

Web Appendix for
Partisanship, the Electoral Connection, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress,
1877-2006

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This document contains analyses that are linked to our paper, “Partisanship, the Electoral Connection, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress, 1877-2006,” but because of space constraints could not be housed in the main body of text. Two figures and four tables are included, and we will discuss each based on their specific placement to analyses in the paper’s text.

Table 1A provides a breakdown of the proportion of House members in lame-duck sessions from the 45th through 72nd Congresses (see page 4 of the main text for a related discussion). Exiting members constituted 30.5% of the chamber, on average, during this period (and 29.4% as measured across the entire data series). Turnover was especially high through the mid-1890s, peaking at 52.2% in the 47th Congress (1881-83). After the critical elections of 1894-96, however, turnover began a fairly steady decline, consistent with the elimination of many marginal districts and the rise of careerism in Congress (Brady, Buckley, and Rivers 1999). After 1900, turnover rose above 30% on only three occasions, the most famous perhaps being the 1932 Democratic landslide, as FDR’s election swept the Republican majority from office.

[Table 1A about here]

Table 2A provides a list of the major acts of Congress passed in lame-duck sessions from the 45th through 72nd Congresses (see page 5, footnote 8 of the main text for a related discussion). The data was compiled by Stathis (2003). Of the 221 major acts in these Congresses, 63 (or 28.5%) were passed in lame-duck sessions. Some Congresses were especially active in producing major acts in lame-duck sessions, like the 49th Congress (1885-87), which passed seven such landmark pieces of legislation; other Congresses did little in lame-duck sessions, like the 46th (1879-81), 53rd (1893-95), 54th (1895-97), 65th (1917-19), and 66th (1919-21) Congresses, which produced no major acts.

[Table 2A about here]

Figure 1A provides an illustration of the sequence of congressional sessions and elections, before and after the 20th Amendment (see page 6 of the main text for a related discussion). Prior to the Amendment, elections to the *next* Congress occurred during the adjournment *between* sessions of the current Congress. After the Amendment, the timing of elections to the next Congress was altered, and elections were typically held during the adjournment *between* Congresses. This alteration was meant to eliminate the lame-duck session of Congress, and thereby eliminate the agency problem that had been present in congressional representation from the founding of the Nation. Of course, over time, the second session of a given Congress has sometimes extended beyond the November elections – so a “new” type of lame-duck session has emerged.

[Figure 1A about here]

Table 3A provides a breakdown of the proportion of roll-call votes in House lame-duck sessions from the 45th through 72nd Congresses (see page 9 of the main text for a related discussion). Lame-duck session roll calls constituted 30.2% of all House roll calls, on average, during this period (and 29% as measured across the entire data series). The Congress-to-Congress variation was sometimes considerable: the high was 62.7% of all roll calls in the 57th Congress (1901-03) held in the lame-duck session, while the low was 12.9% of all roll calls in the 53rd Congress (1893-95) held in the lame-duck session. Only once, however, did lame-duck session roll calls constitute a majority in a Congress, with most lame-duck proportions ranging from 20 and 40 percent.

[Table 3A about here]

Table 4A provides more extensive results of the party-voting analysis presented in Table 1 of the paper (see pages 9-10 of the main text, and footnote 16, for a related discussion). Here, we build on the basic model of exiting members (losers and retiring members) and include additional covariates: specifically seniority (measured by seniority and seniority-squared variables) and incidence of the Australian ballot (coded 1 if the Australian ballot was in effect during the congressional elections, by state, and 0 otherwise).¹ The important result here is that the magnitudes and statistical significance on our key exiting variables (lost and retire) *did not change* after the inclusion of these additional covariates, supporting the basic results illustrated in the first two columns of the table (which are replicated from Table 1 in the paper).

More generally in Table 4A, we found that the Australian ballot had a significant effect on member behavior (as measured by “differential distance from the party median,” our dependent variable).² In terms of expectations, the Australian ballot provided voters with the ability to split their tickets more easily, and thus made rewarding or punishing individual incumbents easier.³ But, as mentioned, the Australian ballot’s effect *did not* change the magnitudes or statistical significance on our key exiting variables. It appears that the inclusion of the Australian ballot principally affected *returning members of Congress* (as captured in part by the constant term): once the Australian ballot was in place, these members had to toe the constituency-line in regular sessions, but once the November elections were completed, they could then shirk their constituents’ interests. Due to the way the dependent variable is

¹ For a list of states and their adoption dates (as well as the variant of the Australian Ballot that was adopted), see Evans (1917), Albright (1942), and Engstom and Kernell (2005).

