

The Effect of Dominant Regimes on Urban Democracy

On-line Appendix

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Case Selection

I set out to collect 100 years of data on the 244 cities that were listed as one of the 100 largest cities in the United States at any decennial census between 1790 and 1990.¹ I used secondary sources to establish time periods where a single organization appeared to have strong control over government, city-wide for at least a decade during the 20th century.² Specifically, I relied on the main comparative urban texts that discuss dominance. I used Mayhew's analysis in *Placing Parties in American Politics* and Erie's *Rainbow's End* to define periods of time when a city was dominated by a machine organization. Mayhew also reported on some reform dominated cities. I supplemented Mayhew's historical analysis with information on the development of non-partisan slating groups from Bridges (1997), Davidson and Fraga (1988), and Childs (1965) for reform dominance. Mayhew's analysis reviews all large cities in every state and many small cities for evidence that a well-defined organization regularly nominates winning candidates for public office and exchanges material inducements for support.

In many cases Mayhew provides precise dates for the rise (and fall) of machine monopolies. Where he does I use the same dates in my analysis. In other cases Mayhew describes the rise of the organization by decade, "early 30's," for example. For a substantial number of cities Mayhew explains that a machine had dominated at some point or continued to dominate but gave no more precise dates. For example of Waterbury, Connecticut, he says

¹ There are a total of 259 places listed by the Census as belonging to this list. I exclude the 15 places that were annexed to other cities on the list, such as Brooklyn, New York. For the remaining cities data are missing for a variety of reasons. In some years cities were not yet established or were not large enough to warrant the collection of statistics by the Census Bureau. Frequently the Census did not tabulate data for cities with a population smaller than 25,000. For the years 1900-1930 data were encoded from paper copies of the official census. For the years 1940-1977 data were taken from the ICPSR File "County and City Data Book [United States] Consolidated File: City Data 1944-1977.

² Most of the sources that I relied upon for determining cities with histories of dominance were published before 1990 and focused on earlier time periods. For this reason if a city's dominance period began after 1980 it is not captured in my data set. I hope to extend this analysis for modern forms of dominance in future work.

“Democratic ‘powerhouses’ ...are said to have operated in the 1960’s.” I note that these cities were dominated, but exclude them from my case selection.

Again using these secondary sources I coded dominance in reform cities. I looked for dates when a city manager charter, at-large, non-partisan elections, and a non-partisan slating group operated to control local policy making for at least ten years. Similar to the machine case, I found a number of cities that were dominated but with no clear way to determine the start or end dates. For all cities in the data set, I took a general indication of a decade in which an organization was powerful to be a “precise” date and then determined individual years for the rise and fall of the organization after identifying the cases for which I could get election data. The table below lists those cities with evidence of dominance in the 20th century, but unclear start or end dates.

Cities with evidence of dominance during the 20th century Unclear start and end dates					
MONTGOMERY	AL	Reform	SCHENECTADY	NY	Machine
LONG BEACH	CA	Reform	SYRACUSE	NY	Machine
SACRAMENTO	CA	Reform	DAYTON	OH	Reform
DENVER	CO	Machine	STEUBENVILLE	OH	Machine
BRIDGEPORT	CT	Machine	OKLAHOMA CITY	OK	Reform
HARTFORD	CT	Machine	HARRISBURG	PA	Machine
WATERBURY	CT	Machine	POTTSVILLE	PA	Machine
TAMPA	FL	Machine	READING	PA	Machine
AUGUSTA	GA	Machine	SCRANTON	PA	Machine
SAVANNAH	GA	Reform	WILKES-BARRE	PA	Machine
LEXINGTON	KY	Machine	CUMBERLAND	RI	Machine
LOUISVILLE	KY	Machine	NORTH PROVIDENCE	RI	Machine
WORCESTER	MA	Machine	CHARLESTON	SC	Machine
BAY CITY	MI	Machine	CORPUS CHRISTI	TX	Reform
FLINT	MI	Machine	EL PASO	TX	Reform
GREENSBORO	NC	Reform	FORT WORTH	TX	Reform
RALEIGH	NC	Reform	NORFOLK	VA	Machine
CAMDEN	NJ	Machine	VIRGINIA BEACH	VA	Machine
NEW BRUNSWICK	NJ	Machine	SEATTLE	WA	Reform
NEWARK	NJ	Machine			

In total I determined 25 cities with clear dates for the emergence and decline of the dominance period. These cities are listed in the table below.

