

Appendix A for

**“Rethinking Presidential Responsiveness: The Public Presidency and Rhetorical
Congruency, 1953-2001.”**

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Supplemental Tables from Main Text

As noted in the text, additional tables (Tables 1 and 2) are included in this appendix that expand the original text Table 2, including information on coefficients related to individual presidents and individual issues. The differences among presidents is discussed at length in the main text, but additional discussion concerning the differences between the individual issues is warranted here. In particular, the differences between first term and second term presidencies in their congruency with specific issues is an interesting finding. Interestingly, no differences in significance (and generally coefficient size) exist between the first and second half of any president's term, suggesting presidents are relatively static in their congruency with issues within terms, largely as a result of the legislative packages they pursue and the continuity of their programs. For some issues, the congruency levels remain static; for instance, because of constant public concern, crime is an issue presidents are continually congruent on (see Edwards and Wood 1999), whereas defense is often less salient and presidents are routinely non-congruent on these matters.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

However, as noted, important differences exist between *first* and *second* terms presidents. First, several issues are less statistically significant in the second term than the first. Specifically, education, Social Security, campaign finance reform and foreign policy all lose statistical significance moderately or altogether. These changes make substantive sense. For Social Security issues, presidents generally wait until their second term to tackle issues relating to the "third rail" of American politics, and when they do, they are less likely to make statements popular with the mass public (including raising

retirement ages or reducing benefits) (Sharp 1999; Light 1999). Campaign finance reform does have a significant effect on presidential aspirations for reelection, including returning more partisans or their own reelection funding, and presidents are often more likely to choose these issues in the first (rather than second) terms to begin the process early. In addition, most major foreign policy decisions are made by presidents in their first years, including Eisenhower in Korea, Kennedy in Cuba, Johnson in Vietnam, Nixon in Vietnam, Reagan in Grenada and Libya, Bush in the Persian Gulf and Clinton in Haiti and Bosnia (see Sobel 2001). Second term foreign policy is likely therefore less “congruent” with public opinion by exclusion rather than by design.

Many of these first term (but not second term) congruent issues can also be seen as “reelection” fodder, or issues that presidents go out of their way to retain popularity on during their first terms for the design of getting reelected. Evidence on congressional reelection suggests that members of Congress moderate their views as election approaches, possibly drifting into non-congruence (Thomas 1985). As a popular issue of constant public concern, education would clearly fall into this category (Elam 1978). Campaign finance reform would also fit into this category since the issue tends to flare up during election campaigns. Civil rights is also an issue that loses significance (and actually turns negative) from the first to second terms, so one might include these issues in the “reelection” issue category. In the end, the congruency on these issues further suggests that presidents are concerned with reelection and choose particular issues to help them accomplish that goal.

On only one issue, health care, did presidents apparently become *more congruent* in their second terms than in their first terms. Specifically, we see a significant increase

in size and statistical significance (from none to significant at $p > .01$) from term one to term two. Driving much of this finding was President Clinton's *lack* of discussion of non-congruent aspects of health care reform and acceptance of ancillary measures including the Kennedy-Kessenbaum reforms (see Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Of course, on some issues, presidents become *less* congruent in their second terms, specifically on taxes and welfare. Taxes have, in particular, been shown to be less popular as presidents become more "frank" with the public concerning economic tradeoffs (Grant and Mockabee 2002). Second term honesty in tax policy, in particular with Ronald Reagan, seems to follow this pattern (Cannon 2000). Further, President Clinton's desire to reverse aspects of the policies in his second term (that he approved in his first term) were not popular with the public (Gilens 2000).

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The original CHS specification did not include data on foreign policy (although it did include foreign aid and defense, neither of which were not significant). In the present model specification, foreign policy is a strong and significant predictor of congruence, but only for the first term. These issues often involved popular elements of foreign policy (such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, Vietnam (under Johnson), Grenada invasion, the Gulf War), where a majority of the public agreed with the President's decision on foreign policy issues. However, causality is difficult to sort out here. The "rally around the flag" phenomenon not only involves the public blindly following the president but it also requires presidential effort to shape this issue environment for the media (Brody 1991). It is likely that both factors are at work in establishing this high congruence.