² Seniority-squared also had a small effect.

³ Column 4 breaks the general Australian ballot into its two manifestations (the party column and office bloc systems). The party column appears to be driving the general Australian ballot results, but the party column and office ballot coefficients do in fact pool.

constructed, the Australian ballot captures that post-election shirking well (the positive coefficient signifies greater differential movement in the lame-duck session).

[Table 4A here]

Figure 2A provides the percentage of party-pressure votes in the House by session, from the 45th through 72nd Congresses (see page 12 of the main text for a related discussion). There was a good deal of variance across both positive and negative pressure series throughout the era, with various spikes through the late 19th Century and a general uptick late in the middle-1920s. The 1920s were an interesting period, as the Republican House leadership fought strenuously against the elimination of the lame-duck session (Crowe 1969; Jenkins and Nokken 2006). These data provide some evidence of why that was case, as double-digit positive-pressure vote proportions are uncovered in the lame-duck sessions in the 68th (1923-25) and 71st (1929-31) Congresses.⁴ At the same time, double-digit *negative*-pressure vote proportions are also uncovered during the Republicans' reign in the lame-duck sessions of the 69th (1925-27) and 71st (1929-31) Congresses. For a more precise accounting of the series' proportions, a session-to-session breakdown by Congress appears in Table 2 in the main text.

[Figure 2A about here]

Finally, Table 5A provides the proportion of positive and negative pressure votes in the House by session, from the 76th through 109th Congresses (see pages 19-20 of the main text, and footnote 26, for a related discussion). There is only one significant difference – on negative pressure votes in the 109th Congress (2005-06), as votes in the lame-duck session exceeded that of the regular session. As the Republican majority was outgoing in the 109th, the leadership was unable to exert any pressure in the lame-duck session – hence, the significantly larger proportion

⁴ The Democrats controlled the House in the 72nd Congress (1931-33), another case of a double-digit positive-pressure vote proportion.

of negative pressure votes. On the whole, the limited number of roll calls in modern lame-duck session makes it difficult to uncover significant differences across sessions. Still, the 91st (1969-71), 93rd (1973-74), 96th (1979-80), and 97th (1981-82) Congresses all had a reasonable number of lame-duck roll calls (71, 76, 54, and 91, respectively), and there were no significant drop-offs in party pressure across regular and lame-duck sessions. This supports our contention in the paper that lame-duck sessions in the modern era are very much like extensions of regular sessions. This is likely due to low turnover in the modern era, which provides party leaders with a large group of returning members in lame-duck sessions toward which to direct pressure.

[Table 5A about here]

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Table 1A: Lame Ducks in the House, 45th–72nd Congress (1877-1933)

Cong.	Years	Lost	Retired	Lame Ducks	Total Members	% Lame Ducks
45	1877-79	45	84	129	293	44.0
46	1879-81	40	66	106	293	36.2
47	1881-83	56	97	153	293	52.2
48	1883-85	60	83	143	325	44.0
49	1885-87	52	78	130	325	40.0
50	1887-89	47	76	123	325	37.8
51	1889-91	83	80	163	332	49.1
52	1891-93	57	73	130	332	39.2
53	1893-95	98	87	185	356	52.0
54	1895-97	71	77	148	357	41.5
55	1897-99	53	58	111	357	31.1
56	1899-1901	33	57	90	357	25.2
57	1901-03	37	51	88	357	24.6
58	1903-05	26	34	60	386	15.5
59	1905-07	38	47	85	386	22.0
60	1907-09	39	35	74	391	18.9
61	1909-11	73	47	120	391	30.7
62	1911-13	60	45	105	394	26.6
63	1913-15	52	55	107	435	24.6
64	1915-17	47	31	78	435	17.9
65	1917-19	57	48	105	435	24.1
66	1919-21	63	53	116	435	26.7
67	1921-23	78	54	132	435	30.3
68	1923-25	41	38	79	435	18.2
69	1925-27	29	21	50	435	11.5
70	1927-29	35	28	63	435	14.5
71	1929-31	59	26	85	435	19.5
72	1931-33	120	40	160	435	36.8