Cities with evidence of dominance during the 20th century		
Clear start and end dates		
PHOENIX	AZ	Reform
BERKELEY	CA	Reform
SAN JOSE	CA	Reform
NEW HAVEN	CT	Machine
DES MOINES	IA	Machine
CHICAGO	IL	Machine
GARY	IN	Machine
NEW ORLEANS	LA	Machine
BALTIMORE	MD	Machine
KANSAS CITY	MO	Machine
JERSEY CITY	NJ	Machine
ALBUQUERQUE	NM	Reform
ALBANY	NY	Machine
BUFFALO	NY	Machine
NEW YORK CITY	NY	Machine
CINCINNATI	OH	Machine
PHILADELPHIA	PA	Machine
PITTSBURGH	PA	Machine
PAWTUCKET	RI	Machine
PROVIDENCE	RI	Machine
MEMPHIS	TN	Machine
AUSTIN	TX	Reform
DALLAS	TX	Reform
SAN ANTONIO	TX	Reform
RICHMOND	VA	Reform

Of these 25, eight of the cities can be classified as reform and 17 as machine. Given this imbalance and the small likelihood that I would be able to collect election returns for all of the cities, I began searching for data for the reform cities. Time series election data at the city level is notoriously difficult to collect, so I started by requesting data from city politics scholars who had published analyses with reference to election results. Notably Amy Bridges provided me with election returns for Austin, Dallas, and San Antonio for nearly the entire period. I was able

to request missing data from the registrars of voters in these cities. I attempted to get data for the remaining cities: Albuquerque, Berkeley, Phoenix, Richmond, and San Jose from other city politics scholars but was unsuccessful. I also called registrars to find out if they could easily send me information but was unsuccessful. In part because I had excellent access to political figures in San Jose, I decided to collect my own data in that city. This required reading through minutes from every city council meeting for the 100 year period on microfiche and hand entering the results. Once this data collection was complete, my budget and time were exhausted.³ I then set out to find data for a comparable number of machine cities. Again I began my search by requesting data from scholars who had studied machines academically. I was able to obtain Robert's Dahl's data for New Haven from Amy Bridges. Robert Lineberry provided me with data for Chicago and Steven Erie for New York. Searching through libraries and on-line resources I also found data for the entire period for Kansas City in a collection published by the city, and Philadelphia collected by a non-profit organization. Rather than select only four of these cases, I include them all in the analysis for a total of nine cities in the collection.

It is possible that the cities for which I was able to obtain data had the most well established histories of dominance. For this reason my conclusions should be said to explain the effects on municipal elections and resource allocation when a very powerful organization controls city government. It would not be appropriate to say that these nine cities explain political patterns in all or even most cities in the United States. However, with all of the normal caveats about generalizations, I do feel comfortable using these nine cities to make inferences about dominant organizations. They represent machine and reform dominance well.

³ Election returns for Richmond, Virginia are available beginning in 1926 in hard copy. With additional time and resources I hope to include this case in my analysis.

Table A1 shows the cities for which election results were obtained, the dominance period for each city, and the years included in the electoral analysis.

<i>Table A1: Data Collection</i>		
	Dominance Period	Election Data Set
Austin	1957-1972	1919-1989
Chicago	1935-1982	1905-1989
Dallas	1941-1974	1921-1989
Kansas City	1914-1939	1869-1987
New Haven	1953-1988	1901-1989
New York	1901-1932	1882-1989
Philadelphia	1894-1950	1853-1990
San Antonio	1955-1974	1945-1989
San Jose	1944-1973	1914-1990

Additional Analyses

Referenced in note 6, these analyses show that dominance reduced competition even with alternative measures of competition and further controls.

Table A2: The Effect of Dominance for Incumbent Margin of Victory

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	18.9968022	8	2.37460027	Number of obs =	595	
Residual	37.8929757	586	.064663781	F(8, 586) =	36.72	
				Prob > F =	0.0000	
				R-squared =	0.3339	
				Adj R-squared =	0.3248	
Total	56.8897779	594	.095774037	Root MSE =	.25429	

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Dominance	.0539029	.0224102	2.41	0.016	.0098888	.0979171
Incumbents	-.0046842	.0108578	-0.43	0.666	-.0260092	.0166407
Candidates	-.0634313	.0076512	-8.29	0.000	-.0784584	-.0484041
Turnout	-.9069128	.1056359	-8.59	0.000	-1.114384	-.6994417
Population	.0060729	.0127405	0.48	0.634	-.0189498	.0310955
Machine/Ref	.0816642	.0572689	1.43	0.154	-.030813	.1941414
Seat	-.0454327	.0290673	-1.56	0.119	-.1025214	.0116561
Year	.0018754	.0005566	3.37	0.001	.0007822	.0029686
_cons	-2.930987	1.107107	-2.65	0.008	-5.105367	-.7566075