Dichotomous Dependent Variable

In addition to the supplemental variables from our model in the main body of the paper, we also include here (in Table 3) a discussion of an alternative measure of congruency – a dichotomously coded variable where we use a logistic regression analysis to examine whether or not the variable interactions and effects predicted with our OLS model are similar. In particular, this investigation allows for a comparison between Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) who use a dichotomously coded dependent variable (whether or not the president’s budget request for individual issues was congruent with the public’s desire for an increase or decrease in this funding) for their analysis and the current study which relies on a continuous measure in the main text.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Table 3 incorporates the model specification repeated from the discussion in the main text (and displayed in Table 2 in the main text). Overall, the model is a good fit statistically considering the percent of cases correctly predicted (74% and 73% in term one and 82% and 83% in term two). The results for the category of first term presidents are generally similar to our original findings, lending credence to our interpretive analysis from the main text. There are marginal differences in the first term worth noting, none of which, however, seem to alter our original conclusions. The coefficient for “above average” in the first half of term one is not negative as it was in the original model specification, but the modestly small nature of the coefficient is retained (moving from -.049 to .041) and is still not statistically significant. The coefficients for the “television” dummy variable are of similar statistical significance but are smaller than originally

reported (-8.24 to -.828 in the first half to -8.09 to -.797 in the second half). The coefficients for “oral delivery” are also modestly smaller than in the original specification. We also find that (from Table 4) President Reagan’s statistical significance fades away (but dummy variables for Ford and Clinton both retain their significance).

The second term figures are also relatively similar, the primary change being in the level of statistical significance. The coefficients for “above average” and “below average” are relatively similar, but lose statistical significance, including “above average-first half,” “below average-first half,” and “below average-second half.” The one significant change is the “above average-second half” variable became positive here from negative in the original model design (although it was never statistically significant).

These results may explain why Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) find little consequence of the “reelection” effect that we find in our *second* term presidents. Their dichotomously coded variable may miss certain nuances (as ours did here). This finding ultimately signifies the need for a continuous public measure of presidential congruent statements as we offer.

From these considerations, the public presidency looks less “public” when congruency is coded dichotomously, although not exclusively so. “Oral delivery” becomes smaller and loses statistical significance (although stays positive) under this new coding rubric, and the “television” variable is negative in the second term just as in the first term under the new coding scheme. These divergent findings suggest that the model is less likely to capture presidents making congruent statements in public in their second terms when the congruence variable is dichotomous. However, the salience variable (“public concern”) does become significant under a dual coding scheme, indicating the

presidents are paying at least symbolic attention to the public's most urgent needs (see Cohen 1999). This finding alone comports with our original findings that document second term presidents as similarly "public" agents as first term presidents.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

A dichotomous dependent variable coding also alters the significance levels of the individual issues reported (see Table 5). In particular, we see in the first term, civil rights, welfare, crime and Social Security as not significant, and in the second term, welfare, crime and Social Security all not significant under the current dichotomous coding rubric (whereas it is significant under our original continuous measure). The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable coding is expanding the standard errors for these variables, and, in many instances as indicated in the note on Table 5, several issues had to be dropped from the model due to a perfect prediction. The same issue precludes analysis of Social Security, parks and space as issues in Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004, 701). Therefore, the ability to discuss differences across issues (and across terms) is a desirable approach, making our original model specification superior.

Repeated Statement Analysis

Another complication of the data are the presence of repeated statements – that is, statements where the president (on separate occasions) discusses the same issue, and as a result of our matching parameters (see Appendix B), these statements were matched to the same opinion data.¹ In the original analysis, we left these individual instances in our data because of our assumption that presidents are making these statements for a particular reason, including trying to drum up support for an unpopular issue or attempting to continually take credit for a popular issue (Kernell 1997). However, the

¹ We thank an anonymous reviewer for calling this point to our attention.

occurrence of these statements may later the conclusion of the model. The summary of repeated statements illustrated in Table 6 demonstrates that more recent presidents make more repeated statements – President Eisenhower only had one repeat statement while President Clinton had forty-eight total. The necessities of communicating to a more fragmented audience and a media environment with dozens of outlets likely contributes to the necessity of constant issue repetition (Wattenberg 2004).