Table 2A: Major Acts of Congress Passed in Lame-Duck Sessions, 45th–72nd Congresses (1877-1933)

Cong	Law	Date
45	Arrears of Pension Act	1/25/1879
45	Women Admitted to Practice before U.S. Supreme Court	2/15/1879
45	Creation of the U.S. Geological Survey	3/3/1879
45	National Board of Health	3/3/1879
46	NONE	--
47	Pendleton Act	1/16/1883
47	Mongrel Tariff of 1883	3/3/1883
47	Navy Enlarged	3/3/1883
48	Unauthorized Fencing of Public Lands	2/25/1885
48	Contract Labor Act	2/26/1885
49	Electoral Count Act	2/3/1887
49	Interstate Commerce Act	2/4/1887
49	Dawes General Allotment (Severalty) Act	2/8/1887
49	Contract Labor Act Amended	2/23/1887
49	Hatch Experiment Station Act	3/2/1887
49	Tenure of Office Act Repealed	3/2/1887
49	Edmunds-Tucker Antipolygamy Act	3/3/1887
50	Department of Agriculture Act	2/9/1889
50	ND, SD, MT, and WA Enabling Act	2/22/1889
51	Court of Appeals Act	3/3/1891
51	Immigration Act of 1891	3/3/1891
51	Meat Inspection Act of 1891	3/3/1891
51	General Land Revision Act of 1891	3/3/1891
51	International Copyright Act	3/3/1891
52	Diplomatic Appropriations Act	3/1/1893
52	Railway Safety Appliance Act of 1893	3/2/1893
53	NONE	--
54	NONE	--
55	Reimbursement to States and Territories for Expenses Incurred in Spanish-American War	3/3/1899
56	Platt Amendment	3/2/1901
56	Spooner Amendment	3/2/1901
56	National Bureau of Standards Created	3/3/1901
57	Expedition Act	2/11/1903
57	Department of Commerce and Labor Created	2/14/1903
57	Elkins Act	2/19/1903
58	Transfer Act of 1905	2/1/1905
58	Trademark Act of 1905	2/20/1905
59	Tillman Act	1/16/1907
59	Immigration Act of 1907	2/20/1907
59	Pay Increase for Vice President, Cabinet, and MCs	2/26/1907
59	Citizenship and Expatriation Act	3/2/1907

60	Opium Exclusion Act	2/9/1909
60	Enlarged Homestead Act	2/19/1909
60	Criminal Code Revision of 1909	3/5/1909
61	Weeks Forest Purchase Act	3/1/1911
62	Webb-Kenyon Act	3/1/1913
62	Physical Valuation Act	3/1/1913
62	Department of Labor Established	3/4/1913
63	U.S. Coast Guard Created	2/28/1915
63	Seaman's Act of 1915	3/4/1915
64	Immigration Act of 1917	2/5/1917
64	Smith-Hughes Act	2/23/1917
64	Second Jones Act (Organic Act for Puerto Rico)	3/2/1917
65	NONE	--
66	NONE	--
67	Agriculture Credits Act	3/4/1923
68	Kelly Act (Air Mail Act)	2/2/1925
68	Judges' Bill	2/13/1925
68	Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925	2/28/1925
69	Radio Control Act	2/23/1927
70	Boulder Canyon Project Act	12/21/1928
70	Naval Construction Act of 1929	2/3/1929
70	Migratory Bird Conservation Act	2/18/1929
70	Administration of American Samoa	2/20/1929
71	Adoption of Nation Anthem	3/3/1931
72	Twenty-First Amendment	2/20/1933

Note: Data compiled by Stathis (2003). Stathis lists both legislative acts and treaties. Only legislative acts are listed here.

