cells report parameter estimates from a conditional logit regression where the outcomes are vote for one of six parties with robust standard errors in parentheses. The RPR is the reference category. RMC = *Room to Maneuver Constraint*, as defined in the text, scaled -1.5, -.5, .5, 1.5. .

** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, two-tailed tests. Number of observations = 1688.

Joint χ^2 tests for the joint significance of the coefficient of the variable of interest and its interaction with RMC are as follows: Prospective Economy = 37.99**, Economic Issues = 195.80**, Social Issues = 64.54**, Party Identification = 378.35.

Table 2. Effects of Room to Maneuver Constraints on Economic Evaluations and Party Issue Positions, 1997 French Legislative Election

	Expected Vote Probabilities with No Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 0)			Expected Vote Probabilities with High Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 3)			
Prospective Economy	Economy Better	Economy Worse	First Diff.	Economy Better	Economy Worse	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Center-Left	.37 (.07)	.38 (.08)	-.01 (.11)	.58 (.08)	.50 (.08)	.09 (.10)	-.10 (.18)
Center-Right	.60 (.07)	.34 (.07)	.26** (.10)	.18 (.05)	.18 (.04)	.00 (.06)	.26* (.15)
Front National	.03 (.02)	.28 (.09)	-.25** (.09)	.24 (.08)	.33 (.08)	-.09 (.11)	-.16 (.17)
Economic Issues	Left	Right	First Diff.	Left	Right	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Center-Left	.91 (.04)	.05 (.02)	.86** (.05)	.97 (.02)	.06 (.03)	.90** (.04)	-.04 (.08)
Center-Right	.09 (.03)	.62 (.09)	-.53** (.07)	.03 (.01)	.20 (.05)	-.17** (.05)	-.36** (.08)
Front National	.00 (.00)	.34 (.06)	-.33* (.10)	.00 (.00)	.74 (.08)	-.74** (.08)	.40** (.14)
Social Issues	Liber-tarian	Author-itarian	First Diff.	Liber-tarian	Author-itarian	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Center-Left	.61 (.08)	.25 (.06)	.37** (.11)	.82 (.06)	.32 (.07)	.51** (.10)	-.14 (.18)
Center-Right	.35 (.07)	.59 (.06)	-.24** (.08)	.11 (.03)	.21 (.04)	-.10** (.04)	-.14 (.10)
Front National	.03 (.02)	.16 (.05)	-.13** (.05)	.07 (.04)	.47 (.09)	-.40** (.10)	.28** (.12)

Notes: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party coalition with standard errors in parentheses. Center-Left Parties equal the cumulative expected probabilities, PCF + PS + Greens. Center-Right Parties equal the cumulative expected probabilities, UDF + RPR. Values generated by using estimates from Table 1 and iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a female from northwest France, who is a Catholic who attends mass only for ceremonies, who is a white-collar worker, and who possesses mean values on age and education. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$ for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the model reported in Table 1.

Table 3. Conditional Logit Estimates of the 2001 British Election
Dependent variable: Respondent vote choice

	Choice Specific		CON/LAB		LIBDEM/LAB	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Prospective Economy			-.667**	(.176)	-.489**	(.172)
x RMC			.480**	(.236)	.394*	(.234)
Retrospective Economy			-.510**	(.161)	-.193	(.178)
x RMC			.051	(.210)	-.114	(.237)
Economic Issues	-.060**	(.014)				
x RMC	.022	(.018)				
Social Issues	-.016**	(.006)				
x RMC	-.012*	(.006)				
Party Identification	2.927**	(.156)				
x RMC	.149	(.196)				
RMC			.004	(.230)	-.024	(.199)
Trust in Government			-.420**	(.172)	-.522**	(.176)
Labour Capable			-.831**	(.147)	-.500**	(.157)
Interest in Politics			.358**	(.130)	.153	(.131)
Exposed Sector			-.314	(.306)	-.414	(.320)
Public Sector			-.358	(.260)	.197	(.274)
Manual Worker			-.191	(.319)	-.128	(.322)
Homeownership			.316	(.318)	.030	(.322)
Age			.040**	(.009)	.030**	(.009)
Female			.700**	(.248)	.047	(.259)
Family Income			.039	(.030)	.067**	(.030)
Education			-.109	(.124)	-.061	(.135)
North			-.177	(.377)	.125	(.455)
Midlands			.185	(.396)	.121	(.484)
Southwest			.858*	(.487)	1.585**	(.518)
Southeast			.725*	(.371)	.609	(.452)
Wales			-1.539**	(.735)	.400	(.625)
Scotland			-.961*	(.512)	-.636	(.611)
Intercept			-.242	(.196)	-.046	(1.020)
<i>Joint χ^2 Tests^a</i>						
Prospective Economy	24.10**					
Retrospective Economy	11.88**					
Economic Issues	22.25**					
Social Issues	9.58**					
Party Identification	372.29**					
Model Wald χ^2	641.27**					