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

The existence of these repeated statements may have substantive value in commenting on presidential interaction with public opinion, however, the statistical presence of these statements may inflate and distort the coefficients in our model. In order to test our assertions with these potentially inflationary statements removed, an alternative analysis is presented in Tables 7 to 9 that does *not* include these repeated statements. In examining the differences between Table 2 (in the main text) and Table 7 below, it is clear that the variables for the first term are *nearly identical* in coefficient size, statistical significance and sign. In addition, if we examine the differences between Tables 1 (on individual presidents) and 2 (on individual issues) discussed in the main text (but reported above) and Tables 8 and 9, the same presidents (Ford, Reagan and Clinton) are statistically significant and the coefficients are nearly identical and the same political issues (civil rights, crime, education, Social Security) are statistically significant and of commensurate size. This finding asserts that, for the first term data, the inclusion or exclusion of repeated statements are largely a moot consideration.

[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]

However, the relationships change (in some cases considerably) in our second term analysis when comparing the models with repeated statements and without. The biggest difference seems to be the loss of statistical significance in the second term coefficients² – for both “above average-first half” and “below average-second half” the coefficients are not statistically significant with the exclusion of the repeated policy statements. But, the fact that these coefficients retain their sign and relative size hints that the model specification and our assertions in the main text are correct. Also, the coefficients for “oral delivery,” which we suggested support our conclusions about the continually “public” nature of the president (even in the second term) are not significant, although, again, they retain their sign and relative size suggesting our analysis in the main text is proper.

Another difference is the switching of signs for the “television” coefficient from positive (in the main text, Table 2) to negative in Table 6 (in this appendix) with repeated statements excluded.³ The removal of the repeated statements, many spoken on television and coded as “oral,” no doubt has an effect on the movement of these coefficients. Specifically, the removal of the president’s preferred communicative strategy (television appeals) depresses the overall outcome measure of congruence in the second half of the second term. And, given that we know these variables to be more substantively and statistically significant with the repeated statements left in, we retain confidence in our conclusions.

² The single coefficient that is significant *without* the repeated statements is the “press conference” variable. The size and sign are the similar.

³ In addition, the coefficients for “2nd half” in the second term data are negative in Table 6 but positive in Table 2 (in the main text).

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Appendix A TABLE 1
Model Specifications and Individual Presidential Congruency

Variable	Model			
	First Term (CHS Specification)		Second Term (CHS Specification)	
	1 st Half	2 nd Half	1 st Half	2 nd Half
Eisenhower	-.022 -1.75 (3.93)	.007 .547 (4.49)	.045 2.45 (15.37)	.081 4.45 (11.56)
Kennedy	-.016 -1.49 (4.46)	-.007 -.624 (4.51)	—	—
Johnson	-.048 -3.28 (3.89)	-.038 -2.60 (3.53)	-.087 -7.94 (13.24)	-.100 -9.207 (12.56)
Nixon	-.047 -3.18 (3.29)	-.044 -2.99 (3.57)	-.153 14.04 (13.98)	-.134 -12.32 (12.48)
Ford	-.105 -6.87 ** (3.26)	-.141 -9.20 *** (3.27)	—	—
Reagan	-.120 -5.47 ** (2.54)	-.145 -6.61 *** (2.78)	-.249 -8.96 (15.51)	-.178 -6.41 (11.46)
Bush	-.069 -3.28 (2.74)	-.044 -2.09 (2.83)	—	—
Clinton	-.155 -6.26 ** (2.61)	-.185 -7.45 *** (2.74)	-.146 -4.90 (15.93)	-.215 -7.21 (11.76)

NOTE: Standardized coefficients in bold; unstandardized (and standard errors) below. Carter is the omitted president. Johnson's first fully elected term (beginning in 1965) is treated here as his "second term." The figures are rounded off. *** indicates statistical significance at $p > .01$. ** indicates statistical significance at $p > .05$. * indicates statistical significance at $p > .10$.