Table A3: Margin of Victory Restricted to Reform Cities

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	14.1907663	7	2.02725232	Number of obs =	845	
Residual	54.3469158	837	.064930604	F(7, 837) =	31.22	
				Prob > F =	0.0000	
				R-squared =	0.2071	
				Adj R-squared =	0.2004	
Total	68.5376821	844	.081205784	Root MSE =	.25481	

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Dominance	.0735591	.0183128	4.02	0.000	.0376147	.1095035
Incumbents	.0530549	.0121752	4.36	0.000	.0291575	.0769524
Candidates	-.0366779	.0045791	-8.01	0.000	-.0456657	-.0276901
Population	3.79e-09	5.72e-08	0.07	0.947	-1.08e-07	1.16e-07
Year	.0016113	.0007156	2.25	0.025	.0002068	.0030158
Turnout	-.69511	.1106155	-6.28	0.000	-.9122263	-.4779937
Seat	-.0288104	.0228792	-1.26	0.208	-.0737177	.0160969
_cons	-2.642737	1.38742	-1.90	0.057	-5.365969	.0804943

Table A4: Margin of Victory Restricted to Machine Cities

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 192		
Model	1.78819247	6	.298032079	F(6, 185)	=	14.12
Residual	3.90515264	185	.021108933	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3141
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2918
Total	5.69334512	191	.02980809	Root MSE	=	.14529

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Dominance	.1168998	.0235483	4.96	0.000	.0704421	.1633575
Incumbents	-.0238078	.021999	-1.08	0.281	-.067209	.0195933
Candidates	.0119741	.0110033	1.09	0.278	-.0097339	.0336821
Turnout	-.4266033	.0803116	-5.31	0.000	-.5850475	-.268159
Population	.006489	.0059362	1.09	0.276	-.0052222	.0182003
Year	.0010569	.0003546	2.98	0.003	.0003572	.0017566
_cons	-1.745515	.6793157	-2.57	0.011	-3.085717	-.4053138

Table A5: Turnout of Eligible Voters Controlling for % White

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 462		
Model	6.00246435	8	.750308043	F(8, 453)	=	135.23
Residual	2.51348307	453	.005548528	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.7048
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6996
Total	8.51594742	461	.018472771	Root MSE	=	.07449

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Dominance	-.0579575	.0080818	-7.17	0.000	-.07384	-.042075
Incumbents	.0073026	.0050691	1.44	0.150	-.0026593	.0172645
Margin	-.0816311	.0136501	-5.98	0.000	-.1084565	-.0548057
Candidates	-.0004255	.0022897	-0.19	0.853	-.0049252	.0040743
Population	-5.98e-09	4.12e-09	-1.45	0.147	-1.41e-08	2.12e-09
Machine/Ref	.3145851	.0131966	23.84	0.000	.288651	.3405192
Year	.0036895	.0004369	8.44	0.000	.0028309	.0045481
% White	.4876464	.0554595	8.79	0.000	.3786567	.5966362
_cons	-7.435962	.8860472	-8.39	0.000	-9.177235	-5.694689

Referenced on page 18, the following analysis investigates patterns of turnout for different foreign stock populations in Chicago during the dominance period.

Table A6: Chicago Turnout of Eligible Voters By Ward

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 400		
Model	1.98369042	6	.33061507	F(6, 393) =	21.94	
Residual	5.9211796	393	.015066615	Prob > F =	0.0000	
				R-squared =	0.2509	
				Adj R-squared =	0.2395	
Total	7.90487002	399	.019811704	Root MSE =	.12275	

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
% Irish	1.511651	.3210603	4.71	0.000	.88044	2.142861
% Polish	.3928555	.117105	3.35	0.001	.1626248	.6230861
% German	-.4617539	.2693165	-1.71	0.087	-.9912351	.0677273
Dawson	.0423413	.0273674	1.55	0.123	-.0114635	.0961461
% Black	-.0963298	.0366641	-2.63	0.009	-.1684121	-.0242475
Year	-.0026035	.0004699	-5.54	0.000	-.0035273	-.0016798
Constant	.6420273	.0321408	19.98	0.000	.5788379	.7052167

Referenced in note 10, these analyses show that spending and taxation declined during the dominance period.