Note: Cells report parameter estimates from a conditional logit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. RMC = *Room to Maneuver Constraint*, as defined in the text, scaled -1.5, -.5, .5, 1.5. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, two-tailed tests. Number of observations = 1265.

^a Joint significance of the coefficient of the variable of interest and its interaction with RMC.

Table 4. Effects of Room to Maneuver Constraints on Economic Evaluations and Party Issue Positions, 2001 British Election

	Expected Vote Probabilities with No Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 0)			Expected Vote Probabilities with High Room to Maneuver Constraint (RMC = 3)			
Prospective Economy	Economy Better	Economy Worse	First Diff.	Economy Better	Economy Worse	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Labour	.45 (.13)	.07 (.04)	.38** (.12)	.19 (.09)	.22 (.10)	-.03 (.12)	.40** (.20)
Conservative	.28 (.10)	.61 (.11)	-.33** (.13)	.48 (.14)	.48 (.13)	.00 (.17)	-.32 (.27)
Lib. Democrat	.27 (.11)	.32 (.10)	-.05 (.13)	.33 (.12)	.30 (.11)	.03 (.15)	-.08 (.25)
Retrospective Economy	Economy Better	Economy Worse	First Diff.	Economy Better	Economy Worse	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Labour	.25 (.09)	.15 (.09)	.10 (.10)	.27 (.09)	.15 (.08)	.12 (.10)	-.02 (.17)
Conservative	.34 (.09)	.59 (.12)	-.26** (.13)	.43 (.11)	.52 (.13)	-.10 (.14)	-.16 (.24)
Lib. Democrat	.41 (.11)	.25 (.10)	.16 (.13)	.30 (.10)	.32 (.12)	-.02 (.13)	.18 (.23)
Economic Issues	Left	Right	First Diff.	Left	Right	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Labour	.35 (.11)	.05 (.04)	.29** (.11)	.26 (.09)	.15 (.10)	.11 (.13)	.19 (.18)
Conservative	.13 (.07)	.85 (.10)	-.73** (.14)	.36 (.15)	.62 (.20)	-.26 (.29)	-.47 (.39)
Lib. Democrat	.52 (.12)	.09 (.07)	.43** (.13)	.39 (.12)	.24 (.12)	.15 (.18)	.28 (.25)
Social Issues	Liber- tarian	Author- itarian	First Diff.	Liber- tarian	Author- itarian	First Diff.	<i>Diff. in FDs</i>
Labour	.19 (.08)	.20 (.08)	-.01 (.06)	.29 (.09)	.11 (.06)	.19** (.08)	.19 (.12)
Conservative	.49 (.13)	.45 (.16)	.04 (.24)	.16 (.08)	.81 (.12)	-.65** (.17)	.70** (.35)
Lib. Democrat	.32 (.11)	.36 (.14)	-.04 (.18)	.55 (.12)	.09 (.07)	.47** (.14)	-.50* (.27)

Note: Cells report expected probabilities of voting for the party with standard errors in parentheses. Values generated by using estimates reported in Table 3 and iteratively manipulating variables of interest for a hypothetical voter who is a male from greater London who owns his home, who is neither a manual nor a public sector worker, and who possesses mean values on economic evaluations, issue distances, age, family income, and education, unless otherwise noted. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, for first differences based on taking 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the model reported in Table 3.