**Appendix A TABLE 2
Model Specifications and Presidential Congruency**

Variable	Model			
	First Term (CHS Specification)		Second Term (CHS Specification)	
	1 st Half	2 nd Half	1 st Half	2 nd Half
Civil Rights	21.51 *** (8.27)	21.70 *** (8.28)	-8.45 (16.15)	-10.63 (16.01)
Welfare	6.90 ** (3.02)	6.91 ** (3.07)	-24.93* (4.54)	-25.76 * (13.16)
Crime	17.83 *** (3.61)	17.88 *** (3.64)	23.25 *** (7.35)	22.82 *** (7.30)
Defense	-2.12 (4.27)	-1.78 (4.29)	-4.56 (4.88)	-5.10 (4.81)
Education	11.88 *** (3.93)	12.17 *** (3.95)	10.82 ** (5.12)	11.62 ** (5.08)
Transportation	5.06 (11.44)	6.39 (11.48)	No cases	No cases
Health Care	3.61 (3.21)	3.20 (3.21)	9.70 ** (5.19)	11.88 ** (5.09)
Social Security	37.86 *** (15.76)	37.78 *** (15.82)	11.48 * (7.09)	15.19 * (7.07)
Taxes	6.90 (3.02)	6.91 (3.07)	-9.72 * (4.54)	-9.68 * (4.51)
Budget	3.83 (2.94)	3.67 (2.95)	-.843 (16.15)	.314 (3.90)
Campaign Reform	25.84 *** (6.66)	25.88 *** (6.69)	16.03 (11.27)	17.86 (11.26)
Foreign Policy	5.92 *** (1.90)	5.77 *** (1.91)	-.952 (3.69)	-.799 (3.66)

NOTE: The issues are not exhaustive, so no issue was left out. The figures are rounded off. *** indicates statistical significance at p>.01. ** indicates statistical significance at p>.05. * indicates statistical significance at p>.10.

Appendix A TABLE 3
Presidential Congruency by Term in Office (Logit Results)

Variable	Model			
	First Term (CHS Specification)		Second Term (CHS Specification)	
	1 st Half	2 nd Half	1 st Half	2 nd Half
2 nd Half	—	-.202 (.355)	—	-1.16 * (.711)
Above Average	.041 (.036)	-.029 (.048)	.034 (.070)	.125 (.186)
Below Average	.086 *** (.034)	.005 (.025)	-.119 (.147)	.071 (.091)
Public Concern	-.012 * (.007)	-.010 (.007)	.125 *** (.053)	.116 *** (.052)
Television	-.828 *** (.359)	-.797 ** (.352)	-.695 (1.28)	-.876 (1.35)
Press Conference	-.127 (.265)	-.153 (.262)	-.322 (.569)	-.357 (.572)
“Broad” Audience	-.389 (.328)	-.533 * (.324)	.354 (.553)	.373 (.544)
Oral Delivery	.205 (.362)	.148 (.355)	.479 (.648)	.478 (.657)
Presidents	See Appendix A, Table 4			
Issue Topics	See Appendix A, Table 5			
Cases Correctly Predicted	74%	73%	82 %	83%
Number of Observations	492	492	199	199
Nagelkerke R ²	.274	.245	.389	.391

NOTE: Dependent variable: dichotomous (coded as 0 or 1) percent of “pro” policy recorded before presidential speech – coded “1” if 51% of the public agreed with the president’s statement. The figures are rounded off. *** indicates statistical significance at $p > .01$. ** indicates statistical significance at $p > .05$. * indicates statistical significance at $p > .10$. “Broad” statements were coded positively if the intended audience for the communication was the entire nation, such as if the president spoke at a national event (like the Business Roundtable or the National Council of Mayors), was campaigning, sent letters to members of Congress, during swearing in of appointees or announcement of executive orders. If the event was on television, either live or not live, it was coded positively for this category. If press officials who were able to ask any questions attended the event, the event was coded as a “press conference.”