Table A7: Direct General Expenditure Per Capita

Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

Group variable:	id_city	Number of obs	=	128	
Time variable:	time	Number of groups	=	16	
Panels:	correlated (balanced)	Obs per group: min	=	8	
Autocorrelation:	common AR(1)	avg	=	8	
		max	=	8	
Estimated covariances	=	136	R-squared	=	0.7450
Estimated autocorrelations	=	1	Wald chi2(7)	=	425.32
Estimated coefficients	=	8	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000

	Panel-corrected		z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
Dominance	-.0620696	.0283521	-2.19	0.029	-.1176387	-.0065006
Mach/Reform	.32683	.0553772	5.90	0.000	.2182926	.4353674
Population	-8.35e-08	2.10e-08	-3.98	0.000	-1.25e-07	-4.23e-08
% Non White	.3747261	.3239874	1.16	0.247	-.2602776	1.00973
Year	.011675	.0016916	6.90	0.000	.0083595	.0149906
Pop 5 yr chg	3.61e-07	2.39e-07	1.51	0.131	-1.07e-07	8.30e-07
General Rev	1.17e-07	1.03e-08	11.36	0.000	9.71e-08	1.38e-07
Constant	-22.59991	3.282889	-6.88	0.000	-29.03426	-16.16557
rho	.5770766					

Table A8: Total Taxes Adjusted for Inflation

Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

Group variable:	id_city	Number of obs	=	137	
Time variable:	time	Number of groups	=	16	
Panels:	correlated (unbalanced)	Obs per group: min	=	8	
Autocorrelation:	common AR(1)	avg	=	8.5625	
Sigma computed by casewise selection		max	=	9	
Estimated covariances	=	136	R-squared	=	0.9457
Estimated autocorrelations	=	1	Wald chi2(7)	=	281.72
Estimated coefficients	=	8	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000

	Panel-corrected				[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z		
Dominance	-41553.44	20464.97	-2.03	0.042	-81664.04	-1442.842
Mach/Reform	66306.8	50781.11	1.31	0.192	-33222.34	165835.9
Population	.2663992	.0665294	4.00	0.000	.1360039	.3967945
% Non White	-231775.7	445990.4	-0.52	0.603	-1105901	642349.4
Year	2075.231	2238.905	0.93	0.354	-2312.942	6463.404
Pop 5 yr chg	.6506101	.5352914	1.22	0.224	-.3985419	1.699762
General Rev	.3095002	.0345236	8.96	0.000	.2418352	.3771651
Constant	-4140847	4333832	-0.96	0.339	-1.26e+07	4353308
rho	.7350979					

Referenced in note 12, the following regressions use electoral measures (competition and incumbency advantage) as a proxy for dominance. The resulting patterns are the same as those presented in the paper; expenditures for the core coalition and veto players rises and spending on welfare declines.

Table A9: Turnout of Eligible Voters

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	668
Model	10.1953135	6	1.69921892	F(6, 661)	=	167.89
Residual	6.69014493	661	.010121248	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.6038
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6002
Total	16.8854584	667	.02531553	Root MSE	=	.1006

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Factorbinary	-.0331508	.0092215	-3.59	0.000	-.0512577	-.0150439
Incumbents	.0171764	.0057499	2.99	0.003	.0058861	.0284666
Candidates	.0070988	.0027665	2.57	0.011	.0016667	.012531
Population	-5.55e-09	3.95e-09	-1.41	0.160	-1.33e-08	2.21e-09
Machine/Ref	.3000141	.0124752	24.05	0.000	.2755183	.3245099
Year	.0004476	.000187	2.39	0.017	.0000805	.0008147
_cons	-.7365091	.3651244	-2.02	0.044	-1.453453	-.0195657

Table A12: Public Expenditures

Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

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Group variable:   id_city           Number of obs   =       51
Time variable:   time              Number of groups =       9
Panels:          correlated (unbalanced)  Obs per group: min =       3
Autocorrelation: no autocorrelation      avg =  5.666667
Sigma computed by casewise selection      max =       6
Estimated covariances =       45         R-squared       =  0.2393
Estimated autocorrelations =       0      Wald chi2(9)    =  663.73
Estimated coefficients =       10         Prob > chi2     =  0.0000
    
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	Panel-corrected				[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z		
Factorbinary	-.0523836	.018246	-2.87	0.004	-.0881452	-.0166221
Machine/Ref	.0624244	.0231528	2.70	0.007	.0170458	.107803
Population	1.54e-08	6.66e-09	2.32	0.021	2.37e-09	2.85e-08
% Non White	-.3337236	.0646023	-5.17	0.000	-.4603417	-.2071055
year	.0029133	.0007859	3.71	0.000	.0013731	.0044536
Pop 5 Yr Chng	6.01e-09	1.05e-07	0.06	0.955	-2.01e-07	2.13e-07
General Rev	6.25e-09	6.93e-09	0.90	0.367	-7.33e-09	1.98e-08
% Intrgov Rev	-.2960249	.0660145	-4.48	0.000	-.425411	-.1666388
Land Sq Mi	-.0000222	.0000117	-1.90	0.057	-.0000451	6.54e-07
_cons	-5.525075	1.528426	-3.61	0.000	-8.520735	-2.529415

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