Table 3A: Roll Call Votes by Session, 45th–72nd Congresses (1877-1933)

Cong.	Years	Total Votes Per Congress	Total Votes Regular Session	Total Votes Lame-Duck Session	% Votes Lame-Duck Session
45	1877-79	377	261	116	30.8
46	1879-81	439	320	119	27.1
47	1881-83	349	249	100	28.7
48	1883-85	334	188	146	43.7
49	1885-87	306	203	103	33.7
50	1887-89	320	207	113	35.3
51	1889-91	587	414	173	29.5
52	1891-93	304	223	81	26.6
53	1893-95	373	325	48	12.9
54	1895-97	162	100	62	38.3
55	1897-99	183	146	37	20.2
56	1899-1901	149	87	62	41.6
57	1901-03	185	69	116	62.7
58	1903-05	87	55	32	36.8
59	1905-07	136	102	34	25.0
60	1907-09	312	268	44	14.1
61	1909-11	202	132	70	34.7
62	1911-13	262	194	68	26.0
63	1913-15	282	214	68	24.1
64	1915-17	157	96	61	38.9
65	1917-19	266	203	63	23.7
66	1919-21	339	247	92	27.1
67	1921-23	362	297	65	18.0
68	1923-25	179	125	54	30.2
69	1925-27	114	81	33	28.9
70*	1927-29	72	54	18	25.0
71	1929-31	103	71	32	31.1
72	1931-33	123	86	37	30.1

* Because Poole and Rosenthal (1997) suggest that 25 roll call votes in a given period – here, a session – are required to generate reliable NOMINATE scores, we dropped the 70th Congress, which had only 18 roll calls in the lame-duck session, from our DW-NOMINATE estimation.

Table 4A: Change in Ideological Distance from Majority-Party Median, 45th–72nd Congresses (1877-1933)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.0111*** (0.0021)	0.0096 (0.031)	-0.0027 (0.0357)	-0.0040 (0.0358)
Retire	0.0122** (0.0041)	0.0171*** (0.0045)	0.0179*** (0.0046)	0.0180*** (0.0046)
Lost	0.0124*** (0.0037)	0.0125** (0.0041)	0.0130** (0.0042)	0.0129** (0.0042)
Seniority	---	---	-0.0032 (0.0027)	-0.0032 (0.0027)
Seniority ²	---	---	0.0003* (0.0001)	0.0003* (0.0001)
Australian Ballot	---	---	0.0179* (0.0091)	---
Office Bloc	---	---	---	0.0122 (0.0109)
Party Column	---	---	---	0.0200* (0.0093)
Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4614	4614	4614	4614
R ²	0.004	0.839	0.840	0.840
Adj R ²	0.003	0.666	0.667	0.667
F	8.55**	2.93***	3.01***	2.94***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Note: OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Fixed-effects model includes both time (Congress) and member effects.


Table 5A: Equality of Proportions Tests, Positive and Negative Pressure Votes by Session, 76th–109th Congresses (1939 - 2006)

Cong.	Years	Positive Pressure Votes (%)			Negative Pressure Votes (%)		
		Regular	Lame-Duck	z-score	Regular	Lame-Duck	z-score
76	1939-41	2.8	0	0.34	3.8	0	0.40
77	1941-42	3.2	0	0.18	6.4	0	0.26
78	1943-44	10.1	14.3	-0.35	10.9	0	0.92
81	1947-48	16.9	11.1	0.46	18.2	22.2	-0.30
91	1949-51	13.9	12.1	0.39	16.7	21.2	-0.86
93	1953-54	13.0	8.5	1.10	16.3	14.1	0.48
96	1969-71	12.7	18.4	-1.16	15.3	8.2	1.37
97	1973-74	12.7	11.5	0.31	12.3	9.2	0.84
103	1993-94	9.0	0	0.44	9.1	0	0.45
105	1997-98	11.3	12.5	-0.11	10.0	0	0.94
106	1999-2000	10.8	16.7	-0.46	8.1	0	0.73
107	2001-02	6.9	15.4	-1.19	3.0	0	0.63
108	2003-04	2.4	0	0.44	4.1	0	0.58
109	2005-06	6.2	0	1.06	4.3	11.8	-1.47*

** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$

Figure 1A: Sequence of Congressional Sessions and Elections Pre- and Post-20th Amendment

Pre-20th Amendment



Post-20th Amendment





Figure 2A: Proportion of Party Pressure Votes, By Session

Positive Pressure Votes



Negative Pressure Votes