Appendix A TABLE 4
Model Specifications and Individual Presidential Congruency
(continued from Appendix A TABLE 3)

Variable	Model			
	First Term (CHS Specification)		Second Term (CHS Specification)	
	1 st Half	2 nd Half	1 st Half	2 nd Half
Eisenhower	.193 (.701)	.701 (.826)	2.01 (29378)	-.249 (29440)
Kennedy	.714 (1.12)	1.33 (1.11)	—	—
Johnson	-.740 (.619)	-.080 (.536)	-19.79 (28192)	-20.54 (28255)
Nixon	-.067 (.493)	.101 (.535)	-20.70 (28192)	-21.77 (28255)
Ford	-.613 (.480)	-1.07 ** (.472)	—	—
Reagan	-.308 (.375)	-.472 (.405)	-17.83 (28192)	-19.95 (28255)
Bush	-.214 (.435)	.165 (.456)	—	—
Clinton	-1.05 *** (.395)	-1.244 *** (.416)	-16.96 (28192)	-19.59 (28255)

NOTE: Carter is the omitted president. Johnson's first fully elected term (beginning in 1965) is treated here as his "second term." The figures are rounded off. *** indicates statistical significance at $p > .01$. ** indicates statistical significance at $p > .05$. * indicates statistical significance at $p > .10$.

Appendix A TABLE 5
Model Specifications and Presidential Congruency
(continued from Appendix A TABLE 3)

Variable	Model			
	First Term (CHS Specification)		Second Term (CHS Specification)	
	1 st Half	2 nd Half	1 st Half	2 nd Half
Civil Rights	20.67 (18979)	20.65 (18995)	-.321 (41033)	-.281 (41034)
Welfare	20.61 (15667)	20.65 (15606)	-21.12 (28368)	-21.20 (28409)
Crime	21.01 (7751)	20.78 (8011)	19.05 (15929)	19.09 (15838)
Defense	-1.24 ** (.594)	-1.14 ** (.582)	-.192 (.850)	-.073 (.888)
Education	1.66 * (1.06)	1.76 * (1.06)	1.06 (1.18)	.990 (1.14)
Transportation	-.812 (1.49)	-.716 (1.53)	No cases	No cases
Health Care	-.217 (.437)	-.350 (.431)	20.69 (9419)	20.39 (9764)
Social Security	20.07 (40192)	20.14 (40192)	19.43 (16273)	19.50 (15922)
Taxes	1.12 ** (.540)	1.06 ** (.532)	-2.02 *** (.650)	-2.05 *** (.662)
Budget	-.664 * (.398)	-.648 * (.389)	-.352 (.583)	-.228 (.590)

NOTE: The issues are not exhaustive, so no issue was left out. The figures are rounded off. *** indicates statistical significance at p>.01. ** indicates statistical significance at p>.05. * indicates statistical significance at p>.10. Foreign Aid, Parks, Space, Campaign Finance and Foreign Policy were removed due to compete correlation with selected cases.

Appendix A TABLE 6
Repeated Statements by President

President	Repeated Statements	Percent of Total
Eisenhower	1	.7 %
Kennedy	2	2.4 %
Johnson	7	4.5 %
Nixon	5	3.2 %
Ford	6	4.7 %
Carter	22	8.1 %
Reagan	31	9.4 %
Bush	18	8.3 %
Clinton	48	9.8 %
Total	140	7.1 %

NOTE: Data compiled by the author. Repeat statements constitute statements where the president's assertion was the same as a previous assertion (within a span of a week).

Appendix A TABLE 7
Presidential Congruency by Term in Office (without repeat statements)

Variable	Model			
	First Term (CHS Specification)		Second Term (CHS Specification)	
	1 st Half	2 nd Half	1 st Half	2 nd Half
2 nd Half	-3.20 (2.63)	.980 (2.72)	-7.78 * (4.39)	-8.40 * (4.45)
Above Average	-.160 (.224)	-.205 (.306)	2.17 (.310)	-.005 (.606)
Below Average	.448 ** (.249)	.096 (.203)	.056 (.548)	.841 (.695)
Public Concern	-.003 (.056)	.000 (.056)	-.076 (.189)	-.092 (.194)
Television	-8.13 *** (2.83)	-8.13 *** (2.84)	-1.67 (6.63)	-2.83 (6.46)
Press Conference	-1.75 (2.03)	-1.97 (2.05)	-5.46 * (3.21)	-5.33 * (3.19)
“Broad” Audience	1.01 (2.28)	.736 (2.29)	-.075 (3.25)	.266 (3.18)
Oral Delivery	1.14 (2.81)	1.43 (2.80)	4.15 (4.08)	3.89 (4.03)
Presidents	See Appendix A, Table 8			
Issue Topics	See Appendix A, Table 9			
Constant	62.15 ***	59.57 ***	63.92 ***	62.62 ***
Degrees of Freedom	404	404	162	162
Adjusted R ²	.089	.083	.213	.218

NOTE: Dependent variable: percent of opinion favoring policy recorded before presidential speech (a continuous measure). The figures are rounded off. *** indicates statistical significance at $p > .01$. ** indicates statistical significance at $p > .05$. * indicates statistical significance at $p > .10$. “Broad” statements were coded positively if the intended audience for the communication was the entire nation, such as if the president spoke at a national event (like the Business Roundtable or the National Council of Mayors), was campaigning, sent letters to members of Congress, during swearing in of appointees or announcement of executive orders. If the event was on television, either live or not live, it was coded positively for this category. If press officials who were able to ask any questions attended the event, the event was coded as a “press conference.”

Appendix A TABLE 8
Model Specifications and Individual Presidential Congruency (without repeat statements)
(continued from Appendix A TABLE 7)

Variable	Model			
	First Term (CHS Specification)		Second Term (CHS Specification)	
	1 st Half	2 nd Half	1 st Half	2 nd Half
Eisenhower	-.858 (4.22)	.358 (4.88)	4.80 (15.8)	7.64 (11.63)
Kennedy	-1.23 (5.08)	-1.74 (5.06)	—	—
Johnson	-.964 (4.44)	-1.40 (4.07)	-16.66 (14.1)	-16.13 (13.5)
Nixon	-2.40 (3.61)	-2.33 (3.95)	-11.14 (14.0)	-9.16 (12.8)
Ford	-7.81 ** (3.67)	-9.70 *** (3.69)	—	—
Reagan	-5.14 * (2.99)	-6.15 ** (3.27)	-9.73 (16.1)	-5.57 (11.7)
Bush	-2.55 (3.24)	-2.01 (3.27)	—	—
Clinton	-5.63 ** (3.07)	-6.42 ** (3.21)	-2.39 (16.5)	-.747 (12.1)

NOTE: Carter is the omitted president. Johnson's first fully elected term (beginning in 1965) is treated here as his "second term." The figures are rounded off. *** indicates statistical significance at $p > .01$. ** indicates statistical significance at $p > .05$. * indicates statistical significance at $p > .10$.

Appendix A TABLE 9
Model Specifications and Presidential Congruency (without repeat statements)
(continued from Appendix A TABLE 7)

Variable	Model			
	First Term (CHS Specification)		Second Term (CHS Specification)	
	1 st Half	2 nd Half	1 st Half	2 nd Half
Civil Rights	17.02 ** (8.67)	17.60 ** (8.68)	-10.45 (15.80)	-11.17 (15.7)
Crime	15.35 *** (3.95)	15.36 *** (3.97)	21.26 *** (7.12)	21.37 *** (7.10)
Defense	-3.82 (4.83)	-3.47 (4.85)	-6.29 (4.71)	-6.50 (4.61)
Education	8.76 ** (4.19)	8.91 ** (4.21)	8.83 * (4.94)	9.19 * (4.91)
Transportation	.159 (11.8)	1.63 (11.8)	No cases	No cases
Health Care	.632 (3.71)	-.014 (3.71)	9.16 * (5.49)	9.82 * (5.45)
Social Security	33.64 ** (16.4)	33.68 ** (16.5)	11.47 (9.44)	12.87 (9.39)
Taxes	3.78 (3.37)	3.54 (3.39)	-9.10 ** (4.57)	-9.63 ** (4.56)
Budget	1.02 (3.32)	1.07 (3.33)	-.761 (3.66)	-.102 (3.68)
Campaign Reform	22.13 *** (6.99)	22.32 *** (7.01)	-6.77 (9.24)	-6.17 (9.23)

NOTE: The issues are not exhaustive, so no issue was left out. The figures are rounded off. *** indicates statistical significance at $p > .01$. ** indicates statistical significance at $p > .05$. * indicates statistical significance at $p > .10$. Foreign Aid, Parks and Space were removed due to complete correlation with selected cases. Welfare was excluded due to multicollinearity.